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________________________________________________________________________________ 
This thesis examines how complexity thinking is understood and how it relates to two other 
administrative science‟s key concepts – efficiency and uncertainty. At the same time, thesis was 
discerning towards an alternative interpretive framework based on philosophical hermeneutics and 
general complexity. The aim of this study was not to deny, demystify, or impose clearer 
dichotomous (categorization) thinking; it was to contemplate new ways complexity thinking claims 
to be producing an understanding.  
 
The main objective of this thesis was to elucidate different presuppositions in the philosophy of 
science; how they affect, for instance, what we can depict in the first place, and how this relates 
towards what is truth and what is knowledge. Thesis challenges some of the taken for granted 
stands and conceptualizations in regard to the three concepts – complexity, uncertainty, and 
efficiency; concepts that forge administrative science‟s reality. How they together, separately, and 
in relation to elsewhere constrain what can be e.g. said, seen, or thought. Hence, analyses 
enunciated meanings and contexts that provide, for instance, novel interpretations. Furthermore, 
thesis examined these questions in relation to complex adaptive systems approach – how it depicts 
reality. Moreover, thesis showed how certain constraining understandings are evident inside it. 
 
The end contribution and conclusion was an interpretation; an interpretation that illustrated 
complexity and the other two concepts in regard to the first one – inside an alternative interpretative 
framework. Interpretative framework depicted some exemplifying principles derived from Edgar 
Morin‟s general complexity and Hans-Georg Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics. Thesis 
showed how we can use them in order to position ourselves in a more „complementary‟, a less 
mutilating way, in conjunction with other understandings. 
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________________________________________________________________________________ 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli tarkastella kompleksisuusajattelun luomaa ymmärrystä ja sen 
sijoittumista suhteessa kahteen muuhun hallintotieteen keskeiseen käsitteeseen – tehokkuuteen ja 
epävarmuuteen. Tutkimus avasi käsitteiden historiaa, vaikutteita sekä rakentumista hahmottaen 
samalla kohti vaihtoehtoista tulkintakehystä. Tutkimus ei pyri kieltämään, paljastamaan tai jollain 
tapaa asemoimaan selvempiä kahtiajakoja eri tieteellisten lähestymistapojen välillä, vaan kuinka 
ymmärrystä luodaan.  
 
Päätavoitteena tutkimuksella oli avata erilaisia tieteenfilosofiaan pohjautua ennakkokäsityksiä, jotka 
vaikuttavat tutkimusten mahdollisiin tulkintoihin. Koskien muun muassa mitä voimme ilmentää 
alunalkaenkaan sekä kuinka tämä heijastaa sitä, miten sijoittaudumme suhteessa tietoon ja 
totuuteen. Tutkimus haastaa osittain itsestäänselvyyksinä pidettyjä käsityksiä ja käsitteellistämisiä 
suhteessa kolmeen tarkastelun kohteena olevan käsitteeseen: kompleksisuuteen, epävarmuuteen ja 
tehokkuuteen. Nämä konseptit ja niiden luomat käsitykset vaikuttavat keskeisesti hallintotieteellisen 
todellisuuden muodostumiseen, mitä voidaan sanoa, nähdä tai ylipäätään edes ajatella. Analyysi toi 
esiin merkityksiä sekä konteksteja, jotka mahdollistavat lisäksi uudenlaisten tulkintojen syntymisen 
ja tarkastelun. Tämän lisäksi tutkimus tarkasteli tässä kappaleessa muotoiltuja käsityksiä suhteessa 
kompleksisiin adaptiivisiin systeemeihin ja kuinka CAS:sin käsitys kuvaa ja rajoittaa todellisuutta. 
 
Tutkimuksen tuoma lisäarvo lepää edellä mainitun lisäksi myös loppupäätelmissä. Loppupäätelmät 
ovat tulkinta, joka muodostuu luodun ja kuvatun tulkintakehyksen sisällä tarkasteltaessa 
kompleksisuutta sekä toisaalta tehokkuutta ja epävarmuutta suhteessa kompleksisuuteen. Tämän 
ohella luotu tulkintakehys esitti useita havainnollistavia periaatteita, jotka johdettiin Edgar Morinin 
yleisestä kompleksisuusteoriasta ja Hans-Georg Gadamerin filosofisesta hermeneutiikasta. Näiden 
eri osien avulla tutkimus kuvasi, kuinka pystymme sijoittamaan itsemme vastavuoroisella tavalla, 
joka on vähemmän vääristymiä luova osana muiden tulkintojen luomaa ymmärrystä. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed 
ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for 
us to speak. Only other human beings can do that. (Rorty, 1989: 6).
1
 
 
We live in a time that is characterized as being hectic; a time that is immersed in constant change 
where problems have only become ever more complicated. As the time passes this has only been 
estimated to reach invariably more prevalent forms; defining the working environment for those 
trying to solve problems. (Prime Minister‟s Office Finland, 2014.) This is not just concerning the 
ageless questions or the big problems; it will impinge itself not just on governments but on local 
decision makers; it will affect public sector as well as the private and the third sector; not just 
managers but ground level workers as well (e.g. Ministry of the Interior, 2006, 2010b, 2014). 
Hence, it demands solutions that can combat these problems and questions posed by it. One of the 
research areas to step up to these tasks are complexity related theories that offer us novel ways to 
conceive change, boundaries, development, environment, innovation, interaction, and knowledge – 
among other things (see e.g. Andriani, 2011; Boisot, 2011; Cilliers, 1998; Morin, 2008; Stacey, 
2010). It will offer us new ways to find certainty, efficiency, and scientific knowledge amidst these 
uncertainties, inefficiencies, and relativistic options that appear to smother us; options that seem to 
deprive us of our ability to base our decisions on a discernable level of clarity and certainty (see e.g. 
Gell-Mann, 1994; Morçöl, 2012). But is this complex operational environment, words used to 
describe it by the Finnish Government (Ministry of the Interior, 2010a), merely a new thing, a state 
of reality we have slowly reached, or just a new way of conceptualizing the problem?  
 
The aim of science is to be a systematic procedure acquiring and raising new knowledge within the 
limits set by the scientific community; it produces truths or at least truths that are more “truthful” 
than the previous ones (Niiniluoto, 1984b).
23
 On the other hand, when a manager, a decision maker, 
or a society calls scientific community to help with a problem, then, he is asking – if not ways to 
                                                          
1
 Citation represents Rorty’s view on truth that was based on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche; even though the world 
is out there, the depictions of the world are not. For the purpose of this thesis it is noteworthy to say that even though 
Rorty perceived hermeneutic task as an up keeper of conversation, in which the task of conversation is relativistic, for 
Gadamer it represented a quest for knowledge. 
2
 Each scientific community has “a stake in defending their quasi-monopoly over knowledge claims” (Maguire, 2011: 
87). 
3
 In this paragraph I will enunciate the problem in a rather straight forward way. Consider these relations again after 
you have read the thesis. 
2 
 
solve it – ways to understand the problem; not to bring uncertainty and more complications into the 
mix, unless it helps as a stepping stone on the ultimate mission of seeing, solving, or understanding 
the problem.
4
 Whenever a company manager or a political decision maker executes a decision he 
has to have if not the only truth, then, an aspect of clarity and certainty
5
 he can impose on the 
decision in order to answer why it needed to be done – to not appear inconsistent or arbitrary. After 
all, what use is a philosophical contemplation – what can you really know – for a decision maker 
who has to make some kind of decision anyway? We aim for solutions (what we perceive as 
knowledge and truth) or at least means towards it. The way knowledge and truth are perceived also 
shapes the expectations imposed on certain scientific faculties – what kind of knowledge they are 
expected to produce, in other words, what is seen helpful in a set of scientific disciplines (see e.g. 
Kuhn, 1970; Macintyre, 1999). 
 
When we examine researchers using complexity theory in administrative science, the way they 
produce knowledge concerning complexity, it is in considerable amounts done by using complex 
adaptive systems theory (CAS). CAS is a line of thinking ascribed in restricted complexity (Morin, 
2007, 2008; see also Thietart & Forgues, 2011: 53–54, 56) that has its historical line of thinking in 
positivism. A line of thinking where researchers create and compose the rules of conception how 
complexity is understood; among other problems, it does not force us to consider ethical issues in 
our way of producing science in its own uncertainty – the level of closure complexity claims to be 
producing (Alhadeff-Jones, 2008: 71–73; Morin, 2008; compare Popper: truth and certainty). What 
CAS claims to be offering is order amidst complexity,
6
 but what kinds of order of social reality can 
we really offer? The way CAS can be capitalized e.g. as a method, a tool, or an application of 
course varies greatly – as well as its conceptualization does; furthermore, as does complexity theory 
in itself. This wide variety inside of complexity theory is due to the way its interpretations are 
differing – what is complexity exactly – as well as its heavy linkage with its historical development 
in biology, engineering, management, physics, et cetera (Alhadeff-Jones, 2008: 74); and further, the 
meld between these approaches. 
 
This thesis contemplates different ways we are approaching complexity theory in administrative 
science in relation to two questions, which are also two key historical administrative concepts – 
                                                          
4
 See conversation concerning the rise of practicality problem in science; where political pressure has led scientific 
results to be increasingly bundled up with their practical usage. 
5
 Since in most cases they are accountable to someone for their actions (people, stock holders, investors, et cetera). 
6
 See Santa Fe Institute’s (http://www.santafe.edu/) home site banner and mission statement: “Searching for Order in 
the Complexity of Evolving Worlds”. 
3 
 
efficiency and uncertainty. In relation to which they seem to be now interrelated with complexity 
and offering solutions on the ways of resolving these related questions/ problems. In other words, 
the way they are conceptualized and applied for in their usage. These different premises, grounded 
in the philosophy of science, guide researchers in the ways they perceive knowledge and obtaining 
knowledge possible, as well as their relation to practice (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 
131). The way we conceptualize complexity, as well as certainty and efficiency, affects what we 
perceive to be the „truth‟, the kind of knowledge that will help us towards this truth, and what kind 
of knowledge, and hence the truth, is „useful‟ in our quest for better problem solving, decisions, and 
eventually construction of reality. In order for us to understand this process we need to examine not 
just the way our conceptualization is build but the way these concepts are build. Presuppositions 
built inside these concepts and how these presuppositions affect what we perceive complexity, 
efficiency, or uncertainty to be; and, furthermore, what this means when we build knowledge that 
effects our reality. This thesis will contemplate questions related to the philosophy of science, in the 
administrative science context, showing the current way of conceptualization related to these three 
concepts while holding complexity as the main viewing angle. Moreover, at the end of this thesis I 
will describe an alternative interpretative framework how to understand complexity and display 
how it would affect interpretation related to complexity, in addition to the other two concepts of 
efficiency and uncertainty – providing the contemplation to the research question. 
 
1.1. Research background, question, and contribution 
 
Studies on organization and management made their appearance at a moment in history 
when the natural sciences were not only well established; they were veritably basking in 
the string of spectacular experimental and theoretical discoveries that marked the first 
decade of the twentieth century (Juarrero, 2011: 155). 
 
Administrative science
7
 is a study of organizations, management, governance, and public policy 
(Stenvall et al., 2015: 47–51); grounded in a long-term conversation whether it is a science, an art, a 
                                                          
7
 There are numerous different terms that are used to describe what Stenvall, Johanson, Pekkola & af Ursin (2015) are 
referring to as administrative science. Terms such as public administration, administrative, management, or 
organization theory are often used interrelated and “loosely” in literature, although in fairness they can be given 
distinguishable characteristics. Furthermore, their usage sometimes differs in different countries. For this thesis it is 
not a purposeful aim to try to unify them or discuss their differences, which would mean a constant need to explain 
every time it is used in that particular literature in a diverging way; rather I will use the term the way it is used in that 
particular literature I am referring to. And at the start and in the end I will use the term administrative science as it is 
the term used by the faculty I am studying in; making it also more distinguishable for the reader. 
4 
 
craft, or a profession
8
 (Salminen, 2011: 309, question first posed by Waldo). Main interests for 
administrative research are effects that influence and shape action. In addition, how different 
policies can coexist and further how they affect different dynamics and interactions. (Stenvall et al., 
2015: 49.) Some lines of thinking are committed to a more positivist ways of doing scientific 
research (Virtanen, 2011: 324–325); and further as others (Barrett, Powley & Pearce 2011: 193) 
note as well, in organizational studies research is still mostly committed to “a logical positivist view 
of knowledge”;9 trying to discuss the problem while distancing them from the object of the 
research. Seeking a way we can produce the last word or to find the “true reality behind the 
appearance” (Morin, 2007: 6). For instance, in sensemaking Weick holds on to an objective “real 
world apart from interpretation” (Barrett et al., 2011: 209). This research stands on the lines set out, 
among others – I do not mean invented – by Deleuze and Guattari (1994) and further reaffirmed, for 
instance, by Barrett et al. (2011: 194) that facts are a “competitive enterprise”. An approach where 
value, such as efficiency, cannot be regarded as a value in itself, in other words, holding something 
worth of having intrinsically but as a (social) „construct‟10, which is an interpretation11, created 
through time.
12
 By an interpretation I am not just referring to its current understanding but to the 
source of the concept as a dialogue, how it has developed through time and its position in relation to 
others.  
 
In this thesis I will examine and problematize background assumptions of complexity theory and 
complexity theory‟s relation to two „key‟ concepts of administrative science that are efficiency and 
uncertainty. The research question is: what is the meaning we attach to general complexity by 
addressing it as a character of efficiency. This question will reveal itself in a twofold way. Firstly, 
                                                          
8
 For instance, McIntyre, in his diagnosis of modernity, criticized public administration on the base of its development 
and aims, in other words, in its aspiration for scientific base; that was assumed in order to avoid going to be regarded 
merely as a social science in its aims at the betterment of governments. These ‘sides’ of betterments, i.e. where those 
seen as real betterments come from, are seen as those stemming from positivism (see e.g. MacIntyre, 1999; Overeem 
& Tholen, 2011; compare in Finnish administrative science history Ahonen 2011; Vartola, 2011). 
9
 Logical positivism is strand mostly associated with the Vienna Circle (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 134); it has 
certain nuances, but for the purpose of this thesis it is regarded in the same way contradictory as positivism is. 
10
 At this point it is adequate to mention that I will adopt the view of Gadamer (2013) in relation to social 
constructionism in this thesis, where knowledge is a dialog. In general, included in the theoretical grounds of ‘social 
constructivism’ are an extremely heterogeneous group of scholars that approach the subject in various, often 
conflicting, ways (see e.g. Hacking, 1999). 
11
 Definition of interpretation will be provided in 1.4. 
12
 Time should not be regarded as a unified story, some line, or a path. “Time is no longer primarily a gulf to be 
bridged because it separates; it is actually the supportive ground of the course of events in which the present is 
rooted. Hence temporal distance is not something that must be overcome. This was, rather, the naive assumption of 
historicism, namely that we must transpose ourselves into the spirit of the age, think with its ideas and its thoughts, 
not with our own, and thus advance toward historical objectivity.” (Gadamer, 2013: 297). In positivism the aim is 
ahistoric that, in most simplified views, reduces time into a mathematic quantity (Turunen, 1995: 135–138). 
5 
 
the object of the study is to bring into the foreground, through problematization, assumptions 
grounded in positivism and the philosophy of science. Furthermore, presuppositions of what is seen 
as useful are estimated from this perspective. As Peter Winch (1990: 3) argued, “any worthwhile 
study of society must be philosophical in nature”. After all, in the context of social science (not to 
say only) every researcher makes ontological and epistemological commitments
13
, the question is 
merely are they explicit or implicit (Blaikie, 2004: 768). Thesis contribution will be examining 
these stances through complexity related writings:
14
 how they define and perceive complexity as a 
problem and what are the solutions to this problem that is posed by complexity. And, in addition, 
what line of thinking, in the philosophy of science, they are situated in and what kind of 
interpretation framework they are portraying (see Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 131–132). To 
further illustrate the point, the concept of complexity will be accompanied with shorter 
examinations of the two other concepts – efficiency and uncertainty – from which the latter is a 
shorter „integrative‟ concept between the other two. On the other hand, in the contemplation 
concerning efficiency an alternative build in meaning of efficiency is shown, in which efficiency is 
seen in an Aristotelian sense of a moving force. The second aim of the study is to portray an 
alternative interpretative framework – it is going to provide the contemplation to the research 
question, towards which all these earlier parts build for – that I will examine in a context of general 
complexity, complexity related base will be gone through in the first part. It answers to a 
contemplation what it would mean for interpreting complexity this alternative way, how this 
different kind of interpretative framework would portray it; furthermore, in relation to efficiency 
and uncertainty inside this alternative interpretative framework. But because administrative science 
research is foremost interested in public policies and the effects of policy programs (Stenvall et al., 
2015: 49), in this last part I will accompany these contemplations, in regard to complexity, into a 
related conversation that includes a comparison how it, the concept, is used in one of the Ministry‟s 
                                                          
13
 In philosophy, ontology is a branch that is concerned with the nature of what exists, theory of beings about what 
makes up reality (Blaikie, 2004a: 768), on the other hand, epistemology is concerned how humans accumulate 
knowledge of the world around them, what kind of knowledge is possible, and on what grounds it is adequate and 
legitimate (Blaikie, 2004b: 310–311); methodology refers to the ways it can be applied. Due to their interrelated 
nature discussing epistemology and ontology separately is tasking; as an answer to a question: what constitutes social 
phenomena, then, has direct results how we can acquire knowledge about the phenomena (Blaikie, 2004a: 768), 
henceforth, the necessity why we need to consider the philosophy of science – the presuppositions. Furthermore, 
understanding of what concepts ‘are’ is fundamentally related to this argument (see e.g. Margolis & Laurence, 2014; 
will be further elaborated in 1.3.) 
14
 Murray Gell-Mann (1994), John Holland and John Miller (1991); Niklas Luhmann (1990, 2006); will be explained in 
further details later on (2.2.1.). 
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contemporary public policy contexts and what this alternative interpretative framework would 
correlate in that case.
1516
 
 
In general, going through these different stances, grounded in the philosophy of science, in 
administrative research is not a new thing (see e.g. Virtanen, 2011; Salminen, 2011). However, 
doing it in the context of complexity is not common (for exceptions see e.g. Cilliers, 1998, 2011; 
Stacey, 2010) and even less so in a Finnish context
17
. Even in complexity related theories outside of 
administrative science this line of inquiry has only started to pick up the space during the last few 
years; it has lead, among other things, towards a conversation where the dichotomy of general 
versus reductionist way of perceiving complexity has become a tentative conversation.
18
 In this line 
of inquiry the aim is not to go through or analyze the effects, efficiency, or effectiveness of some 
policies; or evaluate the outcome of the usage of these three concepts; or to form and compare it in 
some quantitative way. It is to analyze different meanings attached to them, which are often hard to 
see due to researcher‟s closeness to them as they have shaped, and are presently shaping, the way 
researcher‟s current understanding of them has been formed (compare e.g. Bloch, 1992: historian‟s 
two pitfalls), which is why a research should choose certain focal points as different angles from 
                                                          
15
 I acknowledge that this kind of an angle of an approach is not the most reader friendly, as the reader’s process of 
compiling and discerning the ‘meat on the bones’ is a toilsome task. It is a task where none of the paragraphs or 
chapters in themselves provides an answer; as them together do not provide it either per se. In addition, the line of 
argumentation is perhaps not the most ‘preferred’ one either, which accentuates the matter (see footnote 29). 
Perhaps the best advice I can offer for the reader is a sentence, which he/ she can reflect constantly on his/ her way 
forward, and that explains my intentions: my aim is to ponder and explicate the conditions for the possibility of 
understanding as such; how this transforms towards our current understanding. Hence, there are a lot of concepts and 
understandings we will touch upon and impinge ourselves into their understanding; concepts such as information or 
truth. But they are not the object of the study; they are ‘byproducts’ that should be viewed in relation to the sentence 
I just offered as an advice. How they relate to each other and what is the result of this. Henceforth, perhaps one could 
claim that my aim is to contemplate the way understanding is provided, presuppositions evident inside it, and the 
produced ‘incoherence(s)’ because of these; where my approach can be perceived to be bringing multifaceted 
viewpoints, acting as points of view for examining the problem illustrated before. 
16
 As I once again acknowledge the difficulty for this kind of a thesis from reader’s perspective, hence, in an attempt to 
provide more clarity towards my understanding, l will try to reflect myself and my reasoning – ‘the guiding 
understanding or principles’ – why I am doing this thesis. There are various alternating understandings concerning the 
way we produce understanding, and hence knowledge, in itself. The way we understand these different positions 
effects, for instance, how we can understand or solve problems in the first place. I perceive them evident in the way 
we have produced an understanding concerning different concepts, conceptualizations and problems. It effects how 
we can approach, solve, or understand the problem in the first place (in the case of this thesis, in complexity, 
efficiency, and uncertainty). Yet, as it is so often, we do not recognize these tensions radiating because of them, in 
other words, that are evident inside them. Henceforth, the way we approach it or any aspects of it, or rather of the 
reasons behind our inability to solve them, is caused by our inability to recognize these constructing ‘elements’ ‘it’ 
has, it’s ‘elements’ have, or that are build inside our own argumentation – how the interpretation has been 
constructed. It is not to say there is only one interpretation, a better interpretation, or an interpretation that we 
should have. 
17
 In the Finnish context any use of the complexity related theories is still extremely young in age, for instance, one of 
the first dissertations, in the context of public policy, was published in 2007 (see Jalonen, 2007). 
18
 See, for example, conversation around the work of Edgar Morin. 
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which he then examines the object of the study and their meanings (Fay & Moon, 1977: 222–227; 
see also Morin, 2008: 49–52, 54–57, meta-points of views); furthermore, it will demarcate the 
research and show the context of the study. Related to this is one of the key aims of qualitative 
research: to bring into to the foreground those unspoken presuppositions (Thorpe & Holt, 2008: 5–
7, 107). For administrative science this means, due to the fact that by its nature administrative 
research is a multidisciplinary study (see e.g. Stenvall et al., 2015: 49), that it is sometimes hard to 
trace, or rather form, some kind of unified historical conceptual representation as it will coercively 
involve demarcation. None the less, some kind of demarcation has to be made. As Max Weber 
(1994) would proclaim, research is always merely interested in a partial significant picture of an 
immensely complicated phenomenon. Henceforth, my interpretation is not the only one with some 
necessarily better elements; rather it is an interpretation ascending from the chosen concepts and the 
context I have chosen to compare it with; as context in itself can already be a research outcome in 
social science related fields of study (see e.g. Palonen, 1998). 
 
Trying to problematize something that is deemed as the way to do is a problematization that 
“involves first and foremost a systematic questioning of some aspects of received wisdom in the 
sense of dominant research perspectives and theories”, for instance, interpretation related theory is 
seen as a problematization friendly way (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011: 45). Although it could be 
stated that every scientific research involves some form of problematization my understanding is 
closer to Foucault‟s one. According to Foucault (1985: 9), conceptualization of problematization is 
an “endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of 
what is already known”. Rather than offering demystification19 I will offer the reader a „journey‟ for 
an interpretation that ultimately leads into a dialogue what this different line of thinking would 
mean. This does not correlate into a view that I would see problematization and criticality as an end 
in itself; a trivial quest that would have no purpose outside of philosophical pondering.
2021
 Instead, I 
                                                          
19
 A term Ricoeur uses for the hermeneutic line of interpretation advocated by Nietzsche, Marx, Foucault, et cetera. 
This mystification is a result from our own stories that create causality and intention as a byproduct in order for us to 
have constancy and identity. (Barrett et al., 2011: 190–192.) “The paradox of emplotment is that it inverts the effect 
of contingency … by incorporating it in some way into the effect of necessity or probability exerted by the configuring 
act … that only becomes integral part of the story when understood after the fact” (Ricoeur, 1992: 142 cf. Barrett et 
al., 2011: 191). Hence, to keep also in mind when we are talking about problematization, it should not be regarded in 
a strict sense of denying. 
20
 Compare to introduction’s second paragraph.  
21
 Political decision makers, or the work life for that matter, can rarely rely on having unified scientific knowledge; at 
least on any knowledge concerning administrative, economic, or social sciences for their decision making processes 
(Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti, 2006: 9). Henceforth, ability to distinguish between different kinds of knowledge, the 
way it is produced and the way it reflects on reality is crucial. Decision makers need an ability to distinguish between 
these diverging views (Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti, 2006: 10–11; think about e.g. Sipilä’s (A-Studio 2.12.2015) view 
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see it as a mean to identify and challenge assumptions underlying existing concepts, 
conceptualization and scientific theories; as a result, being able to create more informed and novel 
research (see e.g. Shenhav & Weitz, 2000: 393; compare Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 
161–177).22 After all, would any of these concepts or their related theories bear a claim of providing 
some kind of impeccable „truth‟ in its current understanding? Would someone claim that there are 
no defects with the current way we approach and deal with efficiency or uncertainty? Would 
someone claim there is nothing beyond our grasp related to complexity – making us able to say 
without uncertainty that the road we are on concerning complexity is an immaculate one? 
Henceforth, my aim of positioning alongside these different contexts and interpretations attached to 
them enables „fruitful‟ examination, and will further lead into seeing new angles, and new 
possibilities, to create more informed and novel research. 
 
1.2. Concepts and contexts 
 
The conjunction between science and concept is crucial; one of the primary principles emphasized 
for students that are making their thesis is the exact definition of the concepts they are using (Virta, 
2011: 114). This understanding originates from the ancient Greek where Socrates had discovered its 
bearings and Plato acknowledged the discovery of concept as “one of the great tools of scientific 
knowledge” (als Beruf, 1922: 9). Resulting in a statement: “and from this it seemed to follow 
that if one only found the right concept of the beautiful, the good, or, for instance, of 
bravery, of the soul ‐‐ or whatever ‐‐ that then one could also grasp its true being” (als Beruf, 
1922: 10). And even though in Greece science was to advance politics, acting as a citizen of the 
state, one can see the purpose of concept, moreover, the reason in the background why their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
on the problem of having on every turn all kind of different adjunct professor opinions). There are no final winners in 
scientific knowledge only temporary victories (Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti, 2006: 70). 
22
 Another reason, why we need to consider the way we produce science is because scientific research is always about 
argumentation and argumentation in this context is inevitably competition. Competition situations are inevitably 
social situations; they define how one competes and on what grounds; defining who ultimately wins. Hence, these 
social conditions are crucial for researcher’s success. (Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti, 2006: 13–14.) By attaching 
funding mechanisms, decision making and cultural acceptance into certain ways of producing knowledge and reality, 
then, we do not merely steer research; on a long run we predetermine what is seen as useful in science. Competition 
about science transforms into competition about succeeding in evaluations, measurements and in comparisons 
(Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti, 2006: 71; think about Olli Rehn’s, 2016 speech that we need to find new 
measurements in university funding – how to evaluate effectiveness. It leaves ways how it is done to the universities, 
but with delimitation how they can already in the start produce knowledge concerning this). Of course this already 
ignores the conceptual metaphorical delimitation it builds in itself by deducting interaction to competition. 
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importance is emphasized so much. In other words, semantic units [concepts] are the things we use 
to construct the world (Nietzsche, 1990). They are building blocks used to pave a way.
23
 
 
It appears that I have chosen three concepts that are part of an endless debate; debate taking place 
inside these particular concepts, between the concepts, as well as in their relation to other concepts, 
not to mention between different paradigms; hence, each of them can be described as being 
bottomless pits of meaning. As explained earlier, and even though my explanation of complexity 
will be a much more extensive one, my aim in each of these concepts is to only go through a certain 
kind interpretation, not to provide an all-encompassing explanation. Furthermore, before we even 
get to contemplate these concepts, we have to answer another problematic question: are they terms, 
definitions, or concepts?
24
 Their common usage aside, even in research concept is used in a 
neglectful way or at least understood to have a diverging meanings, for instance, between various 
philosophers. In addition, each concept comes from a diversified field of related questions that are 
sometimes if not contradictory then not usually discussed in a same study
25
. Hence, it creates an 
importance on the way the researcher can „control‟, explain, and limit the examination in each of 
these concepts.
26
 As Max Weber (1994) would proclaim, research is always merely interested in a 
partial significant picture of an immensely complicated phenomenon. Most of the other concepts 
related to this thesis, other than administrative science, i.e. complexity, certainty, or efficiency are 
often times as well applied without a more precise definition; in addition to the previous list we can 
adjoin change, interpretation, improvement, public policy, truth, or governance. This kind of 
                                                          
23
 Compare to Rorty’s citation at the start of this thesis. 
24
 When the object of the study is ambiguous, first we have to define what we mean by an interpretation. 
Interpretation is a question of what x means and what is the meaning of x. In this case research has an object that has 
a meaning, which we aim to elicit; this elicitation is the interpretation (Niiniluoto, 1984: 155–158, 163–170). These 
interpretations manifest themselves as concepts, terms, definitions, and as a change in them (Meklin, 2009: 32). 
“Concepts are the constituents of thoughts” (Margolis & Laurence, 2014); in philosophy and logic concept is 
considered to be “the product of the faculty of conception; an idea of a class of objects, a general notion or idea (OED: 
Concept). Referring to something in the surrounding reality called the object. In other words, it is composed from the 
term and its definition. (Tieteen termipankki: käsite.) One form of concepts is abstracts, which in social science 
represents any idea, but as Kuhn (1970: 111–136) notes, there are no pure observations; they are all filtered through 
an unconscious or conscious theoretical lenses. What one has to realize in relation to complexity, is that “the task of 
philosophy, when it creates concepts and entities, is always to extract an event from things and beings” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 33). Hence, the more complicated the problem in society is that we are talking about, the harder it 
becomes extracting it; or rather we should understand it can never truly be ‘extracted’ as a whole, to portray a truth, 
henceforth, it is always rather an interpretation. When I use complexity, efficiency, or uncertainty I will refer to them 
as concepts, but if the author I am discussing uses, for instance, the word term, then, I will use it in that particular way 
for the reasons indicated before. 
25
 For instance, think about the three concepts and their opposites; one can find commonalities, for instance, 
uncertainty in chaos theory can create efficiency, but especially one finds bipolarity. 
26
 The further we can clarify different meanings inside a concept, or the contextualizing towards organization, the 
better we can evaluate our actions strengths and weaknesses in a multifaceted ways and use it to develop our action 
(Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 168). 
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„skittish‟ usage is typical for organization and management related vague, or magical, concepts (see 
Pollitt & Hupe, 2011); especially this comes more apparent when we come closer to those used by 
consulting, where holding the truth behind the concept is means of doing business (see Ernst & 
Kieser, 2000: 6); in addition, this can be caused by their closeness to spoken language and their 
loose and shallow usage by researchers‟ (Hirsijärvi et al., 2009: 304–307), or a mix with colloquial 
speech (Niiniluoto, 1984: 167–170). 
 
Why do we need to study the etymology or the historical meaning of a concept; it is one of the 
inevitable questions concerning the foundation of this thesis. As Shenhav and Weitz (2000: 394) 
note, the roots of many key concepts in organization theory are inadequately known. For instance, 
Shenhav and Weitz (2000: 376) conducted an analysis of the Administrative Science Quarterly 
during the period of 1985-95 and concluded that 16 percent of the articles dealt explicitly with 
uncertainty. Furthermore, the toilsome task of examining any of these key concepts in itself means 
that their interplays are sometimes meagerly studied. For example, in relation to this thesis, Allen, 
Maguire and McKelvey (2011: 21) remark, a common problem in the management literature is that 
the relationships between uncertainty and complexity are sparsely studied. This can be further 
elaborated by seemingly discernable conversation concerning some of the explanatory concepts that 
are related to the concept of uncertainty, in other words, where assessing critically meta-concepts 
that have spun in relations to it
27
. Due to administrative science‟s relatively young age and 
multidisciplinary nature (see 1.1.), it occasionally lacks research concentrating on elaborating the 
historical groundings of these concepts; especially when one considers the habit how problems are 
resolved, by replacing an old concept with a new one that in some cases holds or transforms some 
of old the meaning to the new one;
28
 not to mention organizational habits of clinging on to the old 
understandings in the framework of the new one. Furthermore, our public policies are often times 
related to the ways concepts, such as efficiency, are used to solve perceived problems. In other 
words, understanding that some concepts intrinsically include what we need to solve some problem, 
like a missing bolt, which we now just screw in, then, will finally get the car running again that we 
can carry on into the right direction.
29
 
                                                          
27
 Concepts that aim to, for instance, resolve problematic aspects dealing with issues arising from uncertainty such as 
resistance; e.g. they are critically researched in a much more elaborate way in the fields of political science (In relation 
to resistance see e.g. Chandler, 2014a, 2014b). 
28
 E.g. how action is enabled or restricted by the terms we use (Barrett et al., 2011: 195–196) or how we perceive 
knowledge gaps to be replaced, i.e. if we see them as a result by the lack of information or by the very nature how we 
understand (Tsoukas & Chia, 2011: 5–6). 
29
 In addition, these lines could be complemented by, for instance, how different lines of building argumentation, 
evident in present academic writing, have changed. As Mika Ojakangas (see Pörsti, 2015 in UP 3/ 2015) points out, 
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Already in 1947 Robert Dahl noted that public administration has lacked comparative research 
element, when, on the other hand, it has been an object of a substantial amount of interest in the 
political science (Baker, 1994). As Eglene and Dawes (2006) argue, one of the problems of this line 
of inquire is the nonequivalence of key concepts, in addition many of these key concepts used by 
the management originate from America. It is noteworthy to mention that certain key concepts 
already have diverging meanings inside „American‟ literature; as shown by Eglene and Dawes 
(2006: 608–609), in certain cases it already becomes distinguishable between United States and 
Quebec.
30
 After all, the use of the concept of efficiency inside the European Union publications 
compared to the national states ones already begs to ask the question of its conceptualization. 
Understanding differences will produce not just novel interpretations, potential pitfalls, or clearer 
instructions but transparency from governance side towards countries, municipalities and ultimately 
citizens. 
 
Whenever we are examining anything in relation to human reality understanding its context is 
essential, as human reality is essential saturated by different meanings; furthermore, also objects or 
facts do have a meaning in themselves
31
. Hence, we have to relate them to other facts that require 
interpretation, be sensitive to context, and towards other meanings. (Moilanen & Räihä, 2015: 52–
53.) There are multiple reasons why understanding meanings becomes difficult. There are meanings 
we know and meanings we are unconscious of, they also relate to individual, communal, and 
universal meanings. The point of interpreting meanings is to get some sense of the thing we are 
interpreting, but as a researcher the interpretive question always defines the kind of meanings we 
are looking for, in other words, by making certain presuppositions, knowingly and unknowingly, 
the researcher is already delimiting possible meanings; for this reason, making, or trying to make, 
these delimitations apparent is essential. And even though getting rid of these presuppositions is 
impossible, according to hermeneutics,
32
 it never the less initiates the interpretation process that can 
be altered further down the line. (Moilanen & Räihä, 2015: 53–58.) The problem of studying or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Anglo-American way of addressing argumentation (the point of the text can be easily summarized) has increasingly 
occupied/ smothered space from other ways, like the philosophical way of argumentation that was/ is present in 
France (the thought is gradually developed along with text towards somewhere, the point is not necessarily to reach 
some well-defined conclusions). 
30
 Even though this thesis is not concentrated on comparative research, I am using it to accentuate the need for 
historical elaboration and interpretation. 
31
 One main criticism of positivism is that it ignores the meaning of these different meanings (like concepts or anything 
else that science ‘produces’), hence, if we do not understand them we cannot interpret them (Turunen, 1995: 135). 
Concepts are not discursive, humans are (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). 
32
 In hermeneutic understanding (Gadamer) the interpretation is always incomplete. 
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researching meanings is that they are perishing, as Nietzsche (1990) and Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994) also state,
33
 and if we are to examine someone‟s conceptions we precisely need to 
understand the nature of these conceptions and how we can even get a hold of them! (Moilanen & 
Räihä, 2015: 59–60.) In other words, the context in itself does not create meaning but the 
interaction as a two-way process, a dialect in Gadamer‟s (2006) terms. 
 
In qualitative inquiry understanding the contextualism of interpretation, where contextualism refers 
to the nature of interpretation, is key. In hermeneutics, context bound interpretation is one of the 
only things that is common for the whole inquiry (see e.g. Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2014); meaning that 
the interpretation is always taking place in some background set of beliefs or practices (Schwandt, 
2007: 44), which Gadamer (2006) calls tradition. This will lead us to the next section in which I will 
explain what we mean by an interpretation as well as by the alternative interpretative framework I 
have promised to portray. 
 
1.3. The way of interpreting as well as thesis contribution to the philosophy of science 
 
The second aim of this thesis was to describe an alternative interpretative framework for complexity 
and what it would mean for interpreting the three concepts in the light of it and the first concept.
34
 
In research, framework is a frequently used term, shortly it means “an essential or underlying 
structure; a provisional design, an outline; a conceptual scheme or system” (OED: Framework, n.). 
In other words, those underlying assumptions, ideas, and truths defining specific theories that shape 
the way we produce knowledge, and how producing knowledge is even possible in the first place. 
The way researcher builds the framework allows the problematization and the way he 
problematizes, as discussed earlier; thus, it makes an alternative interpretation possible by seeing, 
for instance, different presuppositions. Henceforth, through this interpretative framework we can 
moreover form an alternative way of producing knowledge as well as compare it to the current one, 
                                                          
33
 Nietzsche presents it in a much more despair way. 
34
 The contribution of this thesis is to problematize the background philosophical suppositions that science and more 
particularly administrative sciences have concerning the subject of the study. One object, in any kind of critical 
studies, is to examine researchers own philosophical background views; by bringing to the front presuppositions 
concerning, for example, values, knowledge, and reality, then, we contribute to the objectivity of research; and, 
furthermore, we make the applications of research ‘easier’ in the long run; by examining these presuppositions 
theoretically we can eliminate and elucidate conflicts and contradictions. (Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti, 2006: 9–
11.) Criticality is also pointed towards the way of what is seen as scientific. 
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making novelty, conceiving pitfalls, debate, as well as differing understandings possible. (see 1.1.
35
; 
Kakkuri-Knuuttila, 2006: 131.)  
 
Inside a framework, in order to get the most „effective‟ results, research should be approached 
asking questions: what it is that we do not know, how can we find more about it, and how should 
we present those findings (Williams, 2012: 137). Even though these different stances, in the 
philosophy of science, are often seen as contradictory and perhaps I am as well bit avid in my ways 
of pointing them out, they none the less do not always differ as substantially in every way. For 
instance, we can find cohesion in their aims of general betterment. They both as well have certain 
complimentary virtues that can benefit each other, for instance, in the context of public policy 
where these different needs naturally intersect. Hence, interpretation is seeing different aims, gains, 
possibilities, and complementary ways instead of trying to claim one or a foremost advantage of 
one. 
 
Keeping the previous in mind, this study is located amongst the interpretative studies of 
administrative science. And for the sake of some kind of clarity I will regard it (interpretative 
approach) contradictory to positivist approach. This division into opposites is also used in the 
complexity related theories in organization and management research
3637
 (Maquire et al., 2006: 
Maquire et al., 2011); furthermore, it is also an allocation used in social science. For instance, 
Kakkuri-Knuuttila (2006: 54) positions interpretative research contradictory to positivist research.
38
 
                                                          
35
 By this reference I am referring to the effects of these stances in the philosophy of science. 
36
 Maquire et al. (2006) divide approaches to complexity between objectivist (those trying to give an external view) 
and interpretivist (interpreting meanings) approaches (see also next footnote). 
37
 Naturally objectivism is not a same thing as positivism; in the context of this thesis they are seen to pose certain 
correlations that can be seen in a same way contradictory to the interpretivist approach. Positivism holds on to an 
external point of view, all reality can be objectively described by concepts that are congruently understood (Kakkuri-
Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 135); furthermore, holding on to a nomothetic understanding, where science’s ideal is 
producing order for explanation and prediction (Kakkuri-Knuuttila, 2006: 57). As objectivism holds on to an objective 
reality (ontologically) and where through knowledge we can increase this objectivity (Ratner, 2008: 567). As Ratner 
(2008: 571) exemplifies, a common mistake in qualitative research is to assume that the kind of objectivism positivism 
predicates is the only one; yet in the sense that objectivism is used by the researchers employed in this thesis one can 
regard them having the understanding explicated. A further note, this kind objectivism, the other one, in qualitative 
research goes on the lines of Dilthey, which Gadamer opposed (will be shortly exemplified in the first part of 
hermeneutics section; also compare Ratner, 2008).  
38
 Further dichotomies related to the positivist versus interpretative research can be illustrated (divided with ;-sign). 
For instance, one is provided by Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti (2006: 13, 40–42, 47–48, 104–106, 133–138; see also 
Turunen, 1995: 135–138): if not positivism then on ‘a scale of relativism’ its location, for example, moderate relativism 
means that arguing and finding conclusions between different values and understandings is possible, which someone 
might be inclined to call truths, although their aptness is tethered to the situation; the aim of research is not, 
foremost, to systemize observations and find causality between them; furthermore, reality can be seen to build up 
dichotomically either as atomic or holistic, whether it should be even regarded either or (Morin, 2008), or as a system 
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In positivists‟ term as contradictory to positivism, it means that interpretative approach does not 
acknowledge „definite truths‟; this position can best be illustrated trough an example: for instance, 
shared leadership is impossible to describe trough sense perceptions, hence, scientifically solving it 
in positivist means, in the way they can produce knowledge, is regarded impossible;
39
 it as well 
ignores value related debate (Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti, 2006: 13, 133–138).40 Next I will 
open up philosophical hermeneutics (the interpretation approach I have chosen) and the background 
of this understanding, which is the base that this thesis builds towards (in the philosophy of 
science). 
*** 
 
The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naive 
assimilation of the two [horizons], but in consciously bringing it out (Gadamer, 2006: 
256).
41
 
 
Etymologically, the term hermeneutics originates from Greek mythology and from a boundary 
crosser called Hermes. Hermes‟ job was to be a messenger between the gods and the mortals; a job 
where interpreting and convoying messages required a certain level of trickery. Hence, his name 
was borrowed once mortals became interested on what other people said or did, mostly in texts, and 
called it hermeneutics. Originally hermeneutics entailed two separate ideas for the Greeks in Plato‟s 
dialogue: the significance of “the texts for present purposes (Protagoras‟ view)” and “reading 
through texts to find out their true meaning (Socrates‟ view)”. The former included the way people 
solve problems and convince others in public policy, such as through narrative, while the latter was 
“concerned with knowledge of unchanging realities”. In his dialogue Plato banned Protagoras view 
as he partially viewed this line of thinking treacherous as it failed to convey the truth when the 
purpose of hermeneutics was to find out what the author “really meant”. (Barrett et al., 2011: 182–
183; see also Hope & LeCoure, 2010: 436–437.)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
is a separate question we will come back later on (on complexity thinking system approach critique see e.g. Stacey, 
2010).  
39
 ‘Gains’ achievable from these perspectives, compared to other questions how we could be producing knowledge, is 
a different kind of contemplation that I will not discuss in this thesis. 
40
 Compare this to the first chapter of this thesis where I refer to the ethical concerns (Alhadeff-Jones, 2008: 71–73; 
Morin, 2008; compare Popper: truth and certainty) 
41
 This citation does not refer to the different stances in the philosophy of science; it refers to the interplay and 
understanding, advocated by the hermeneutics (between the past and the current). 
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Until the last 400 years‟ hermeneutics was associated almost solely with what Plato called Socrates‟ 
view, which we now associate most closely to biblical hermeneutics, concentrating on the 
interpretation of the Bible. In the 18th century theologians started to revisit scriptures realizing that 
the “meaning is not always fixed”, but also requires a “historical interpretation”. During the same 
century Fredrich Schleiermacher struggled with the Enlightenment tradition of knowledge and 
widened the array by calling “attention to the role of the reader” and introducing the hermeneutic 
circle. Schleiermacher claimed interpretation to be a legitimate way of knowing that differs from 
the positivistic way of knowledge; it is an interpretation that covers all texts – and not just text – but 
all modes of understanding (Barrett et al., 2011: 183–185; see also Hope & LeCoure, 2010: 437–
438.) This understanding is further developed by Gadamer and Ricoeur into a situation where this 
“text” includes all modes us understanding such as institutions, organizational practices, social 
structures, practices, et cetera. They are texts because they can be regarded, understood and 
interpret in a similar manner of written text. (Prasad, 2002: 23–24.) 
 
Heidegger further elaborated hermeneutics by widening understanding to include not just meaning 
but background practices, a preunderstanding, that makes knowing possible where one is “being-in-
the-world”. For Heidegger language was the foundation of this being, in other words, “ideas and 
concepts are language”. Furthermore, he extends the notion of hermeneutic circle by widening it 
from the relation of subject and text to the “relationship between self-understanding and 
understanding of the world”. (Barrett et al., 2011: 187–188.) Heidegger‟s student Gadamer 
advanced what it means to understand, which Gadamer regards ultimately as an application
42
, a 
practical one where we are in a dialogue with the original, trying to achieve common ground that 
gives it a familiar meaning applicable to this situation. Hence, it is not so much about finding the 
exact correct meaning of which we are interpreting but translating it through a conversation with 
the former to some common ground. (Barrett et al., 2011: 190; see also Hope & LeCoure, 2010: 
436–438.) The term Gadamer used for it was extending one’s own horizon to the horizon of what 
we are interpreting where the fusion of horizon is this understanding that we achieve; horizon is not 
a rigid boundary but something that is always partial and malleable
43
 (Malpes, 2015). 
 
Currently hermeneutic approach is merely a minority approach in social sciences (Barrett et al., 
2011: 193) – even less so in organization and management theory (Prasad, 2002). The method I am 
                                                          
42
 An understanding based on Heidegger and Aristotle; once you reach section concentrating on efficiency, compare 
this understanding what it would mean if one regards it as an application. 
43
 Notice a strict difference to the way system thinking perceives boundaries. 
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referring to as hermeneutics
44
 includes a various number of “streams”.45 The commonality is that 
hermeneutics stresses interpretation and understanding of the phenomena, forming an opposite 
method to those stressing independence and objectivity in the formation of knowledge (University 
of Jyväskylä, 2014a; 2014b). As qualitative research is about understanding, understanding depends 
on how we give meaning to (interpret) language and change (Murray, 2008: 107). It is an 
understanding where it creates different meanings in which knowledge is formed as a process of 
continuous renewal of this interpretation and hence renewal of the knowledge. In other words, 
rather than trying to see it as an interpretation of something true in the background we are doing 
interpretation on their meanings. (Malpes, 2015.) It means a constant openness for a „challenge‟,46 
as the horizon is not a boundary nor is it anything else rigid in form; a form is already a misleading 
term. Henceforth, historical idea is not merely a classic that stretches into our time by the dead hand 
of tradition
47
, but part of what also radiates into our current struggle for meaning (How, 2011: 50). 
By not realizing this and by not bringing ideas or concepts into our current setting but interpreting 
them in their time, then, makes them just transferring their already dead meaning into our reality 
(Nietzsche, 1980)
48; or in Ricoeur‟s terms, it is one way of making an intentional fallacy 
problem.
4950
 
 
Furthermore, hermeneutics allows one to indicate how meaning is understood in its context. It is an 
understanding that is formed through time, not as the truth already born in certain form, but as an 
accumulation of knowledge that has created a certain kind of understanding. In the context of this 
thesis it means why we perceive efficiency or complexity to be what they are today. Hence, I am 
aiming to show that this understanding is not the only possibility or that it possesses some kind of 
                                                          
44
 For a general introduction in hermeneutics see Ramberg and Gjesdal, 2014; hermeneutics in management and 
organization research see Prasad, 2002; a comparable different way of categorizing different hermeneutic approaches 
see Demeterio III, 2001; as a note, comparably Ricoeur also uses diverging categorization. 
45
 A term Prasad (2002: 14) uses to describe the division into three different approaches in hermeneutics: classical 
hermeneutics, philosophical hermeneutics (used in this thesis) and critical hermeneutics; the latter two only have very 
minor differences that are mostly associated with a question of what a truth is (see debate Gadamer versus 
Habermas). In this research I will use Prasad’s division, it is not to say it is the best or the only one as illustrated in the 
previous footnote.  
46
 One should not interpret this in a way of autopoiesis theory (see Luhmann1990; Maturana & Varela, 1980), as in any 
kind of boundary or boundary exchange per se. 
47
 Term used to describe, practically always in a negative sense, the influence historical texts have on us. 
48
 Compare to Bloch’s historian’s pitfalls. 
49
 Is an indication of a bias someone ‘committed’, according to Ricoeur, that he used as an illustration when someone 
asked him, what was your inspiration when writing that book, what were you reading when you came up with the 
idea, et cetera (see e.g. Uggla, 2010: 1–29; Hope & LeCoure, 2010: 436; also Stiver, 2012). 
50
 Furthermore, compare this to Socratic problem as well as how Gadamer regards time. 
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objective truth we should „value‟ in itself.51 Appreciating hermeneutics is essentially about 
perceiving the moving horizon that is an “on-going re-articulation of the dynamically historical 
nature of all human thought” (Ramberg and Gjesdal, 2014)52. Henceforth, I am painting a canvas 
where the two merging horizons are not a unified body but a nebula
53
 of differences of different 
kinds of views in themselves, which we should not interpret as being one; as Maguire (2011: 87–
88) points out, complexity is a challenge of interpretation. But a challenge that should not be seen 
merely as a context but as a “historicality of understanding” – the compulsory conditions in order 
for us to understand – that Gadamer (1976: xii–xv; see also Prasad, 2002: 18–19) refers to as 
“prejudices”54.  
 
This thesis will use philosophical hermeneutics which develops further, for instance, philosophical 
issues that surround the constitutive act of interpretation (Prasad, 2002: 15). I perceive hermeneutics 
suitable for this thesis due to its conception, for instance, how language has an ontological 
significance (Prasad, 2002: 20), how our meaning is built through language and that there are no 
fixed meanings (Prasad, 2002: 20–21) and how borders are seen as elastic (Malpes, 2015). The 
rather more troubled task was choosing between different hermeneutic traditions.  As Prasad (2002: 
16–17) point out, both of these lines of thinking are “antipositivistic in [their] nature”. 
Hermeneutics of suspicion would have greatly suited the purpose of examining the alleged 
complexity of the financial crises (Ricoeur: hermeneutics of suspicion); whereas I perceive 
Gadamer‟s approach be more suitable for the purposes I am claiming in this thesis: as my aim is not 
to deny, but rather to show that there are always different horizons in play, which means that there 
                                                          
51
 I like to ‘pitch’ around truth as a meaning in this thesis; by truth I do not mean that it is uncontested or that there 
would be no differences inside it. I am referring to it when something has a prevalent status because it imposes itself 
upon us. In other words, I do not see that there is no truth as some of those categorized under hermeneutics of 
suspicion. Gadamer thought these different “truths” we enclose into an event, and in here I mean in complexity or 
efficiency, emerge retrospectively in the light of succeeding horizons, and do not eliminate other understandings (see 
How, 2011: 54). We should not fall into the trap of seeing the current emerging view as the only one, or something 
better or progressive in itself (such as the one misunderstanding attached to the concept of evolution). 
52
 In hermeneutic interpretation one can exceed current perceiving angles, the prejudices (compare to focal points 
referred to earlier); these interpretative horizons enable for a researcher that he/ she can achieve critical 
consciousness; it is achieved by understanding one’s on historical position, which furthermore enables new ones to 
emerge; and ultimately it will lead to the assimilation of horizons (Gadamer, 2013, 436–440; Kusch, 1986, 107–110). 
53
 By nebula I am only illustrating the boundary problem, not any other analogy that one can draw from it. 
54
 I will go through, at least in some form, historical understandings in three different contexts – complexity, efficiency 
and uncertainty, in which the difference between text and our current understanding is differing. By doing this I am 
aiming at what Prasad (2002: 18–19) calls making visible Gadamer’s legitimate and productive prejudices versus 
unproductive prejudices. By examining these different understandings, I am enabling confrontation between a 
historically distant ‘text’ and our prejudices – it creates a temporal distance, which makes it possible for us to 
distinguish productive prejudices; furthermore, when we “encounter a text whose meaning challenges the truth of 
our prejudices” we can become aware of our own prejudices. (Prasad, 2002: 19). 
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are different suitableness for different purposes that we need to acknowledge.
55
 It means that each 
interpretation is a productive one – building a new understanding, changing it, or reaffirm it – rather 
than reproductive one (Prasad, 2002: 21). Hence, one can say that I have a harder time accepting the 
general framework under which they are currently rammed, in short of a better term. In other words, 
even though I might seem rather adversarial in my articulation my aim is to be questioning and 
perhaps somewhat conversational, to which some have described Gadamer‟s approach of 
hermeneutics belong to, while holding (How, 2014: 50). Whereas the hermeneutics of suspicion 
denies truth in its essence (Malpas, 2015), I regard it through Gadamer (2006) as something that we 
should perceive to be temporal. Furthermore, in Prasad‟s (2002: 23) terms what Gadamer‟s 
hermeneutics offers as a method is a broad epistemology and philosophical (understanding) 
interpretation and considerable flexibility; the goal is not to provide a narrow method of 
interpretation but to “explicate the conditions for the possibility of understanding as such” (Prasad, 
2002: 23–24, 26).  
 
1.4. Earlier research and the structure of the study 
 
I do not give you enough information to think (Verhoeven, 1990).
56
 
 
When I started reading the background information needed for this thesis, then, I soon found myself 
overwhelmed with material that these three notions deluge one with. Notably this was the case 
when I started to think what it means if something is complex. I found myself thinking about certain 
problems where interrelations seem to be ceaseless. This ceaselessness that I had also encountered 
before, for example, when the bubble burst in 2008; it had also manifested itself again during my 
first employment when I was trying to figure out why people feel more insecure even though crime 
rate has gone down; and now it was raising its head again while trying to think these different 
threads one finds in complexity thinking. I did not „feel‟ as I do „normally‟; where one can pick a 
certain angle and a theory and start contemplating the implications to produce an argument. I felt 
                                                          
55
 Some researchers would position critical hermeneutics, which does not refer to Ricoeur per se but e.g. Habermas, 
contradictory to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics; one should rather examine it as a family squabble (see e.g. 
How, 2011; Prasad, 2002: 17); and should not confuse what Ricoeur calls hermeneutics of suspicion to be same as 
Habermas critical hermeneutics. Henceforth, I do not see any build in problem using authors such as Nietzsche or 
Foucault to display certain features how historical meanings have led to certain constructions; it is rather that the 
interpretation that I make concerning the ‘ontological assumption’ of knowledge differs. As an example, one way of 
seeing interpretation is to regard it as a never ending conversation, which shapes and reshapes our understanding. 
Difference is whether one sees it as a relativistic quest (Rorty) or a quest of producing knowledge (Gadamer). 
56
 In a movie called Total Recall this is an answer that the evil person of the plot gave to his right hand man, when the 
right hand man has tried to solve a problem (and failed to do so) without consulting him first.  
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like I could never reach the accumulation point where one could solve something, to be able to add 
that little nugget of information behind the problem; because as soon as I could find it, something 
else was connected to it and added unforeseen uncertainty into my finding. In some cases, like the 
banking crises, which started in 2008, this unforeseen uncertainty that was called and credited to 
complexity was merely a created illusion (see e.g. Christophers, 2009); it could not bear closer look. 
But in the latter two it had become ever more prevalent in my mind. I felt like I never had enough 
information to think the way I was thought to; no matter what I read, disjoined, demarcated, or 
abstracted (Morin, 2008: 3–5; see also Niiniluoto, 1984b: 19–32), I could not find a way to say 
something definite behind those two problems in a level of certainty that I was content with. 
Frustration became my ruler, until I started to think about the background reasoning. Why is it so 
hard to start thinking about those two problems and why do I even have to the way I do? Especially 
in this particular way of producing something that can for certain to see endure time; why do I have 
a perception of knowledge as something that has to endure time and to be in some kind of way 
definite? I am not saying that the following choices taken for this thesis are somehow intrinsically 
the truthful ones; I am not claiming that they are the right kind of choices, e.g. concerning the 
stance I have taken in the philosophy of science, nor that they are the only possible ones; moreover, 
I am not claiming that this would inevitably produce in itself some kind of more precise truth.
57
  
*** 
 
Next two sections will elucidate what kind of stances, in the philosophy of science, these three 
concepts include
58
; furthermore, analyzing related writing materials and their contemplations are 
embedded into these sections. Last two sections of the thesis will contemplate alternative 
interpretative framework and potential implications. 
 
The next two sections, the unfolding of the first part of the research question, will concentrate on 
the three concepts central to this thesis (complexity, uncertainty, and efficiency). My intention is 
not to „reinvent the wheel‟ but to bring into the forth this problem posed in 1.1. I will use and 
                                                          
57
 As said earlier, I am offering an interpretation that will hopefully produce different kind of angles and inflect readers 
to contemplate on their different perspectives that they might have taken for granted beforehand. 
58
 By examining philosophical presuppositions, the point of this thesis is not to be building juxtapositioning or clearer 
boundaries. As Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti (2006: 109–110) state, through philosophical analyzing we allow 
dialogue to emerge between presuppositions, in other words, by comparing different meanings that concepts have; 
and, furthermore, by using richer language we enable conceptual understanding. Even though this thesis does not aim 
to reach or even to propose any synthesis to emerge, it will elucidate the build up to the current situation. By 
understanding these concepts – and conceptual understandings as a change of our own productions that are, 
moreover, in constant change – we hopefully enable understanding to emerge, rather than trying to impose 
something onto it. 
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combine the work of other researchers as a standing ground in of each of these questions (on these 
three concepts concerning the philosophy of science); while analyzing the writings, it will also be 
the base of the contemplation in each of them. Section concentrating on complexity will be based 
on the work of Edgar Morin (2007, 2008) and in his divide into general versus restricted complexity 
that I will bridge to complexity thinking writings.
59
 Furthermore, I will use Alhadeff-Jones (2008, 
2010), as his research on Edgar Morin provided a healthy comparison and further illustrations. 
Uncertainty related writing is mainly based on the work of Shenhav and Weitz (2000), which I will 
use to illustrate positivist related conceptions concerning uncertainty in organization and 
management research. Lastly, the section concerning on efficiency, will be based mainly on the 
work of Rutgers and van der Meer (2010) and Schachter (2007); rather than just trying to point out 
the same, as in the section concentrating on uncertainty, this section will furthermore offer us steps 
towards „the alternative‟, in other words, the second part of the research question.  
 
Last part of this thesis, unfolding of the second part of the research question, will be based on 
Prasad‟s (2002) understanding on Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics; it is as well 
supplemented by Gadamer‟s (1976, 2006) work and How‟s (2011) notes. Henceforth, perhaps one 
can grasp my reasoning, in other words, why, in the section one, I have constantly repeated the 
nature of the thesis‟ interpretation; as shown by the first part of the thesis title, this will only be an 
interpretation not the interpretation. 
 
2. What is complexity? 
 
Complex, adj. <modern French complexe, or < its source, Latin complexus , past 
participle of complectĕre or complecti to encompass, embrace, comprehend, comprise; 
hence perhaps originally „embracing or comprehending several elements‟, but in course 
of English use tending to its analytical sense of „plaited together, interwoven‟; < com- 
together + plexus plaited (OED: complex, adj.). 
 
The citation above describes the etymology of the word complex, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED), comparatively complexity refers to “the quality or condition of being complex” 
(OED Online: complexity, n.); by looking at the history of a word, or a concept, we can see its 
                                                          
59
 Morin is one of the first researchers who started to talk about complexity related questions in his 6 volumes of La 
Méthode (started in the 1970s). His work is not that well known in the English speaking world. Although, more than a 
few cite him (as an inspirational reading) in the Sage Handbook of Complexity and Management (Allen et al., 2011); 
rather than using his work in any form of a structured theory. 
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original meaning and how this meaning has developed through time. Through studying historical 
meanings and concepts, it offers us “a possibility of a distinct and unique way of interpreting it and 
enables us to develop novel hypothesis” (Shenhav and Weitz, 2000: 393). First use of the word 
complex can be traced to J. Smith in 1652 describing man and man‟s relation between the body and 
the soul as being complex and multifarious (OED Online: complex, adj.)
60
, on the other hand, 
Darwin attributed that there seems to be a tendency in evolution that it advances complexity (OED 
Online: complexity, n.). The word in general is relatively new and the usage of the word only 
started to pick up the pace and accumulation in the 1900-century;
61
 now the usage has expanded to 
biology, chemistry, economy, linguistics, mathematics, psychology, et cetera (OED: complex, adj., 
complexity, n.); to a point that the advancements in complexity theory are regarded, by some, as  
“signaling the arrival of a new scientific paradigm” (MacLean & MacIntosh, 2008: 50). 
  
We can search for the commonness, of the word complexity, by examining its appearance in 
articles.
62
 For this purpose I have done a search for the word complexity
63
 in Sage journals 
(http://online.sagepub.com/) and the word appears in 182 401 different articles
64
 in a wide array of 
different journals between 1847 and 2015.
65
 In comparison I have searched for the word complexity 
in the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/) and the word appears in 33 021 different 
articles
66
, appearing through all sections from 1851 through 2015.
67
 With this display my purpose is 
not to categorize further in what kind of journals, topics, disciplines, meanings, or scientific 
communities the word is most commonly used or for what purpose; I am trying to rather establish 
                                                          
60
 J. Locke (1690) called complex compositions ideas made up from several simpler ones that are put together to form 
ideas of gratitude, beauty, et cetera; Jeremy Bentham (1780) used it to describe the condition of a parent, where he 
considers the different ‘roles’ parents assume during their parenthood: a master, a guardian, et cetera (OED Online: 
complex, adj.). The first known mathematical use of the word is 1832 depicting complex numbers (OED Online: 
complex, adj.). 
61
 Complex (adj.) is listed in the second most used category according to the OED (Band 7 – same category usage as 
words: man, women, day, et cetera), occurring between 100 and 1000 times per million words in typical English usage 
(OED Online: complex, adj.). Comparatively the noun complex, or the verb complex, or the noun complexity, are less 
used (Band 6) according to this categorization (OED Online). 
62
 Even though the common notion concerning complexity differs from the theory of complexity in academic circles, 
the common conception and utilization have known significance how well certain notions are accepted and used by 
the public, politicians, et cetera (see e.g. Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2014). 
63
 Sage Journal and New York Times were selected for this illustration purposes due to the variety of journals Sage 
covers and topics New York Times covers. Both of their records reach out about the same length, to the 1850s. Both 
are also wide known and respected publications, and were hence valid for this short illustrative purpose. Secondly, 
this is merely an illustration of the usage of the word complexity and does not offer any illustration towards 
possibilities that some of the search results which come up might have different meanings per se. 
64
 On the other hand, the word complex appears in 347 310 articles. 
65
 Search result is narrowed for Sage journals available for an access granted to a student studying at the University of 
Tampere. 
66
 On the other hand, the word complex appears in 212 942 articles. 
67
 Search result is narrowed only to articles and only to those accessible for a visitor through the search function. 
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the ground for a claim that the word complexity, and complex as well, are widely used for 
numerous purposes. Hence, the objective of this lengthy description which started in the last 
paragraph, was not just to portray the historical meaning and usage of the word, but to give 
justification for the claim that these words have some kind of understandable meaning when used in 
a context, by this claim I mean that it can be used as „a common sense notion‟.68 If you tell someone 
that we need to understand the complexity of this situation, their next question is (at least most 
often) what you are exactly meaning by this; it creates an interpretation problem (examining 
interpretation problems being the purpose of hermeneutics).
69
  
 
This issue, highlighted in the last paragraph, can best be illustrated trough a simplified everyday 
example, for instance, let‟s say that a person says to another person that someone else is beautiful; 
we can all straight away see what someone means by this notion, but what is it exactly he is 
adhering to still remains somewhat mystified, other than the general condition of being, in this case 
of being beautiful.
7071
 The point of this example was not to merely show that we can now go on 
                                                          
68
 Even more essentially I want to note what we mean by ‘a common sense notion’: it is not just a mix created 
between scientific community and colloquial speech, but is also given due to the nature of the word – not being 
parsimonious in meaning. For instance, compare to the usage of the term information; Adriaans (2013: see 
introduction and section 1) points out that “the lack of preciseness and the universal usefulness of the term” go hand 
in hand. 
69
 There are a lot of different interrelated problems: conceptual confusion between scientific communities concerning 
the exact usage of the word (for conceptual confusion see e.g. Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2014); certain paradigms, 
how it should it be used in certain lines of disciplinary inquiry (see e.g. Bird, 2013); differences between everyday 
usage; and, moreover, how its ‘explanatory value’ is accepted by the public, politicians, et cetera (for further 
elaborations see e.g. Gallie (1956): essentially contested concepts; in political philosophy Rawls, 1999; in law 
Dworking, 1988; and in management leadership David Wilkinson’s writings concerning ambiguity). 
70
 For a problematic concept in ‘more’ scientific terms, see philosophical conversation concerning truth (e.g. 
Glanzberg, 2014) and the earlier footnote reference to information. 
71
 Why is it so arduous for one to consider the problem complexity poses? Why is it so hard to consider the nature of 
any (social) problem? Other than that the researcher is certainly digging his own grave by introducing metaphysical 
conversation (see e.g. van Inwagen and Sullivan, 2015). How difficult is it to answer what the concentration camp 
system (the Gulag) means, considering what the nature of the late USSR was? Morin (2008: 3) traces the reason for 
the fact that “we do not have means to conceive of the complexity of the problem”. Problem described is also the 
reason why for an extended period of time we were unable to recognize the formulation of creativity in an 
organization; it was like a black box from which we could see the inputs and outputs but never look inside (Morin, 
2008: 19–21). It was not long ago that creativity in an organizational setting was still seen as a personal attribute. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that complexity thinking related fields have been a source for numerous theories 
concentrating on creativity and innovation, for instance, how in management theory it can create these advances 
through creative disorder at the edge of chaos (e.g. Stacey, 1991), modes network theory (e.g. Chua, 2015), and 
modes of learning organization (e.g. Son and Kim, 2015). In other words, what differentiates humans from computers 
is our ability to think and use insufficiencies and ambiguous situations to our advantage without knowing every 
variable (Morin, 2008: 21). After all, creative process – let it be writing, research, or art – is about sailing to unknown 
and the ability to live with the unknown. It can also be illustrated through a different way, the more there is 
improvisation, then, potentially the more swept away one is in improvised theater performance, hence, it becomes 
potentially more fertile the more moving parts the performer is able to use and withstand. Furthermore, as Cilliers 
(2001: 136) has argued, that for us to “have a science of complexity” it would imply “a revision of our notion of what 
constitutes as science”. Leaving one to ask what is the problem with our current way of thinking and where is it traced 
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further and describe how we can, for example, categorize certain features people or theorists would 
perceive and associate to this condition, hence, creating e.g. sub-categorizes, as we could have done 
in our example of the usage of the word complex or complexity (in order to „further‟ our knowledge 
concerning what we mean by adhering a meaning of complexity or something being complex).
72
 
For the purpose of this thesis the point is to note the interpretational problem that this multifaceted 
understanding creates, but not merely to regard it as something being complicated.
73
 And secondly, 
how these choices we make effect what we find or even can find in the first place. As Morin (2008: 
2) points out, “the deep cause of error is not error of fact (false perception), or error of logic 
(incoherence), but rather the way we organize our knowledge into a system of ideas (theories, 
ideologies)”. In other words, it “is not just what we know, but how we know, and how we organize 
our knowledge” (Montuori, 2008: xxvi).74 
 
2.1. Indulging into complexity – general complexity theory 
 
Avoidance of complexity is the essence of tyranny (original author unknown cf. 
Mitroff, 2008). 
 
As illustrated earlier, complexity made a relatively late appearance into science;
75
 Edgar Morin 
(2008: 4) traces reason behind this to the Western though that was enchanted for a long time by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
to? Including statements made at the end of previous chapters, what is this “the nature and the consequences of 
paradigms that mutilate knowledge and disfigure reality” (Morin, 2008: 3)? As this revision of what constitutes as 
science was also required in hermeneutics and was instituted by Gadamer. For instance, for Dilthey and 
Schleiermacher the task of hermeneutics was methodological, in other words, making it “properly scientific”. Whereas 
human science could not adopt in a straight way manner models and procedures from natural sciences its task was to 
find a proper methodology that would produce results in a reliable way from human sciences. (Malpas, 2015: 2.2.). 
72
 It is one way that science uses to create further understanding by illustrating meanings, separating, unifying, 
centralizing, creating hierarchies, et cetera (Morin, 2008: 2). 
73
 Words complexity and complex are often used as an opposite for simplicity or when stated that some phenomenon 
is not simple to comprehend, which raises the impression that they are synonyms for something being complicated. 
As this is in a certain sense a sensible conclusion, if we look at the definitions offered by those who define what 
complexity thinking means, for it is described with terms such as nonlinearity, boundary problems, interaction (Cilliers, 
2011), phenomena to which they give rise to (Allen et al., 2011), or behavior not reducible to the interactions of 
individual parts (Thietart and Forgues, 2011); it is important that we do not reduce these notions to it and are able to 
see diverse meanings it holds. If we address it merely as something being complicated, without heuristic 
interpretation, we face the risk of reducing it to simplicity; as Richardson (2011: 367) illustrates, for something to be 
complex and something being complicated need to be kept separate, because if complexity is merely complicated, 
then, it just means that we are waiting, just biting our time, for “the management best seller of all time” to emerge 
called the “Theory of Management” that would reveal what to do in various contexts. It is reductionist lines of 
thinking that are concerned with complications and hyper-complications (Alhadeff-Jones, 2008: 72; Morin, 2008). 
74
 Further elaborations of this problem see, for instance, philosophical conversation concerning epistemological 
problems (see e.g. BonJour, 2016; Matthias, 2014). 
75
 According to Thietart and Forgues (2011: 53) complexity science is regarded as a “scientific study of systems with 
many interacting parts that exhibit a global behavior not reducible to the interactions between the individual 
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“paradigm of simplification” that originated from the work of Descartes, known from the separation 
between the thinking subject and thing being thought of; creating “the principles of disjunction, 
reduction and abstraction” – advocating causal explanation, objectivity and certainty. Cartesian 
epistemology reduced complex social phenomena to its parts that were seen as simple and 
objective. For a long time for us to say it is complex meant an arduous task to give a definition or 
explanation due to the fact that the concept or the law that would bring us the truth was not yet here 
(Morin, 2007: 6); for something to be uncertain was merely so for the time being for it had not yet 
become certain. Henceforth, in this line of inquiry complexity only relates to our current state of 
cursory knowledge (Morin, 2007: 6), to which, in that line inquiry, we can also perceive uncertainty 
and efficiency to be deducted.  
 
First cracks, to the understanding originating form Descartes, were formed through the discovery of 
disordered phenomena such as the thermodynamics (irreversibility of time), evolution (order and 
disorder are related), and Einstein‟s discovery (space and time relation) (Morin, 2008: 7–9). The 
genesis, or the etymological roots, regarding the first wave of complexity science – to what we 
perceive complexity to be today – rose in the study of chaotic processes in engineering and 
mathematics in the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, it still remained outside of social and 
human sciences. Almost at the same time, in the nineteen forties and fifties, it was connected with 
Information theory and cybernetics, which introduced the link between information and feedback. 
(Morin, 2007: 9–10; 2008.) They were set out to deal with “problems of disorganized complexity” 
by developing probability theory and statistical mechanics (Weaver, 1948: 2); issues that came, for 
instance, with increasing automation and a degree of variation in a given system (Morin, 2007: 9). 
The issue of wartime (WWII) raised the question of handling uncertainties presented in the decision 
making of handling military affairs. It brought forward “operation analysis” that concentrated on 
handling the numerous variables presented by the situation through linear calculations solved by 
computers in a more effective way. It was also significant for a second reason, through the use of 
diverse groups consisting of different professional expertise British tried to answer problems of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
constituent parts”. To compare, Allen et al. (2011: 2) defines complexity science as “the systematic study of complex 
systems as well as the phenomena of emergence and complexity to which they give rise”. And Cilliers (2011) 
“complexity refers to a more general understanding of complex systems which focuses on (nonlinear) relationships, 
systematic interaction, boundary problems, emergence and adaption”. Thus, we can see some key points that are 
being emphasized. All of these definitions start by saying that complexity is something in relation to a system (see also 
Maguire, 2011: 83). System, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2014: March Edition), is “an organized or 
connected group of objects”. Seeming to be quite understandable, although once we start contemplating on the 
matter problems arise; system changes according to each actor, action and it is sometimes hard to establish which 
actors’ effect, for example, decisions or knowledge through power or perhaps some indirect ways. Not to mention, 
since we are contemplating human/ social systems, the foremost question becomes who defines a system and how? 
(see e.g. Göktug, 2012: 45–61). Not to mention e.g. what is change in the end (e.g. Brunsson, 2009). 
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tactic and strategy, which lead to a revelation that when formed correctly, then, these groups could 
form a unit that was greater than the sum of its parts. (Weaver, 1948: 6–8; see also Simon, 1947; 
Churchman et al., 1957; Stacey, 2010.) 
 
Second wave came when the notion of emergency rose in scientific conversation contemplating 
organization as a living system. It was set in motion, for instance, by the discovery of DNA. The 
discovery of emergency led to an understanding where it was seen as indeductible from the qualities 
of the parts, which makes it irreducible but at the same it means that it produces qualities and self-
organization (Morin, 2007, 9–10, 22–23; 2008). By this time the notion of complexity was also 
introduced to the epistemological contemplation of organization and management theory by Simon 
(1962)
76
. Second wave of complexity science gave rise to the scientific inquire into different ways 
of solving the problem complexity proposed; these include algorithmic complexity, descriptive 
complexity, computational complexity, artificial intelligence reasoning (e.g. Simon & Newell, 
1958), autopoiesis theory (Maturana and Varela, 1980) grounded in evolutionary biology, general 
systems theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1951), based on cybernetics the notion of self-organization (e.g. 
Von Bertalanffy, 1951; Ashby, 1956), non-linearity based on e.g. Prigogine‟s dissipative structure 
(e.g. Prigogine & Stengers, 1985) and Gleick‟s (e.g. 1988) chaos theory.77 
 
The third break appeared in the 1980s. It started a time period of complexity that is also equivalent 
for how our most recent discoveries, at the present time, apply complexity theory in their usage; it 
furthermore constituted the epistemological divide between what Morin (2007, 9–10; 2008) calls 
generalized and restricted complexity. The latter term is associated with the line of inquiry started 
by the Santa Fe Institute (1984); concentrating on the dynamical systems (Morin 2007, 9–10; 2008), 
now known as complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory
78
; most known for theorists such as Holland 
and Miller (e.g. 1992), Kauffman (e.g. 1993), Gell-Mann (e.g. 1994b). It accentuated the logic of 
formalization that can be achieved, for example, through modeling (Morin 2007, 10) and simulating 
behavior. The banner and mission statement, in the Santa Fe Institute‟s home site 
(http://www.santafe.edu/), already states the purpose for this line of understanding: “searching for 
order in the complexity of evolving world”. What the entrance of Sante Fe Institute reinforced was 
an understanding of complexity that requires “researchers to create and organise the rules of its 
conception” (Alhadeff-Jones, 2008: 71). The former line of inquiry, the generalized complexity that 
                                                          
76
 For the base of understanding that Simon’s advocates (rationalism, positivism) see e.g. Virtanen (2011). 
77
 For further elaborations of this wave see Alhadeff-Jones (2008: 66–70). 
78
 CAS is a term Holland (1995) and Gell-Mann (1995) started commonly using the latest in 1995, as shown in their 
publications. Holland used it at least in his publication already in 1988. 
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Morin (e.g. 1980; 2007; 2008) is advocating, is a way of rethinking that tries to offer us means to 
conceive complexity in a new way through certain principles. These principles offer us reflexive 
tools to conceive complexity in a multifaceted way; it helps us to be reflexive and critical towards 
the way we produce knowledge. The main contention between the two is for as long as one tries to 
attach some “laws to complexity” one is dealing with restricted complexity (Morin, 2007: 10). 
Henceforth, most often those using the ideas of e.g. chaos, disorder, fractals, and uncertainty are 
still dealing with restricted complexity because they attach “complexity as a kind of wagon behind 
the truth locomotive” (Morin, 2007: 6); in the Santa Fe Institute‟s banner, the truth is waiting for its 
King Arthur to pull it out of the stone.
79
 Due to the fact that generalized complexity has rejected this 
claim of truth seeking, it is often declined for not being scientific enough or being demoted a 
philosophical chatter at best (Morin, 2008: 27–28).  
 
Morin‟s (2008) insights were how he treated the accumulation of knowledge, in other words, how 
knowledge (in this case meaning in relation to science) is intertwined to the way we organize it, 
how our culture has developed sectors or rationality like science; the link how science is produced 
and its production is assessed (Morin, 2008: 38–52; see also Kuhn, 1970). To further our 
understanding Morin (2008: 49–51) proclaims a need for macro-concepts, concepts to be defined by 
their cores and not by their boundaries because boundaries are always overlapping and blurring; 
macro-concepts provide ways of understanding these “hearts” of the things we are having problems 
interpreting (Morin, 2008: 48). Concepts overlap by their nature as they are merely snapshots of the 
social that is already starting to flee the moment it is introduced to us (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 
16–34). Morin (2008: 49–51) proposes three linked guiding principles for complexity thinking: 
dialogic, organizational recursion and the holographic principle.  
 
Morin (2007: 27–30; 2008) is claiming that there is no single concept or a set of concepts that 
would reveal our eyes to the magnificence of complexity. Whether we agree to this or not, or if 
complexity can or should be regarded as restricted or general complexity, it still pays dividend to 
realize how these views are formed. Furthermore, and as said earlier (1.4.), it pays to understand for 
what kind of „needs‟ these different understandings are more suitable for and what are their 
limitations. Moreover, it urges us to examine how we relate to science and knowledge, in other 
words, when we explore what is possible that we do not restrict ourselves to what was formally 
                                                          
79
 It attaches a never ending truth seeking into it; making it a word solution when it should a word problem that needs 
our contemplation. It is rather realizing that the moment the truth is said, just as concept is invented (see 1.2.), it 
escapes and starts fleeing from the experience known as the truth by its inventor. 
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probably (Morin 2007: 27–30; 2008). The general complexity should rather be conceived as 
interpretation of a key understandings build by the researcher; as it will help us to realize the heavy 
anchorage complexity thinking has in biology, engineering, management and physics; and how this 
is reinforced by hyper specialization (Alhadeff-Jones, 2008: 72–74; 2010: 479.) It helps us to 
challenge the way we transform knowledge into science while interpreting the world (Alhadeff-
Jones, 2008: 74). 
 
At a paradigmatic level, the paradigm of simplification and the paradigm of complexity (Morin, 
2008: 4), can be enumerated to certain principles. Alhadeff-Jones (2010: 479–480) lists eleven 
principles for both of them. The paradigm of simplification includes principles of universality 
(downgrading the local); eliminating temporal irreversibility (such as history and events); reducing 
the whole to the parts; reducing the knowledge of organization to their inherent order; linear 
causality; absoluteness of order and universal determinism as explaining principles of phenomena; 
separation and isolation of the object and its environment; disjunction between the object and the 
perceiving subject of the study; erasing problems of connected to “self, being, or existence” 
(formalization and quantification) from scientific knowledge (“incapacity to conceive scientifically 
notions such as „autonomy‟); logics absolute reliability in establishing intrinsic truths of theories; 
clear and distinct ideas as the foundation of thought without dialogue in discourse (Alhadeff-Jones, 
2010: 479; see also Morin, 2008: 39–44). On the other hand, the paradigm of complexity that 
suggest challenges rather than solutions, is built on conjunction and includes principles of 
interpretation starting from the singular and the local; integration and recognition of the 
irreversibility of time (including history in all understanding); linking the knowledge of unit of to 
the whole as well understanding the impossibility of perfect isolation of an unit; understanding the 
problematic relationship between the organization and self-organization; complex causality 
“(including mutual causalities, feedback loops, etc.)”; circular logic as a way of interpreting 
organization “(linking order, disorder, interactions and organization)”; disjunction replaced with 
conjunction in relation to the object and the subject, and their environment; relationship between the 
subject and the observer of the study; developing possibilities to understand scientifically the self 
and recognizing being and existence categorizes in different scientific faculties; limited ways in 
recognizing formal complex systems through logical demonstration, rather constructing a discursive 
way of understanding “complementary, concurrent and antagonistic notions”; dialogical thinking 
and understanding through macro-concepts, moreover, establishing as well as critically securitizing 
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relationships and links between different concepts and notions that reach beyond disciplines 
(Alhadeff-Jones, 2010: 480; see also Morin, 2008: 44–52).80 
 
2.2. Complexity theory in organization and management 
 
One recurring theme in the more sophisticated recent discussion of complexity, whether 
in the sciences, management and organization theory, or the social sciences in general, 
is that reductive/ analytic approaches to issues are unable to account for, and give an 
adequate understanding of, complex, interconnected phenomena (Montuori, 2008: 
xviii). 
 
Albeit complexity theory‟s popularity amongst researchers‟ fascination for a relatively long time in 
organization and management theory (see e.g. Maquire et al., 2006; Allen et al., 2011), there is still 
little agreement what it is exactly that we perceive to be complexity theory.
81
 During the thirty years 
of quickening accumulation of research knowledge, concerning complexity, the field still remains 
heterogeneous
82
; even though it has been stated to have become somewhat of a new paradigm (e.g. 
Allen et al., 2011; Cilliers, 2011; Richardson & Cilliers, 2001). For complexity theory to finally 
reach a state of „maturity‟ there are calls, in management and organization literature, for it to 
become more than a metaphor (Hazy, 2011), to find rigorousness (Lichtenstein, 2011: 487), and at 
last to reach its potential (Baumann & Siggelkow, 2011).
83
 Hence, it is begging the question what is 
it currently still missing and why it has not yet reached this state of maturity. 
                                                          
80
 This illustration does not claim that everything belongs to either or (paradigm); furthermore, to have one principle 
does not mean having them all. 
81
 The scientific field of study concerning complexity is eminently diversified, meaning that it is hard to find a branch 
that has not somehow integrated, commented, or ‘resisted’ complexity thinking. Resulting complexity to be though 
and urged to be as something of a new inter-disciplinary solution to various problems in various fields of study, for 
instance, see in management (Allen et al., 2011; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Kauffman, 1993; Anderson et al., 1988; 
Morrison, 2010), neuroscience (e.g. Orsucci, 2006), security (e.g. Rosenow, 2012), economics (e.g. Ormerod, 2011), 
communication (e.g. Qvortrup, 2006), social science (e.g. Walby, 2007), education (e.g. Smith, 2013), international 
relations (e.g. Cudworth and Hobden, 2013), gender (e.g. Enns, 2008), evaluation (e.g. Marra, 2015) and psychology 
(e.g. Schermer, 2012). Even though the field is diversified and the accumulation of studies is starting to be significant, 
there is, for example in the field of organization and management, little agreement what complexity science actually is 
(e.g. Richardson and Cilliers, 2001; Cilliers, 2011; Stacey, 2010). Hence, it is often times easier to start with what it is 
claiming to provide. 
82
 Why should we examine these interpretative problems of complexity thinking? Competing complexity views that 
are inequivalent in their descriptions are seen as the constitutive force both in social and natural sciences (Maguire, 
2011: 82). Henceforth, for us to understand the challenge of complexity we first need to understand how it is 
interpreted in order for us to interpret the ‘reality’ by using complexity. 
83
 In management and organization theory the swift rise has filled journals and books with numerous diverse 
applications (for a very exhaustive illustration see Maquire, 2006; for newer applications see Allen et al., 2011). For 
example, some address key concepts related to complexity (Goldstein, 2011; Maguire, 2011), others epistemological 
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Reasons behind researchers‟ interests are numerous; complexity theory has been perceived to 
provide better and more novel solutions for problems such as understanding the limits of knowledge 
(Cilliers, 1998), explaining the development of innovations (Stacey, 1991), examining multiple 
interactions (Tracy, 2011), as well as organization‟s and environment‟s relationship (Boisot & 
McKelvey, 2011), and furthering our understanding of change (McMillan, 2004); to say a few. One 
of the key reasons behind this appetite is an understanding of society that is becoming increasingly 
more complex (Ministry of the Interior, 2010); a society in which the rate of change is constantly 
increasing (Prime Minister‟s Office Finland, 2014). Complexity theory has been perceived to 
provide answers for several of these perplexing problems raised by the need to find novel ways to 
answer this call (see e.g. Allen et al., 2–3). Furthermore, for many it seems to offer a promise of 
mitigation; a new way to mitigate the uncertainty that this „complexity‟ brings and has brought (see 
CAS related theories e.g. Gell-Mann, 1994); as well as a way of eradicating inefficiency brought to 
us by complexity (e.g. Holland & Miller, 1991). 
*** 
 
What is the more practical meaning? Science establishes grounds on many of the “claims, teaching 
or products” that are used to make more educated long term decisions concerning, for instance, 
environment, healthcare, and safety (Hansson, 2015). Meaning how we see that a certain scientific 
inquiry is supposed to be done in order for it to provide moreover beliefs that are warranted. This 
has led us to e.g. produce science in certain ways. As Chia (2011) points out what makes 
complexity thinking hard for us to acknowledge fully, both in scientific and strategic way, is that it 
tries to recognize what is peripheral and unseen; whereas society, science and strategy appreciate 
rational, direct, and frontal ways of doing. This is also connected to the way, i.e. where see the 
useful nature of knowledge stemming from. As one of science‟s tasks, by creating “concepts and 
entities, is always to extract an event from things and beings” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 33), i.e. 
in order for us to study and create the concept of complexity we need to demarcate it, it is necessary 
so that we can answer any ontological reduction when trying to explain something (e.g. Chalmers, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
and methodological perspectives (Chia, 2011; Cilliers, 2011; Chia, 2011), as a source of depicting organization 
(Baldwin, 2011; Mitleton-Kelly and Ramalingam, 2011), implications and possibilities for management (Boisot, 2011; 
Andriani, 2011), and interfaces to other disciplines (Hidalgo, 2011; Bankes, 2011). One could list different versions: 
ontological analysis (Cilliers, 1998), transdisciplinary (Nicolescu, 2002, 2014), interconnectedness (Lewis, 1993), agent-
based modeling (Kauffman, 1995), living at the edge of chaos (Youngblood, 1997), metaphorical understanding 
(Cornelissen, 2005; 2006), et cetera. Rather what one shortly comes in terms with, is the overwhelming number of 
alternative options, mixture of different elements, and, on the other hand, entanglement and overlap in between. 
Hence, one asks what the novelty of complexity thinking is and wonders how to approach this ‘swamp’ that seems to 
take you deeper with every step you take. 
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1996), which in itself is contrasting towards the idea of complexity, if we are trying to see 
something peripheral and unseen. Significance also being, which the orthodox science already 
notes, that in order for us to do this we would need to establish some causal relations; yet it creates 
a problem, for example, regarding concepts of conscious mental states, such as pain and sense of 
security, whether they can be reducible to some causal relations (see e.g. Papineau, 2002). Those 
that are considered to be the most complex problems in society are frequently those that try to 
tackle the definitional problem, for instance, of sufficient or effective healthcare or trying to create 
the right standards and institutions for safety and security, so that they are not only effective but 
also make people feel safe and secure.
84
 In other words, even though complexity is not a mere 
concept of conscious mental state, if we exclude the fact of humans‟ limited mental capacity, the 
problems that it is used to tackle many times seem to be or at least are connected somehow into it. 
For example, the way we approach these problems, argue the way they should and can be solved, 
what are their implications, how these relate to each other, and how they relate to elsewhere – it has 
foundational implications. Furthermore, if something is removed of its present „mystification‟ by 
stating that it is unnatural, irrelevant, or illogical then it removes it beyond our close scrutinization
85
 
– on the other hand, stating it to be beyond us, then, it easily becomes a conceptual scapegoat (e.g. 
when the bubble burst the bankers blamed complexity). 
 
During the last two decades the emergence of complexity thinking has also slowly started to sweep 
through the decision making sides of governments, companies, municipalities – organizations in 
general. One can find that strategies are being formed by trying to somehow acknowledge our 
inability to control everything through our own actions. For instance, in the Finnish Cyber Security 
Strategy (Finnish Government, 2012), in order to account for complexity, complexity can be seen as 
something that we are trying to achieve through time with our actions and adaptation. These actions 
are seen as our ability, in a novel way, to resist and adapt to threats rather than trying to control 
them. Control is still asserted but now in the officials‟ internal actions in order to increase their own 
resistance and adaptation and through this chain towards the exterior.
86
 This particular way of 
dealing with problems that are posed by complexity is associated with an approach called complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) that the thesis will examine in the next section. 
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 Of course we can only get this far if in the start we bypass the conversation of what is it that we perceive to be 
effective and in what grounds this definition is grounded on. 
85
 Consultancy example of this will be provided in the last section. 
86
 In this example it means transferring control to a more suitable place but still maintaining the same understanding 
of control; aiming to guide the systems towards desired outcomes (in this case it means safety, response, et cetera); 
using control as mechanism but just steering it in novel places; it creates potential problems concerned with 
knowledge and understanding, furthermore, it would as well need ethical considerations. 
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The purpose of this section was to go through some of the things and choices we are already forced 
to make before we can even enter to consider what complexity thinking means, for instance, for 
public policy, uncertainty, or efficiency. In other words, these demarcations make restrictions, 
which is precisely against the very nature of thought that those advocating general rather than 
restricted complexity thinking are telling us to change. That is to change the way we are thinking 
(e.g. Allen et al. 2011; Richardson and Cilliers, 2001; Richardson, 2008; Chia, 2011; Levy, 2000; 
Cilliers, 2011; Morin, 1978; 1981; 2007; 2008). Hence, we can ponder the meaning that was 
presented by the citation at the start of this chapter by connecting it to Morin‟s (2008: 6) thought; 
Morin (2008: 6) examines how the current way of thinking, concerning complexity, has lead us into 
a situation where “mutilating thought necessarily leads to mutilating actions”. In other words, 
Morin is critically pointing out that our way of producing knowledge, and the way we ultimately 
make meaning, is currently done through demarcation – e.g. differences (borders) make meanings. 
This is due to the fact that “the modern pathology of mind is in the hyper-simplification that makes 
us blind to the complexity of reality […] the idea obscures with the reality it is supposed to 
translate, and takes itself alone as real” (Morin, 2008: 6; also see and compare Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994: 33, two paragraphs earlier). 
 
2.2.1. Complexity theory’s diverging interpretations 
 
The dream of capturing a bit of chaos is more insistent, even if the most diverse forces 
stir restlessly within it. Science would relinquish all the rational unity to which it aspires 
for a little piece of chaos it could explore (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 206). 
 
This contemplation
878889
 will include two different writings associated with complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) theory
9091
 and a third
92
 who is not associated with CAS but as to those as well who 
                                                          
87
 CAS was selected due to its pivotal point in the development of what Morin (2008) calls restricted complexity. 
Furthermore, it is an approach that seems to be commonly taken in administrative science research (especially in 
security related fields). In the end it only represents a certain way of approaching from the perspective of the 
philosophy of science. Henceforth, one can claim that it is important to understand what those ‘starting’ 
understandings are for the theory, so that those using it can situate its potential problems for their studies. On the 
other hand, Luhmann’s writing is one the first ones to represent the more modern version of system thinking that 
tries to advance the scientism side of organization research. 
88
 Another way this need can be exemplified is by examining The Sage Handbook of Complexity and Management 
(Allen et al., 2011). In section B: Complexity and Managing (which can be ‘classified’ as more practicality (reference to 
scientism) closed articles, eight of the nine articles were done using some form of CAS related understanding and one 
using a derivative of CAS (see Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2011; Colbert & Kurucz, 2011; Azadegan & Dooley, 2011; Boisot, 
2011; Andriani, 2011; Lichtenstein, 2011; Baumann & Siggelkow, 2011; Eisenhardt & Piezunka, 2011; Hazy, 2011). 
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aim to advance the „scientism‟ side.9394 In an allocation, in the way researchers use complexity 
science, Maguire et al. (2006) make a division into “interpretivist” and “objectivist” approaches; 
CAS related approaches belonging to the latter. Objectivist approaches are concerned with the 
processes of understanding according to which “complex, irregular interactions can achieve order”; 
as well as to those enabling simple deterministic rules to “create complex phenomena that seem to 
be driven by change” (Thietart & Forgues, 2011: 53). Undoubtedly also inside the CAS theory there 
are different ways how to approach complexity. Thietart and Forgues (2011: 57) make a division of 
these objectivist approaches into four different categories, in which CAS represents a line of 
thinking where “organizations are an emergent outcome, being the result of random encounters 
between agents that interact following a set of deterministic rules”. As interaction‟s nature is 
deterministic, henceforth, their “rules are fixed by choice or by nature” (Thietart & Forgues, 2011: 
56).  
 
If we start to unravel in a reverse order,
95
 this fixation into rules by choice or by nature can be 
illustrated in the aim of CAS: to find order amidst evolving complex world (Sante Fe institute‟s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
89
 Thirdly, the misconceptions, meld, and confusion is evident in complexity science. It is evident in Morçöl’s (2012: 
39–43) writing, who as well advances the scientism side, when he struggles with the term adaptive in complex 
adaptive systems definitions. He denies its need as it is extremely difficult to distinguish from complex systems 
approach- I am not advocating some categorization. He points extremely well potential problems that are associated 
in it, when we perceive system adaptive by its nature. But the problem I am elucidating is Morçöl’s inability to realize 
the constitutive conceptual definition in it none the less, i.e. he sees CAS as some sort of right starting point that we 
now develop and take a new step by removing this intrinsic problem. 
90
 I do not claim them to be exactly the same; as Gell-Mann points out, even inside the same theory most often “a 
scientist would rather use someone else’s toothbrush than another scientist’s terminology” (Gell-Mann, 1994: 17). 
Furthermore, I do not claim to have read all their writings nor is it the point of this illustration. I am going to illustrate 
some of the principles in the philosophy of science inside of CAS; it is not a comprehensive traversal. 
91
 Murray Gell-Mann (1994) and John Holland & John Miller (1991); are central writers that have contributed to the 
development of CAS from the beginning. These chosen texts are one of the first ones published concentrating on CAS. 
I do not claim that everyone using CAS has these elements illustrated. Holland’s and Miller’s 1991 published text was 
chosen as I do not have access to the one published in 1988. In addition, exemplifying Kauffman’s CAS would have 
been illustrative (e.g. the relationship between nature and positivism), but it was left out this time. 
92
 Niklas Luhmann (1990) is a central writer to the development of ‘a modern version’ of system theory. 
93
 Belonging to the same ’category’ as Simon, who’s approach we discussed earlier, for this particular categorization 
see e.g. Raadschelders (2008). 
94
 The point of this contemplation is not the be comprehensive but to be a short illustration to include certain focal 
points, which we can examine in relation to what we have gone through in the earlier parts and that we will go 
through in the following parts.  
95
 An analysis for these writings is done using theoretical based content analyses. In the theory-based content analysis 
material can be sorted out based on e.g. previous context, theory, or concept; the aim can be e.g. testing theory’s 
functionality, testing its validity, or testing in a way of applying it in a new context (Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2002: 112–118). 
According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2002), when doing a theory-guided or theory-based content analysis, then, the first 
step is to make an analysis structure, which can be loose or not, depending on the research. Afterwards, the first step 
is picking out the things in the empirical data that are left inside or outside of this analysis structure, in order to make 
the empirical data simpler. The things that are left can be divided into different groups; it makes the examination 
tighter and enables arraying of the empirical data. In the next step these findings are connected to the concepts 
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mission statement). It is to explain how agents make choices when confronted by endlessly novel, 
evolving world (Holland & Miller, 1991: 365)
96
; understanding universal principles that underlie all 
systems and the pivotal differences between them (Gell-Mann, 1994: 18). It is to see how we can 
find emerging simplicity
97
 among these complex interactions (Gell-Mann, 1994); how we can 
reveal the global attractor or optimum towards which these local niches contribute to (Holland & 
Miller, 1991: 365). In the positivist elimination the subject was a mirror, a reflective of the 
objective universe (Morin, 2008: 23). In the current understanding it still holds on to the positivist 
understanding but in a different sense; if we cannot understand the whole through its elements, we 
can understand some of the ways these elements are guided towards constitution through reasons 
found in the universal attractor or optimum. Analogically speaking this quest becomes a task of 
finding, in the first stage, the „large‟ tentative frames – shaped in a form of a compactor – after 
which we start gradually pushing the four sides towards the center into a more compact form that 
will ultimately, in form, shape out to be an attractor or the optimum.
98
 The local can be regarded as 
a smaller compactor inside the larger compactor.
99
 In positivist sense, it is important to notice that if 
something slips between the cracks, we can just open the compactor a little bit and then continue 
again (compare Gell-Mann, 1994: 24);
100
 moreover, if we find something that does not fit inside 
any of the known compactors, then, we just need to produce a new bigger compactor that subsumes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
driven from the theory. The aim of this process is to have a more conceptual view of the issue we are examinating, 
and furthermore, to be able to connect it to the theoretical framework; leading into apprehending and portraying 
what the empirical data meant for the research. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2002: 108–118.) The amount of empirical data 
needed for the purpose of each research is dependent on research, its aims, and the amount needed for to create an 
illustration; trough theoretical based content analysis, we can perceive, then, what is the importance of these 
particular understandings (Hirsijärvi et al., 2009: 181–182). 
96
 Holland and Miller (1991) contemplate economic systems as agents in this particular writing. 
97
 Once again, I am not disputing the intrinsic “value” that can or could be found in simplicity, for instance, in services 
of both private and public sector (see e.g. Mikolon et al., 2015). But once we start seeing this claim of having simplicity 
everywhere as some kind of attached ‘superiority’, then, it easily starts to imply itself as a truth  (compare efficiency). 
Hence, transforming itself, for instance, towards what we are seeking in complexity; and has effects what we try to 
find from it, and how we position ourselves towards knowledge; in other words, such as deducting complexity to a 
meaning of being complicated. 
98
 Compare to the list in the paradigm of simplification, for example, the last three principles. What does it matter 
what each actor does in this illustration? 
99
 I do not mean a straight box inside another box like the Russian doll (maatuska in Finnish), but in a sense of these 
dense points related to different frames. One of the most interesting question for a different kind of research would 
be what this compactor exactly represents in each situation and if/ what kind of variety there is inside it. In other 
words, whether it is an image, some kind of a mental construction, or even a social construction in each or in all cases 
– I am inclined to foremost call it a mental construction in case of CAS, which shows in my explanation.  
100
 One of the reasons why maladaptive (reducing uncertainty in a process by a debilitating way) schemata appear is 
that the system is not defined broadly enough that encompass all that the schemata is concerned with (Gell-Man, 
1994: 22). 
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the previous one(s).
101
 I use the term compactor because, according to Gell-Mann (1994: 19), in 
order to give predictions, a theory needs to be combined with boundary conditions.
102
 
 
What makes these complex adaptive systems adaptive is their evolvement towards certain criteria 
(Gell-Mann, 1994: 21–22); adaptation is a result of those niches it exploits (aims to increase) 
through particular adaptation (Holland & Miller, 1991: 365). For Holland and Miller (1991: 365) an 
agent to be called as adaptive, it means that the agent‟s actions, in its environment, can be assigned 
a value (performance, fitness, et cetera), a value it works towards to increase. It is the reasoning for 
its actions.
103
 Of course there are sources of error in the way it builds schemas;
104
 there are two 
different kinds of error, the way it finds regularities where there are none or the way it overlooks 
regularities (Gell-Mann, 1994: 18–19, 22–23); concentration is on the way we can identify these 
perceived regularities (Gell-Mann, 1994: 25). In the positivist understanding, information was 
perceived in ways of transforming it from one place to another (Morin, 2008: 13–14); when now it 
is a problem of interpretation connected to way of processing the information. As it is impossible to 
have all the information in a complex phenomenon, we can use these fundamental principles as well 
as regularities seen in frozen accidents to find ways to avoid, or at least lower, the probability of 
environments selection; further down the line they can used, for instance, in policy situations (Gell-
                                                          
101
 This is illustrated in Gell-Mann’s (1994: 24) understanding of frozen accidents; sometimes what we perceived to be 
regularities might sometimes turn out to be only frozen accidents that do not apply; presumption is that frozen 
accidents are regularities that apply elsewhere. 
102
 One of the fundamental problems we face while contemplating a system, especially human  social systems, is who 
defines a system (Morçöl, 2012: 45–61). This question draws our attention towards a contemplation what is included 
and excluded inside a particular system; conversation touching a system is always a question of boundary problems 
(e.g. Cilliers, 2001, 2005). Drawing our attention towards our ability to define different borders as precisely as 
possible, which in turn enables us to orient our attention towards, for instance, the interfaces and where the 
exchange happens (see e.g. autopoiesis theory). This line of inquiry has received tremendous fascination, for instance, 
in management literature, consultancy and marketing; conversation concerning customer interface is seen, for 
example, as a source of innovation, or as a reason differentiating professional institutions in the way they can direct 
their innovation towards customer interface (e.g. Tuominen, 2013). Meaning that finding these interfaces becomes 
essential towards the efficiency how an organization works. By improving this ability, it, the meaning that is derived 
from it, becomes more innovative, leading towards better service, advantage in the market, more ‘bang for a buck’, 
value production, et cetera. I am not denying the possible gains achievable through this line of examination, I would 
merely like to elicit other sides of this depictions. The potential problems emerge when we start to derive concepts 
from the realizations achieved through them (for instance, examining everything as a system), because concepts 
should only be defined by their cores and never by their boundaries (Morin, 2008: 46–48; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 
15–34). One of the fundamental Descartian ideas is a clear distinction as well as clarity, which are essential towards 
the truth (Morin, 2008: 48), but concepts are merely intersections and should not be confused as propositions, 
because this is the underlying reason producing a belief that there are certain (or more) scientific concepts (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994: 15–34). Henceforth, by trying to depict borders for what should be included in a concept of complex 
system, it creates a biased reality and as a by-product potential skewedness (Morin, 2008: 54–57, mutilating thought). 
103
 For example, compare to the intrinsic truth for action in the paradigm of simplicity (referred to in the previous 
footnote). 
104
 Schemas are perceived regularities, which it uses to manage (provide descriptions, prescriptions, et cetera) its 
actions (Gell-Mann, 1994: 18–19). 
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Mann, 1994: 24–25; see also Luhmann, 1990: 84). Analogically speaking, it becomes a problem of 
finding and realizing these regularities inside each compactor, as well as establishing various 
bridges between them. As Morin (2008: 14) notes, in positivism interpreting information presents 
itself foremost as a source of “great caps and great uncertainties”.105 Instead of transferring it as a 
boundary exchange (see thermodynamic systems), now, in it, information is regarded as a piece 
wax between two hands that is never endingly molded into a new form, the struggle is rather 
grinding it just the right way into just the right form; as well as a question of how control the 
amount of it – having too much or too little wax in each situation. 
 
Central to the problem concentrated on the previous paragraph was information. As stated 
information is a central concept in the problem of understanding ambiguity (Morin, 2008: 13). 
Since one can never have all the information it becomes a question of having enough but not too 
much information, it becomes a task of gathering information as coarse grains that are constantly 
grinded, doing identification of perceived regularities, and creating different schemata; CAS is a 
“pattern-recognition device” where most of the problems rise due to the flawed ways of interpreting 
information it gathers; furthermore, it is a task of separating important information (Gell-Mann, 
1994: 18, 19, 22, 26). It is not just how it sees and selects operation to be taken but the way it can 
see and form observations (Luhmann, 1990: 81–82). It chooses certain niches that it tries to exploit 
as it can rarely exploit them all; and connects itself, in a networked environment, towards other 
CASs (Holland & Miller, 1991: 365); CAS is relation towards other CASs that form a string of 
subsystems, for instance, markets are an example of CASs in a string of subsystems (Gell-Mann, 
1994: 24). Positivism carries in itself an aspiration for completeness (Morin, 2008: 46), even if 
knowing everything is claimed to be unachievable for a CAS almost in all situations; exploiting all 
the niches is like “finding a universal competitor in a tropical forest” (Gell-Mann, 1994: 22; 
compare Holland & Miller, 1991: 365). None the less, now it holds on to an understanding where 
completeness is not an objective but as an endeavor that, although most of the time we cannot or 
might not achieve in a complete way (for various reasons that fluctuate according to each situation), 
we still walk towards in a same direction. Henceforth, what happens is that instead of seeing them 
like pieces of a manual, they (regularities and principles) are like the stops in The Star of Africa 
(Afrikan tähti); stops between which we travel. It is still adhered in the same way of revealing as 
many stops as possible; difference being that we cannot see them all at the beginning of the game, 
nor do we have to, or in the end necessarily need to. Hence, we move on the board between those 
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 Concerning reducing uncertainty see 1.1. 
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that we see, and the more we uncover the easier it becomes moving between these stops, as one 
does not have to travel as long of a distance between other stops (regularities and principles), which 
reduces potential risks associated with information. It is not just about revealing these stops but 
being able to use them at a right time (see Gell-Mann, 1991: 24). Premises of an attractor are shaped 
like a gradually completed 3D pointillism work. 
 
The nature of CASs is depicted as a never ending struggle, where change in the environment as well 
as CASs adaptation endlessly creates new niches (Holland & Miller, 1991: 365). Rather than just 
„adapting‟, which can be maladaptive (reducing uncertainty in a process by a debilitating way), it 
aims to be „pro‟ adaptive (raising its fitness, or the niche, among others); as these actions are 
emergent, the definition for what „proactiviness‟ results in, concerning each situation, it is 
impossible to give an exact definition but only premises (Gell-Mann, 1991: 21–22).106 As aggregate 
behavior can be explained without the knowledge of each agent or every detail, but still is the result 
of dynamic behavior resulting from individual activities (Holland & Miller, 1991: 365). Hence, now 
the point is not to know every detail in order to achieve understanding, but realizing how to build 
bridges over these perceived gaps and uncertainties. As this way of positivism regards actions 
emergent outcomes unknowable, it still holds on, as a premise, that we can eventually reach a state 
of knowledge that will „iteration by iteration‟ lead us closer to having desired way of improving our 
fitness or niche. In other words, it learns to live with uncertainty and knowledge gaps, which it 
cannot most often even potentially know, by learning ways to ignore or bypass them by making 
them „shorter‟ distance wise; as in the Star of Africa, you do not need to roll as big of a number to 
get to the next stop (regularity or principle), making adaption easier and less left to the enforced 
change of environment.
107
 What one describes is not survival per se but dominance (see Gell-Mann, 
1994: 20–21; see also Luhmann, 1990: 84). Action becomes a way of dealing with complexity (see 
Luhmann, 1990: 84); it gives an ostensible reasoning for truth, certainty, et cetera, where action is 
no longer a wager, as Morin (2008: 54–57) regards it, but a nugget of knowledge that in a long run 
transforms into different truths.
108
 Hence, our understanding of dealing with complexity, let‟s say in 
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 One of the reasons why maladaptive schemata appear is that the system is not defined broadly enough that 
encompass all that the schemata is concerned with (Gell-Man, 1994: 22; compare to the understanding of a 
compactor when something new appears). 
107
 Enforced selectivity is a term Luhmann (see e.g. 1990: 80–85) uses to describe the unavoidable condition of reality, 
which is enforced selectivity. 
108
 They fail to see the meaning of meaning and take their meaning as a truth in a positivist sense, where the problem 
is not constant interpretation, since in a way it is for them as well, but finding these regularities (truths) and shuffling 
them in each case into a right form inside each of these compactors. Hence, truth has evolved from ‘global’ truths (as 
Gell-Mann (1994) points out, fundamental truths are rare) to attractor wise (read each CAS wise) truths that we 
furthermore use to see larger truths (frozen accidents) and connect to all CASs, and systems these CASs are part of. 
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this occasion in terms of a strategy, is based on an illusion; it is derived from gradual betterment. 
For instance, think about strategy in war and how it has developed to our present situation; it is an 
accumulation where the current time is regarded to know, not necessarily everything that was 
known before or doing it in  a more pure way, but „more‟ as a premise.109 
 
What is failure? When it reaches a local optimum and stays in it assuming its lastingness (Holland 
& Miller, 1991: 365); in our inability to realize the ever changing particularity of complexity‟s 
representational meaning (Luhmann, 1990: 84); when we find regularities where there are none, or 
overlook regularities, or when the system is not defined broadly enough (Gell-Mann, 1994). It is the 
role of experience that is given central place (see e.g. Gell-Mann, 1994: 18, 22), the horizon where 
organization is looking from (Luhmann, 1990 84); it aims to make amends to the old problem of 
positivism where history and time are excluded (see e.g. Turunen, 1995: 136–138; Alhadeff-Jones, 
2010). It strives to establishes an ability to continually reflect on our knowledge (see e.g. Gell-
Mann, 1994: 18–19), in other words, it tries to bring recursion that was for long missed into the 
mix
110
 but these reflections are restricted to the niches it aims to exploit and niches that arise 
(Holland & Miller, 1991: 365), and to what is available when this adaption occurs (Gell-Mann, 
1994). As Gell-Mann (1994) proclaims, big steps are extremely rare; as they are in reality as well, 
especially in public policy since those actors are confined to an environment with a complicated 
strings of „rules‟. But this way of construing pins a rather grim realism of the nature of interaction; a 
Hobbesian kind where “a man is a wolf to another man”.111112 
 
As positivism was accused of ignoring the dialogical nature of reality (Turunen, 1995: 137–138)113, 
now it is some sense incorporated into CAS. But its understanding is denoted as a constant struggle 
(see the earlier two paragraphs), not so much as for not dying but for who gets to decide how to 
adapt and towards what we are struggling for – it is a struggle for domination. Henceforth, as 
                                                          
109
 Even though it is a related problem, do not read this as the well-known problem of affiliating development for 
same as progress. 
110
 Recursion principle: It’s both the product and the producer, for instance, individual’s and society’s relationship; it is 
a cycle where every product comes back to the producer; the cycle is self-constitutive, self-organizing, and self-
producing (see Morin, 2008: 49–50). 
111
 Or of Neorealism at its ’best’, where instead pinning it on the nature of a single unit, we see it as well at the level of 
the whole as well where it is a constant build up towards something (compare niches, fitness, et cetera). 
112
 In many ways these elaborations seem suitable for security related institutions but the question it leaves unasked is 
related to its own foundation, not that the ‘institution’ that it represents cannot die, but it takes as certain its need to 
exist. Not so much it’s self-being but the reason for its action. If one wants to be a bit more imaginative in their words, 
they interpret it as filling the void, where it takes the void as a self-evident truth on the account of it becoming filled. 
113
 In complexity dialogue is a part of dialogic principle (whole-part, life-death, effect-cause, product-producer, and 
separability-inseparability) that is seen as both complimentary and antagonistic by its nature; one that is realized in 
the relationship between order and disorder (Morin, 2007: 21; 2008: 49). 
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positivism was accused of narrowing reality, because it attached concepts and thinking into 
empiricism and technical observations (see e.g. Turunen, 1995: 133–135), now CAS narrows 
argumentation as a war or a competition metaphor (see Lakoff & Jonhson, 2003: 3–7).114 To ignore 
the other implications for now, it becomes a struggle for action, where action still is a wager but 
more specifically a wager for the organization that has or has not various often unknowable effects 
outside.
115
 Instead we could examine any taken action as a mutilation, as most of the problems in 
our society (or municipality, or world, or organization) are furthermore also caused by actions (see 
Morin, 2008: 56–57); hence, it is, moreover, a wager for everyone outside the organization.116 
 
As we consider action, change, uncertainty, or their interrelations, it becomes a question what is it 
that we base our decisions on, especially since it should not be adaptive but proadaptive (see earlier 
explanation). For Luhmann (1990: 80, 84) meaning is an answer to this never ending problem, 
furthermore, it as well constructs a bridge that closes the gap between the soft and the hard 
sciences.
117
 Meaning becomes the representation of complexity; meaning is what we look for when 
we are trying to resolve the enforced selection possibilities; what this problem we talk about as 
complexity has posed towards us; what it means for us in this particular situation. It actuates in the 
way we approach that particular problem; it is the link between the actual and the potential (in this 
order). (Luhmann, 1990: 80–85.) In other words, for Luhmann meaning represents the focal point 
what we interpret and how we interpret it. As Thietart and Forgues (2011: 56) point out, in their 
discussing of the objectivists, what we first thought of as randomness further down the line 
uncovers hidden processes. In this case the hidden process is the theorem of enforced selection that 
the soft and the hard sciences can adhere to as a dot – or let‟s call it in Gell-Mann‟s (1994) terms as 
a frozen accident – between two bridges build on both sides to bridge the gap (see Luhmann, 1990: 
85).
118
 As Luhmann (1990), Gell-Mann (1994), Holland and Miller (1991) try to „bridge‟ the old 
problem
119
, it is not the whole nor is it the parts that we merely need to understand but interaction 
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 On the other hand, compare to the criticism of resilience in political science (see Chandler, 2014a; 2014b). In 
addition, see Walker and Cooper (2011) on the genealogy of resilience and what resilience approach would mean as a 
management approach. 
115
 I am not denying the need or possibilities of this interpretation, only its delimitation towards reality. 
116
 For Morin (2008: 54–57) the better we conceive this problem as well as the problem complexity poses towards us, 
then, the better we can form actions (thought) in way that they are less mutilating towards people. 
117
 An understanding that there are, in the first place, things called hard or soft sciences, is based on a false positivist 
ideal that has remained into our time (see Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 134). 
118
 As they were niches in the case of an economy (Holland & Miller, 1991: 365), or as they were regularities in the 
case of CAS for Gell-Mann (1994). 
119
 As Gell-Mann (1994: 25) points out, he does not believe that these fundamental principles can be used as such (at 
that time in 1995) into behavioral sciences, as they need news ways to incorporate situation specific information into 
them (see where the problem is located in); however, they perceive building these abstractions as points between 
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and distribution, in other words, not localization nor system behavior per se; the one depicted as the 
holographic principle by Morin (2008: 50–51).120 The problem for Luhmann, Gell-Mann, Holland 
and Miller remains that their explanation can be in many ways seen through meta-characters of a 
system (regularities, fundamentals), meta-characters of the CAS (niches), and at least in a certain 
way also Luhmann perceives meaning as a meta-characters of phenomena (complexity); it is 
important distinction whether we regard them as Morin does, where meta-character is not a 
character but only a meta-point of view towards e.g. society, not the meta-point of society in itself; 
as illustrated by Gödel‟s theorem or Tarski‟s logic, there is no single point you can use to 
characterize the whole system (see Morin, 2008: 50–51); as the recent research of black hole 
suggests, nothing is completely something (they are not completely „black‟).121 Hence, what does it 
mean to be characterizing and seeing something completely in terms of e.g. niches it aims to exploit 
(compare footnote 102; starting citation of this chapter)?
122
 
 
2.3. Living with uncertainty – how uncertainty constructs our reality 
 
As we know there are „known knowns‟. There are things we know we know. We also 
know there are „known unknowns‟. That is to say, we know there are some things we do 
not know. But there are also „unknown unknowns‟, the ones we don‟t know we don‟t 
know. (Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense, cf. BBC News 2007).
123
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
different bridges; these points from onwards we can start building knowledge on the Cartesian plane, where we can 
incorporate other sciences knowledge (will be explained in 4.). 
120
 System characteristics are distributed rather than localized, passing reductionism (parts) and holism (whole). 
Furthermore, the three principles explained along the way – dialect, recursion, and the holograph – are linked 
together (Morin, 2008: 49–51). 
121
 I will end this section here; further elaborations could also be explained concerning at least context, effectivity, 
interaction, order, and truth. 
122
 Some of these problems elucidated in this chapter are an illustration of post-positivism, for example, more 
‘nuanced’ way of understanding reality; how information and perceiving error can effect interpretation (an 
acknowledgement of bias), seeing and exploiting all niches is often impossible (reality does not exist in a vacuum; 
allowing examination of multiple variables) (see Sharma, 2010). Elaborating these differences further would have also 
been a possibility but I have left this kind of specifying outside of this thesis on same account as explained earlier on 
logical positivism or objectivism. 
123
 The context of this particular speech is about conflict and how to deal with it in a nation context, but it might as 
well be a quote from a manager contemplating expansion into a new market area, or a student writing his/ her thesis, 
or a professor contemplating a claim presented to him in a thesis. In other words, the constraints we are posed with 
limit our decisions making abilities. For instance, nation is limited to its reconnaissance, information sources, voter’s 
opinions, et cetera; manager is limited to his/ her knowledge, to the way they know their market segment works, 
knowledge that they have and can acquire to close the gap between there market segment and the area of expansion, 
et cetera. Henceforth, what we know, positions the way we see the unknown. 
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It would be difficult to talk about complexity without having a conversation concerning 
uncertainty.
124
 The concept of uncertainty plays a crucial role in complexity theories, but for some 
theories, and understandings, its position is more pivotal. For instance, theories concerned with 
complex adaptive systems uphold organization‟s relationship towards uncertainty through other 
interrelated theories, concepts, analogies, or metaphors – such as resilience and robustness. As 
Allen (Millikan, 1987: 133 cf. Allen, 2011: 20) points out uncertainty is a “central concept in the 
organization literature, particularly in theories which seek to explain the relationship between 
organizations and their environment” (also see Chandler, 1962; Scott, 1987; Thompson, 1967). And 
as they would all accentuate, the concept has played a primary role in the development of complex 
organizations; as Thompson (1967: 159) would even further elaborate, coping with uncertainty is 
“the essence of the public administrative process”. Henceforth, it is hard to deny its salience, but 
why does it play such a pivotal role and how have we arrived to this present conception? 
 
Once we start to go on the road paved in the last paragraph, then, we start to think about why and 
from what uncertainty, and hence complexity, arises from? Morin (2008: 20) explains that 
“complexity, in a sense, is always about change”, because it does not origin just from the amount of 
interactions or interfaces, the quantity of, but from indetermination, randomness, and uncertainty. 
But more importantly “complexity cannot be reduced to uncertainty” (Morin, 2008: 20). Because as 
Morin (2008: 19–21) points out, complexity only coincides with a part of organization‟s everyday 
realities of inscribed complexity, being a certain mixture of order and disorder. As complexity 
cannot be reduced to uncertainty, then, it is also one of the crucial difference and the critique I 
would imply towards those theories concerned with adaptive systems and concepts related to it. In 
itself the term adaptive, in complex adaptive systems, is a potential source of misconception; when 
we try to describe social systems through a character, then, we run a risk of applying that particular 
character to its nature, for instance, as a struggle to adapt (Morçöl, 2012: 40–43), therefore, 
imprinting something towards the nature of the complex system in which it is always biased to as a 
meta-character (see 2.2.1.). 
 
Going back to uncertainty, and as elaborated in the previous paragraphs, it would be cumbersome to 
get into an argument concerning the fact that the future is uncertain, change brings uncertainty, or 
that there are intrinsic uncertainties presented in the everyday organizational life. Rather the 
problem manifests itself when we start to contemplate where uncertainty stems from; and especially 
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 For instance, for Luhmann (1990: 84) the structure of meaning is based on the difference between actuality and 
potentiality, where actuality is certain but unstable, and potentiality is uncertain but stable. 
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why and how we can control, mitigate, or eradicate uncertainty that is brought to us by decisions, 
change, et cetera. In the management literature “the concepts of risk and uncertainty predominate”, 
as the research has for long ignored many of those qualitative aspects contained intrinsically into it 
that complexity now forces us to accept (Allen, 2010: 21).
125
 Stacey (2010: 27–37) traces the origin 
for this line of thinking in the fact that the base of the current management theory is in the scientific 
revolution in which uncertainty is merely something in an organization life that has not been 
uncovered for it to become more certain. Furthermore, the roots for the concept of uncertainty, in 
organization theory, can be traced into the technical sphere of industrial America such as 
engineering. It is from here that the success attained by the reduction of technical uncertainties was 
translated into the reduction of uncertainties in the organizational life – leading into seeing, for 
instance, efficiency to be defined in terms of the reduction of uncertainties. (Shenhav and Weitz, 
2000; see also Shenhav, 1999.) In other words, as Shenhav and Weitz (2000: 375) explain through 
the work of Williamson (1975; 1985), the canonical view of reducing and eliminating uncertainty 
and controlling future contingencies is seen as the object of administrative efficiency, and as 
explained was seen as the reason behind the success of industrial efficiency. Leading Shenhav and 
Weitz (2000: 394) to ultimately note that the roots of many of the key concepts in organization 
theory are inadequately known; further as Allen (2010: 21) remarks, a common problem in the 
management literature is that the relationships between uncertainty and complexity are meagerly 
studied. Especially this seems to be the case with theories, related to the concept of uncertainty, that 
assess critically concepts that have spun in relations to it, which have as their aim to manage, 
mitigate or control uncertainty (compare previous paragraph and 2.2.1.).
126
 In other words, our aim 
should not be eliminating complexity by reducing or finding new ways to resist it, rather according 
to Morin (2008: 21) our aim should be “from complexity to ever increasing complexity”; for Morin 
(2008) it is a gradual journey from the hyper-simplification to hyper-complexity; finding new ways 
to live with uncertainties not ways of reducing uncertainties, or ways of controlling uncertainty 
trough knowledge production.
127128129
 
                                                          
125
 Moreover, as Montuori (2008b: xi) points out, disciplinary knowledge has problems in ignoring its own 
paradigmatic assumptions. 
126
 These concepts, or in some cases mere metaphors, are critically researched in a much more elaborate way, for 
example, in the field of political science. For instance, in relation to resilience, Chandler (2014a; see also 2014b) 
perceives it as a concept that gradually dooms us into a state of despair; if it is used as the current way is, in other 
words, this way of seeing it depraves us of hope that is essential for humans’ ambitions – the hope of doing things in a 
new better way being one of our fundamental forward driving forces; as it is in organizational life as well. 
127
 What I was arguing in the last paragraph were the possibilities we can attain by examining critically the roots and 
usage of the concept that is also the aim of this study. It gives us new ways to see existing and potential problems but 
further to elaborate what are the original relations and reasoning behind the concept. If we understand it in a more 
refined way, then, it also opens up new possibilities how it can be used or can/ might/ will interfere with other 
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These different orientations have forceful implications for science and research but also towards 
public policy, strategy, and programs – where they lean to. If we fast forward a little bit, as the 
citation at the beginning of the chapter shows, essentially it is about action, making a decision, 
going towards the unknown, the uncertain; it ultimately says that we have to make a decision and 
take action if we are to purposely try to change something – or adapt in case of CAS – in many 
cases it is about not wanting to leave it in the „hands of faith‟.130 As pointed out, for Morin (2008: 
54–57) action is ultimately a wager, but the question is in what way? How we position ourselves 
towards uncertainties in general will have an effect how we treat them and ultimately approach 
them as part of our decision making or action; and for this reason it is necessary to contemplate how 
we, for example, „cope‟ with uncertainties. The way we perceive action to be taken shapes in a 
fundamental way the paths we take or the method we imply for reasoning. In addition, this is crucial 
for how we deal with uncertain outcomes of these actions. This is secondly important for how we 
understand outcomes relationship towards different actions, since it will affect the way we compose 
concepts, measurements, programs, strategies and ultimately decisions and actions. This all comes 
back to the question, not just the way action escapes our intentions the moment we have taken it, 
but to the fact that if we are perceived to be making interpretations or prescriptions for the 
problem(s) at hand. It comes back to many of those question related to positivism
131
; whether our 
expectations are those of linear ways, such as do this, do that, do not do that, in these cases do that 
or this, but on that case that.
132
 After all, is this claim made by complexity thinking even that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
concepts in a potential way. After all, it is a way of accumulating knowledge about possible relations (compare also to 
the example concerning the nature of at the start of 2.). 
128
 Furthermore, of course this contemplation has a huge variety of different possibilities for different ways in various 
organizations, as for some their only task in reality is reducing uncertainties. Of course in public policy context, there 
are laws, equality, et cetera that we need to take into consideration, but what is one of the background problems they 
are all as well connected to? 
129
 For some this might seem depressing or even demoralizing, to call for a permanent ‘self-reflection’ but it at least 
offers us a step towards less mutilating way of producing knowledge and hopefully will result in less biases on the way 
we use knowledge, in order to perceive and produce desired ways to improve our way of life (in comparison see 
Stacey’s (2010) ending contemplations; and Foucault’s (1980, 2003, 2007, 2008) apparatus, truth, power, and 
governmentality; also compare on Morin’s (2008) understanding of mutilating thought). 
130
 Original meaning of the sentence refers also to the fact that we cannot know every variable in each situation, but it 
should furthermore mean about those that we do not want to know or deny of knowing. 
131
 Parting with positivism means giving up absolute certainty (or rather an illusion of absolute), but do not put the 
emphasis on absolute, as it will become a task of replacing it with variances, et cetera. It is question of not delimiting 
ourselves already at the start to the same problem. 
132
 Humankind has always been fascinated with the unknown, because it is the unknown that holds the keys; and, on 
the other hand, beholds into the future and into the kingdom of better understanding. For a long period of time we 
perceived this to be achievable by meticulously breaking everything down into the smallest detail, listing every 
interaction, relation and categorizing; which would first lead into our ability to say something definite about the 
subject of the study and ultimately lead towards further steps revealing more and more about the nature of its parts, 
the whole, their interactions and ultimately their relations and categorization compared to others. Through this 
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peculiar, few managers would take any universal advice as itself without requiring any 
contemplation into their local setting; as it has been already argued regarding the limits of universal 
value for most of the practices.
133
 Hence, it accentuates the dialogical nature of complexity (Morin, 
2008: 48–51) and the aptitude of the hermeneutical approach for studies relating to complexity. 
 
2.4. How complexity relates to efficiency? 
 
Our orientation towards certain understandings already delimits their connections. If we perceive 
uncertainty or complexity as having a negative connotation, then, it naturally leads on ways of 
wanting to reduce, control, or bypass them e.g. relations. On the other hand, finding something 
intrinsically good, such as efficiency, leads us trying to advance it, and in case of problems, 
especially in case of established concepts and understandings, often finding more suitable ways of 
advancing it in those situations; in terms of a hiccup, so to speak, not to throw the baby out with the 
bath water. For a long time, some might argue, both uncertainty and complexity had solely a 
negative connotation,
134
 but now they have been seen to provide insight into certain important 
processes for organizational life.
135
  
 
Even though we have established that perceiving complexity as a synonym to being complicated is 
a contortion, one could still be willing to say that something that is hard to comprehend, then, can 
be perceived inefficient, perhaps even by its intrinsic nature. It radiates notably from a mathematical 
understanding, where most theories are concerned with the complexity of complexity (to use 
Luhmann‟s (1990) term, how difficult it is to solve; where branches, such as computational 
complexity, perceive it as a relation, for instance, the more it will take time to solve it (compare 
complex modeling, algorithmic information theory). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
process we will arrive, eventually, at the final destination, the last stop of this particular line of thinking; presenting us, 
as the first light of the day presents us with, a revelation that would reveal, or unmask, what has evaded us until this 
very moment of time. But in reality, and as we all know, this moment was inevitable, it was just a matter of when and 
through what it would reveal itself to us. As the journey towards it is sometimes long and treacherous, but fear no 
evil, as the final destination lies ahead as long as you are prepared to travel the journey. 
133
 For instance, compare to the black hole example; recent discoveries concerning the universal application of some 
consultancy ‘truths’ i.e. fabricated results to seem so. 
134
 For something to be described as complex in organization or management theory, as in general conversation, it is 
attributed with a negative connotation: hard to describe parsimoniously, hard to give a definite answer, hard to get a 
grip of the problem; among others, we found it hard to establish a definitive starting point of the problem, from which 
we could go forward in a step by step motion knowing what contributes to the problem and in what proportion (e.g. 
wicked problems). 
135
 See e.g. writings related to chaos theory, nonlinearity, innovation, and creativity. 
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What I am contemplating here, as a transition, are the differences how we do and see science, for 
instance, in organization and management discipline versus engineering related fields of study. I 
doubt that there is anyone who would object the claim that organization theory produces science for 
different purposes than engineering theory, but if we start by transferring the same claim into 
different setting, by saying that the way science is done in organization and engineering theory 
differs foundationally, then, we would raise more than few eyebrows. To illustrate it further, let us 
go back to the notion of complexity and think what is it exactly that we mean when we claim that 
something is complex? Is it by its nature, interaction, relation, or outcome? But once again, and as 
we start to ask these follow-up questions, we roam a different path and ignore the orientation 
already offered to us in the start. In other words, what kind of knowledge science is supposed to 
produce, the customs one is supposed to comply, and disciplinary practices one is supposed affirm; 
because if one steps out of these ways, customs, and practices one faces dangers of 
misunderstanding, stigmatizing, or refusal (e.g. Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006). This is also a 
part in an important quest for disciplinary acknowledgement and legitimacy (see e.g. Ahonen, 
2011). We do not assume that science is done the same way, for instance, it has been a widely 
acknowledged fact for a long time that qualitative data cannot be used the same way to make 
straight conclusions as quantitative data can (see e.g. Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006), 
machines and biological organisms have substantial differences, cultures differ in each 
organization, the interrelation of conception and information, et cetera.  
 
As different stories have diverging strings, so do they have fundamentally different starting points 
that will most often lead to different journeys. One kind of illustration shows an alternative. Calling 
it an alternative means that we are „stretching‟ it; this meaning is not competing, rather I will 
continue to contemplate where it is more suited for certain purposes and how we could establish this 
understanding. 
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3. What is efficiency? 
 
If economic efficiency turns out to be the one true religion, maybe it is because its 
prophets could so easily conquer (Wildavsky, 1966: 308).
136137
 
 
Efficiency is a tricky concept, but perhaps in a substantially different way than complexity or 
uncertainty. In Finland, as illustrated by Vakkuri (2009: 11–30), efficiency, as a concept, is used to 
describe various diverging approaches trying to solve the problem posed to us by what we have 
come to know as efficiency; furthermore, one could even go as far as calling it an obsession of 
finding the right theory to describe it in different (institutional, disciplinary, et cetera) settings. 
Henceforth, it is not surprising when Manzoor (2014: 1) notes that “one of the imperatives of public 
administration is the achievement of efficiency at all levels”. Any form of critique against aspects 
associated with efficiency usually starts by stating: I am not against efficiency in itself. Hence the 
question, how can you really be against efficiency itself?
138
 It appears to be that when a term, or a 
concept, receives a foundationally positive connotation, such as efficiency has, then the only aspect 
of it one can contest is how it is conceptualized, or more easily said accomplished; not the concept 
in itself (see e.g. Yliaska, 2014).
139
 I am even inclined to call it an ideology by which I mean it is a 
vision justifying the action. By this claim I do not mean perceiving it to be something contradictory 
to science or truth but merely in a sense that Marx used ideology; we regard it as a landmark. And 
in this case it means a landmark from where we can start to build our knowledge – our perceived 
truth onwards. As Deleuze and Guattari (19, 26–27) illustrated, the only concept that the Cartesian 
plane needs, in the way it produces knowledge, is the starting point that presupposes nothing 
objective; from this spot on it can gradually build knowledge onwards.
140
 On the other hand, every 
                                                          
136
 Why efficiency in relation to complexity? Complexity thinking is often ‘bound up’ with efficiency. For instance, 
Jalonen (2007), who was one of the first, in Finland, to construct a dissertation that used complexity thinking as a 
theoretical framework, applied complexity thinking in order to achieve e.g. a better way to harness innovation in 
order to gain more efficiency. 
137
 As stated, I do not aim in somehow denying efficiency, but showing a richer meaning into it. If one looks at the 
latest Government Program (hallitusohjelma) it does not matter whether we are discussing defense, environment, 
financial, labor, legal, or science matters – and in other meanings than in relation to cost-efficiency – efficiency is seen 
as a synonym for betterment (Finnish Government, 2015). 
138
 As an additional note, one of the recognized gains from these kinds of considerations is a significance of worth to 
any kind of evaluation; for example, the old build in understandings in institutional settings create ambiguity for any 
evaluation used in interrelation with decision making (Ahonen, 2014). 
139
 As shown by Yliaska (2014) concerning the efficiency seeking in his dissertation; how seeing certain ideas stemming 
from privatization as efficient by themselves had impacts on the public sector reforms in Finland from the 1970s to 
the late 1990s. Furthermore, Yliaska (2014) examined Finnish government’s quest for efficiency during this time 
period and concluded that the quest for efficiency actually did not produce the kind of efficiency that was looked for.  
140
 This can also be further illustrated in relation to Gadamer’s stance on language, as human being is a being in 
language: “Being a part of our own tradition, historical works do not primarily present themselves to us as neutral and 
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scientific inquiry, paradigm, or faculty has their own blind spots and sweet spots (see e.g. Montuori, 
2008b). These blind and sweet spots revolve, for instance, around the concepts, notions, or terms we 
use to depict, indicate, or demarcate our research; towards which management and organization 
theory is no stranger to.
141
 This section articulates one way of perceiving how the canvas was 
painted in the case of efficiency. 
 
One a rather unorthodox way to somehow show the level of difficulty, posed by this question of 
what is efficiency, can be illustrated by my own mind‟s depiction. When I first started to 
contemplate it on paper, then, this kind of „enumeration‟ in relation to public policy came to my 
mind. When talking about efficiency, in organization and management theory, it has created new 
concepts, notion, and values that elicit different kinds of conceptualization. For instance, terms, or 
concepts, such as effect, efficiency, effectiveness, performance, which are, or often times seem to 
be, mixed with notions of value, public value, or „good administration‟; relating to questions such 
as can government be efficient, should it be, and in this case how, what way, and in what situations. 
But is this conversation alone bypassing the conversation concerning the role of efficiency in itself? 
Whether it is a means to an end (instrument) or an end in itself already (value) and in relation to 
what? But even if these new notions of conceptualization, or the micro- macro-concepts to further 
adjust them, cover a better form of efficiency, then, it still does not exclude the need to examine the 
problem introduced; nor would a fact that even if those using it do recognize the build in problem 
with it (efficiency). After all, it seems that efficiency is the ground word in many conceptualizations 
of these new words that merely try to build efficiency in a way that covers a wider, or new, array of 
e.g. (public) values. But this all together excludes the possible problem of it just becoming a task of 
integrating more e.g. values; values that are all counted and compared in their input-output ratio 
(known as the technical efficiency) and just trying to find the right mix between them. Hence, the 
understanding associated with efficiency affects other inferences ushered from it. Secondly, how is 
efficiency still discernable inside these other depictions such as effectiveness? (How) does the 
colloquial usage differ and perpetuate these problems? Henceforth, can we just innovate a new and 
a better „working concept‟ that would depict in a better way reality or that what we perceive to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
value-free objects of scientific investigation. They are part of the horizon in which we live and through which our 
world-view gets shaped. We are, in other words, formed by these great works before we get the chance to approach 
them with an objectivizing gaze”. (Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2014: 5.) 
141
 When talking about social scientists, which could be applied to others as well, Foucault’ (2004: 23–27) stated that 
social scientists are the ones’ who create delimitations through their books, concepts, and theories. In other words, 
their power is in the way they translate reality into a concept or a theory. Because ultimately whenever someone uses 
that theory, a theory that is always only an intersection, he takes action and pushes something aside, which later on 
takes its revenge through the complexity we could not yet see (Morin, 2008: 54–57). 
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desirable according to our values (coming back to as what we know to be efficiency); as it 
somehow seems to integrate an earlier notions parts into it – it seems to retain the interpretation 
problem still in it. Rather if clarity is a virtue, as some claim, then knowing the different built in 
meanings can achieve „more‟ than any new equation or model could hope for; unless it really is the 
right theory of efficiency (for the public policy).
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Going again to the background reasoning why efficiency has been a subject of such fierce debates 
in recent times.
143
 In Finland the current prolonged recession has furthered the quest for efficiency 
and made the calls for the need of efficiency evermore pressing.
144
 Nevertheless, at the same time 
one can find diverging dialogues where some claim that public administration is efficient while 
others claim it to be inefficient. As Rutgers and van der Meer (2010: 756) allege, current 
conversation concerning efficiency has two different build in meanings, but the definition 
recognized and used to justify claims concerning efficiency refers almost solely to the more singular 
meaning of technical efficiency; leading us in a situation that by using this partial understanding we 
are unable to understand the complexity of the concept. Henceforth, at the moment some 
contemplations are arguing besides it, whereas, understanding these different interpretational 
meanings would allow us clarity inside the concept; instead of the way we now create clarity, 
knowingly or unknowingly, by simply reducing the notion to one of its meaning (Rutgers & van der 
Meer, 2010: 756). Part of this conversation are the long term scars of New Public Management 
(NPM), where we were forced to live with the prophecy of who has the best way to show input-
output ratio. In other words, who will finally find the tactic that will at last “allow managers to hit 
the efficiency bull‟s-eye” (Schachter, 2007: 801). As Yliaska (2014: 529–530) illustrates, the quest 
that went on during the NPM „period‟, and as several understandings associated with NPM still are 
going on strong, did not exactly lead into a better evaluating methods; it paradoxically replaced 
values associated with e.g. equality or those related to emotions and regarded them merely as noise; 
on the other hand, its own values that it used to replace them, such efficiency or productivity, were 
and in many ways still are notable even more vague. Hence the claim, where one can argue for the 
need to realize the conceptualization of the notion of efficiency; at the moment it still seems that in 
often times we are doomed in our search to find gold that keeps on turning out to be fool‟s gold; as 
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 Accompanied with the earlier mentioned all-time best seller called the Theory of Public Management and 
Organization. 
143
 In fact, it has been, just in different ‘forms’, part of a fierce debate at least since Wildavsky’s prediction in the 1960s 
(the quote at the start of the chapter). 
144
 For example, in Finland the conversation concerning the universities and the need to raise their efficiency (see e.g. 
Rehn, 2016). 
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oftentimes we do not even know yet what gold is but take technical efficiency as a metaphorical 
path that starts the journey leading towards the pot of it. 
 
As exemplified by the previous last two paragraphs, if one compares my own depiction to that 
shown in the previous one, then, it shows the problem that many of the contemplations are stuck 
with – such as mine was, in other words, unable to realize the conceptual problem at the heart of the 
concept. What Rutgers and van der Maar (2010) were showing, was that there are two different 
definitional meanings at the heart of the concept we know as efficiency; the predominant 
contemplation known as the technical efficiency in its various (also new) forms (e.g. allocative 
efficiency). On the other hand, one of the few instances where we can still see the manifestation of 
the second definitional meaning, known as the substantive meaning, can be illustrated through an 
example. Think about someone being called an “efficient person”; as Rutgers and van der Meer 
(2010: 772) point out, it cannot be illustrated merely through an input-output relation, or at least it 
becomes one in a rather perverted way, or it has to be solely in some clearly delined situations. 
Rather in here the interpretation of “a person capable of getting things done” is the meaning that 
makes in several conjunctions „better sense‟. (Rutgers & van der Meer, 2010:772.)145146147 
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 Often time’s conversation concerning efficiency falls into a conversation where conception is located in an 
instrumental rationality perspective (see Vakkuri, 2009: 11–17), which is common take on positivism. According to 
instrumental rationality, something can be regarded as a value free or to have intrinsic value by themselves, hence, 
offering ways for practical usage through generalizations (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 136, 161–162). 
Furthermore, in here values are left as opinions, hence, they cannot be argued logically (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 
2006: 169–170). Instrumental rationality turns the question merely as a task of finding ways to achieve what we are 
endeavoring for (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 162–165), since it has already been shown that something has 
an intrinsic value; deducting conversation merely as ways of finding new measurements, meta-concepts that further 
the main conceptualization, which intrinsically hold this attribute given to us by this original truth. 
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 Hence, why we need to examine different concepts and where they originate from, what their defects are and why 
we need to consider these effects; one of the ways we can do this consideration is to be more aware of the historical 
meanings and how they have shaped different concepts. 
147
 In interpretative research social reality is constructed from meanings defining the social norms. Hermeneutics 
explain reasons behind; why things happen(ed) the way they did (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti, 2006: 158). Hence, 
making it possible for us to interpret (as seen) the ‘truth’; what is the truth in that particular understanding and 
assessing its effects. 
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3.1. Constitutive meaning of efficiency 
 
As long as there is systems approach, there will be need for making that system efficient 
(Manzoor, 2014: 4).  
 
Even though the generally understood source of madness is incoherence, we often 
overlook the other one that is much more prevalent is the modern society that of 
coherence (Morin, 2008: 48). 
 
Efficiency, just like complexity, is a relatively new notion to be introduced in a systematic way to 
our argumentation. The late 19th century was only the time when the use of efficiency started to 
pick up the pace, hence, many classical economic writings, such Adam Smith‟s Wealth of Nations, 
lack any usage of the word (Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 761). There are at least three different 
ways we can conceptualize efficiency: input output ratio known as technical efficiency; efficiency 
as a quest for optimization e.g. known as the Pareto efficiency; efficiency as a substantive meaning, 
in other words, as a desired outcome, an end, or a purpose why action is undertaken. In the 
substantive meaning efficiency is – an operative agent – (1) the active force, (2) power, or ability, to 
get things done, or (3) a capacity to produce an effect; at least the first and the third definitions are 
present in our current understand of what we perceive efficiency to mean at the moment. (Rutgers 
and van der Meer, 2010.)
148
 My aim in this section is not to go through the concept of efficiency in 
a way that illustrates e.g. how it can be calculated, how cost-effectiveness can or should be 
achieved, how efficiency interrelates to effectiveness; nor is it to criticize the concept per se (for a 
more precise elaboration of the historical roots of the concept efficiency, efficiency‟s definition, or 
its relation to e.g. effectiveness see in public administration e.g. Schachter, 1989; Rutgers and van 
der Meer, 2010; and Manzoor, 2014; in engineering e.g. Alexander, 2009). I am going to illustrate, 
as I did in the complexity section, how through historically built in conception it has a certain 
multifacetedness of meanings built into it, which we rarely acknowledge. 
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 Even though the way Aristotle conducted science is not ‘hundred percent’ (Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s diverging 
understanding of the hermeneutics) congruent with the notion of science elaborated by Edgar Morin it does not make 
it incompatible, because the way I use Aristotle’s work includes merely showing the start of the genesis of the notion 
of efficiency and by referring to the source of the concept I am allowing and showing other meanings of definitions as 
well as novel elaborations to emerge. I am demonstrating how the meaning Aristotle attached to efficiency is built in 
to the notion of what we perceive efficiency to be today. I am not per se trying to introduce a new concept or an 
understanding we should rather now delve ourselves into. As a second note, Heidegger whose student Gadamer was 
based his understanding of hermeneutics on Aristotle (see e.g. Scott-Villiers, 2014). 
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According to the OED (efficiency, n.) the original meaning of the term can be traced to Latin 
efficientia, which means “being an operative agent or efficient cause”, known as the philosophical 
usage of the word. In other words, it refers to efficacy, to the cause “that which gives efficacy to the 
means and makes it effectual” (OED: efficiency, n.). This particular usage of the term originates 
from the Aristotelian understanding of causes and was dominant well into the 20th century (Rutgers 
and van der Meer, 2010: 761). Aristotle‟s concept of efficiency can be traced to his philosophy of 
science known as Artistotle‟s natural philosophy (Istvan, 2012; see also Cohen, 2015 on Aristotle‟s 
metaphysics). Aristotle himself did not use the term efficiency per se, rather it is derived from his 
followers who referred to efficient cause (Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 762). In the line of 
Aristotelian understanding, all scientific explanation has to respond to the “four causes”. The first 
two, the matter and the form cause, respond to from “what an entity is made up from”; the latter 
two, the efficient and the final cause, respond to initiating and bringing effects and accounting for 
the reason what is being intended to gain and what they (processes and entities) are for. (Istvan, 
2012.) The last two originate the reason for change or for standing still, the reason for motion, 
where the efficient cause is always linked to, not subordinate to, the final cause; it refers to the 
production, causation, and creation where efficiency is always linked to, and what it is for, i.e. the 
end; but obtaining the final cause through the efficient cause may or may not be the result (Rutgers 
and van der Meer, 2010: 762; see also Istvan, 2012). In other words, in this line of 
conceptualization efficiency cannot be regarded as a value itself, it can not stand alone, but is 
always related to the final cause.
149
  
 
Until the 19th century efficiency was completely immersed in an Aristotelian causal explanation; it 
was not until the work of Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1817/2005: 8, 11, 15, 25, cf. Rutgers and van 
der Meer, 2010: 763–764), the founder of utilitarianism, who used it in a different sense to describe 
the efficiency of the oath, where efficiency refers to the security we achieve by one‟s obligation to 
the oath; in other words, oath was a mechanisms to ensure us against deception and incorrectness, 
which Bentham saw as being inefficient way of securing it. But the reason behind the use of the 
oath Bentham still retained on the ruling few, hence, he was using a mix of the two notions of 
efficiency, but still referring to it as a “contribution to purposes”, in other words, to its substantive 
meaning and “not as an economic relation between resources and results”. (Rutgers and van der 
Meer, 2010: 763–764, 775.) One of the first indications of the modern usage of the term can be 
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 Another way to see the effect, on what has changed, is in the way we position ourselves towards knowledge. Our 
current understanding of causality, which originates from the influences by the discoveries of natural sciences. makes 
us ask the question how when producing knowledge, where for Aristotle it was a question of what. (Niiniluoto, 1984: 
43–44.) 
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found in the political science and the work of John Stuart Mill‟s (2010: 114–116) On Liberty; Mill‟s 
was concerned with an eventually process where bureaucracy might become so efficient that it 
potentially deprives us from our freedom (see also Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 764). 
 
The forerunners of the substantive meaning of the term efficiency in the modern conversation 
concerning administration are Henry Taylor and the Northcote and Trevelyan report (Rutgers and 
van der Meer, 2010: 764). In his book, The Statesman, Taylor (1836) refers to efficiency as the 
absence of a body of able persons who could take care of the task of government in an adequate 
way, due to the limited number of efficient statesman. In other words, Taylor‟s efficiency refers “to 
the capabilities of those employed” (Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 765.) For instance, we can 
see our contemporary understanding emerge when we examine Taylor‟s (1836: 178) conception 
what is the proper “remuneration” for public servants: it is oftentimes to be stated that in order to 
get efficient service, then, good pay has to be offered. As Rutgers and van der Meer (2010: 765) 
note, one is tempted to read it as an input-output relation, but Taylor‟s definition of efficiency does 
not contain any ratio, it refers to doing the job in time and doing it well. In other words, both 
Bentham and Taylor still referred to efficiency in an Aristotelian substantive meaning (Rutgers and 
van der Meer, 2010: 765). Rutgers and van der Meer (2010: 765–766) trace the first changes, from 
an administrative perspective, to The Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service of 
1854, known as the Northcote–Trevelyan Report, which widened the substantive meaning by 
addressing efficiency to be applied to persons or a body of persons compared to the more common 
processes or organizations, “being efficient concerns character, ability, and experience”. 
 
According to the OED (efficiency, n.) first reference to efficiency as a ratio comes from 
engineering; the efficiency of engines by W.J.M. Rankine who stated: “the efficiency of an engine 
is the proportion which the energy permanently transformed to a useful form”. In here its reference 
to a measurement is evident. Whereas it was not until the start 20th century that the first economic 
use appeared (OED: Efficiency, n.); Rutgers and van der Meer (2010: 767–768) illustrate that it was 
not until the post second world war before the technical or economic meaning of efficiency became 
core vocabulary. The use of the term efficiency accumulated drastically in the early 20th century 
administrative discourse through Taylorism (scientific management), which in turn entered modern 
public administration trough the Research Bureau Movement, which promoted “the core values of 
efficiency and economy (Marx, 1959: 24, cf. Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 768). And even 
though Taylorism is seen as the source of what became New Public Management (NPM) Rutgers 
and van der Meer (2010: 768–769) note that Taylor‟s work on efficiency had a dual notion; and 
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even though it included the term efficiency in a narrow sense of technical-economic efficiency of 
higher output per person, much of it remained in the substantive meaning. Taylor did not regard 
efficiency in itself as a good or a bad thing (Schachter, 1989: 64). In the testimony Taylor gave to 
the Congress (1912) he said: "Scientific management is not any efficiency device, not a device of 
any kind for securing efficiency; nor is it any bunch or group of efficiency devices” (cf. Schachter, 
1989: 64). In other words, the purpose of his work was to unite the interests of employees and 
employers (Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 768). Even Taylor‟s pupil, Morris Cooke, regarded 
efficiency as a way of achieving an amplified response to the public needs (Schachter, 1989: 75–
76); the substantive meaning of the word still remained prevalent (see also Rutgers and van der 
Meer, 2010: 768). 
 
Where then did the deviations start to appear transforming efficiency to what we perceive efficiency 
to be today? Rutgers and van der Meer (2010: 770) trace this subordination of efficiency, in the 
administration related conversation, to a twofold conversation occurring after the Second World 
War. Firstly, in Dwight Waldo‟s The Administrative State (1948), Waldo contemplates how we 
should position ourselves towards efficiency as an administration value. Rutgers and van der Meer 
(2010: 770–771) point out that even though Waldo regarded that efficiency was merely a 
prescription for a relationship among other values, a notion that cannot be a value in itself, nor can 
it be used if the purpose is not clear; in other words, efficient cause always appears with the final 
cause (Aristotle), but furthermore Waldo used efficiency as a subordinate to final cause, which was 
not the case for Aristotle. Secondly, Rutgers and van der Maar (2010: 770–771) trace the change to 
the work of Herbert Simon‟s (1945) and his critic towards the pre Second World War period. In 
Simon‟s work on Administrative Behavior (2013), Simon debates the concept of efficiency as a 
value (255–256), a term (256–258), and as an economic analogue (258–259); by stating that even if 
the “criterion of efficiency” is not always prevalent in “administrators‟ decisions” it would be “if 
they were rational” (Simon, 2013: 258). Henceforth, comparisons with Vakkuri‟s (my own 
translation 2009: 5) remarks are noteworthy “modern society leans on the ideal of efficiency, in 
which these choices are justified by rationality”. And even though Simon (2013: 256–258) notes the 
problematic relationship between efficiency and effectiveness, yet, he still reduces them both, and 
the meaning of efficiency, all under the same rubric of efficiency; this is done by noting that there is 
no better concept available for him to use. He regards it neutral by its nature towards the desired 
end, based on his rationality stating that there is no perfect concept of efficiency – “measure of 
absolute efficiencies” – it is merely “relative efficiencies” towards problems where the “measure of 
efficiency” is “merely a comparison” between “the efficiencies of two alternative positions”. 
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(Simon, 2013: 256–258.) Furthermore, Simon (2013: 256–257) associates the reason why 
efficiency includes a more technical meaning merely to the scientific management. In other words, 
even though he recognizes the historical problem, nonetheless, he does not consider its relevance 
(compare to positivism). This particular conceptualization “fits his aim to rationally calculate the 
desired technical efficiency” (Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 771). In comparison, Ville Yliaska 
(2014) shows how, in Finland, different notions such as efficiency were used to legitimize the need 
for change. Because their status became prevalently seen as good, then, the conversation was not if 
we should use efficiency (in its technical meaning); it merely came attached to the means of how.
150
 
As Morin (2008: 34) notes, efficiency‟s objectivity is in its statutorily presumed intrinsic goodness 
where we just need to find the right formulation. 
 
Looking at the OED entry of efficiency, by this time we have a circle where all entries post the 
Second World War relate to the economic or engineering understanding of efficiency. And as 
Rutgers and van der Meer (2010: 771) note, the “technical efficiency has become the prevalent 
interpretation”; efficiency is seen as a subordinate to other values (Waldo) and can be regarded only 
as a “meta-principle”. Henceforth, this begs the question that some might pose: is this precisely the 
problem being now remediated by referring to e.g. effectiveness? But the problem – and the answer 
– is reflected back to the reasoning that I have already tried to establish when talking about 
complexity – it is also apparent here. When we derive, or usher, or make – whatever term one wants 
to use – new conceptualizations that still hold the previous meaning that was attached to efficiency, 
without knowing (or knowing) what it exactly was („conceptual roots‟), then one is in varied ways 
often limited to interpret the new meaning also in the same kind of limited way. In other words, 
effectiveness is also part of this technical approach in its guest for better input-output relations but 
just through different means, rather than the force and ability founded in the substantive meaning 
(Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010: 773). For instance, in administrative science we talk about an 
effectiveness problem when a company produces products efficiently but there is no demand on the 
market for the product, on the other hand, public services might be produced efficiently but they do 
not match the needs or expectations of the public (Vakkuri, 2009: 12). Hence, in the company 
example the question is being efficient in the right place; in public service the question is being able 
to find the most pressing needs and expectations where to be efficient once again. What they 
question is not efficiency in its economic and technical sense; it is the way this is achieved in a best 
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 As a future note, in Finland the technical rationalization used to restructure administration and organization in the 
1950s was connected with societal engineering planning in the 1960s that set out to shape understandings (Yliaska, 
2014: 48–50). 
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possible manner. Secondly, a new term does not mean that the original meaning would vanish 
somewhere. This problem becomes distinguishable when it is used as a way of interpreting 
historical understanding, which holds intrinsically an ample risk of misinterpretations (Schachter, 
2007). As Rutgers and van der Meer (2010: 772) illustrate, in many interpretations today the richer, 
substantive meaning of efficiency presents itself in the way we use the word in public 
administration and common use. And further as illustrated elsewhere, “a technical preoccupation in 
administrative thought” is a result of misinterpretations, for instance, by translating “Fayol‟s “good” 
and “bad” (bon et mal) as efficient and inefficient” or “Weber´s performance (“Leistung”) as 
efficiency” (Schreurs, 2000: 71–72, cf. Rutgers and van der Meer: 772). The purpose is not to ask 
the question whether the substantive meaning of efficiency is better than the technical meaning of 
efficiency. The question is rather a further conception of the problems concerned with the notion 
that we assign with the term efficiency.  
 
Even though one can regard this just as e.g. a critical exclamation of the NPM, or value assessment, 
or the difficulties of measurements, defining values, or the never ending measurement culture. 
Henceforth, for the sake of this thesis, the most relevant question is not to ask whether and to what 
extent we are not already trying to correct this problem with, for example, the New Public 
Governance (NPG), Public-Private Partnership (PPP), Private Funding Initiatives (PFI), Public-
Private-People Partnership, Urban Design Management (UDM), (for these different „governance 
innovation‟ models look e.g. Anttiroiko, 2010; Anttiroiko et al., 2011), or performance management 
(e.g. van Dooren, 2015). It is rather the supplementary question that accompanies us with these 
questions and what is the problem that the scientific conversation would turn to if it were to 
consider the substantive meaning of efficiency as a second core. It is the problem of increasing 
vagueness accompanied with it (from their perspective), as it would mean further difficulties in 
explaining and defining inputs, outputs and outcomes, in a culture and science where clarity through 
distinguishability is a virtue. But perhaps the problem is rather what we perceive to be clarity, i.e. 
what was pointed out by Yliaska (2014) earlier, in other words, the question is not to deny the need 
for clarity but to ask what we are sacrificing for its sake, which becomes ever more present in those 
situations where finding it becomes more difficult to attain. Henceforth, we come back to the 
question Wiberg (2014: 28)
151
 presented to everyone in his pamphlet (or rather in EVA‟s pamphlet): 
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 Rather aggravated example of this debate is illustrated by a pamphlet (Wiberg, 2014) – Julkea sektori – näin 
byrokratia vaalii omia etujaan – which addresses characterizations of the build in inefficiencies in the Finnish public 
sector. As Wiberg (2014: 25–27) notes, as one of the measurements of the value of critical conversation is its ability to 
bring forward new concepts and conceptualizations while also bringing clarity to conceptual confusion and showing 
the reasoning behind questionable conceptualizations. Yet when he depicts the conceptualization of efficiency he 
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why should we be produce welfare services in an inefficient way when we can produce them in an 
efficient way?
152
 Because concepts are not neutral, they are not discursive, they do not link 
propositions together; if we see them this way it produces an illusion that some concepts are more 
scientific than others, they do not present us with a single truth or the truth (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994: 23). In an Aristotelian sense, the efficient cause is always intrinsically linked to the final 
cause, hence, public administration efficiency always needs to linked to the public. This 
understanding is pivotal for as long as we are dealing with systems – it gets accentuated once we 
regard systems in relation to their borders – then we are concentrating on defining the borders and 
the exchange between these different borders. This is especially manifested if one reads the criteria 
according to what different efficiency theories try to define the intersections where one can receive 
their perceived „truth‟. 
 
The point of this chapter was not to show that we should now go back to the Aristotelian meaning 
or how this is more apt somehow, or holds something „more‟ pure, et cetera; it was to show how the 
meaning what we perceive to be efficiency has developed through time. After all, one has to keep in 
mind what Deleuze and Guattari (1994), and in his own unique way Nietzsche (1990), stated how 
we should address concepts. Concepts lose their relevance in a strict sense the moment they are 
published; every minute that goes forward from then on means that something has changed. 
Furthermore, this is already assuming that it was accurate in the first place for it what it was trying 
to depict. Hermeneutics allows one to inspect and see this transformation. As stated by Edgar 
Morin, complexity is not a word solution but a word problem in itself (see Alhadeff-Jones, 2008). 
Henceforth, when we depict these concepts we have to realize their position. Concepts are not 
discursive in themselves (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) and by perceiving them as something touching 
upon some essence, a truth behind all, then, we are merely looping the problematic understanding of 
replacing one truth with another and getting disappointed by the reality over and over again, 
because just as we thought of catching it, it escaped our intentions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 15–
34). If we understand the way of doing science, getting to know the truth, the same way as ever 
before, we can never get outside of this circle. And it is necessary to understand that what we are 
here offering is not another truth but a note that there are some limits to our current way of 
producing knowledge. In other words, certain things keep remaining outside of this circle of the 
current way of understanding. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
reduces its value to technical efficiency (Wiberg, 2014: 28–29). But yet when addresses what would efficiency bring to 
public administration, then, he muddles the engineering efficiency as an outcome of Aristotelian efficiency. 
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 Or as Bill Clinton put it even more ‘aptly’ concerning even the bigger picture in his campaign (Clinton’s Presidency 
campaign 1992): (It’s) the economy, stupid! (Kelly, 1992). 
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3.2. Efficiency inside of complexity  
 
Explanations exist; they have existed for all time; there is always a well-known solution 
to every human problem neat, plausible, and wrong (Mencken, 1921: 158). 
 
Even though literatures as well as researchers‟ interests concerning complexity have exponentially 
risen during the last two decades, complexity in itself is not a new phenomenon per se. It has always 
been present, hiding in the shadows, biting for its time to come. „Natural‟ reason for its emergency 
can partially be placed in gradual complexifying (see e.g. Chia, 2011; Allen et. al., 2011) that most 
of the time, paradoxically in certain sense, seems to be increasing with new bits of information, 
decisions, interactions, et cetera. But the reason why it has eluded us until now and still does so in 
many ways is due to the reasons that are still presented in our current way of thought. Ways that 
have been a subject, for instance, in Finland of numerous dissertations (e.g. Yliaska, 2014; Kallio, 
2015). In other words, creating efficiency based habits of thought, in science and decision making, 
we have deprived ourselves of complexity (even when efficiency achieved is merely a sensation 
that does not transform in a same way to an outcome e.g. Yliaska, 2014). Positivist and objectivist 
ethos reduces complexity everywhere merely as something to be solved – it attaches it on a situation 
where it is a never ending wait for once we find the right theory, concept, or truth. It cannot have a 
dialogue with what we perceive to be generalized complexity. I would even be inclined to argue 
that in many situations complexity could be regarded merely as inefficiency, and I do not mean just 
in mathematical based complexity thinking. This current line of though is a place where accepting 
„different kind/ line‟ of complexity would mean subverting our “efficiency-based habits of thought” 
(Chia, 2011: 183). Hence, the way to perceive complexity is something that arises “non-deliberately 
as a „negative capability‟” (Keats, 1817 cf. Chia, 2011: 183). But seeing it unnatural (as it seems to 
be seen in consultancy
153154
) or something which needs to be imposed some boundaries (restricted 
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 For instance, Ron Ashkenas (2014), who is a known complexity consultant, provides us with a list how to reduce 
complexity in organization in his Forbes blog (http://goo.gl/mPsBqC). If we take his seven step list, look at list and then 
see what is it about complexity that we need to simplify, we then get a list of its (alleged) problems: it makes us pay 
attention to low value activities, brings ubiquitousness into situations, induces constant tinkering, makes decision 
making process longer (the signal timespan from place A to place B is longer), reduces manager’s control; it is seen as 
unnatural and is caused not by human practices but illogical human practices. Hence, there are certain things that 
truly shine here. Another different kind of example is the new Global Simplicity Index (http://simplicityindex.com/), 
which gives an estimation how much top 200 Fortune companies lose each year, which was little over one billion 
(Am.) in 2010, because of complexity in their markets and organization (Chynoweth, 2011). 
154
 One should not see that I have prejudices against consulting. Consulting is perhaps better stated to be a certain 
kind of niche of management. Of course the impact of consultancy into management can be discussed and seen to 
have had some certain long term effects (see e.g. Stacey, 2010). 
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complexity) just reaffirms our scars with any bit of what they call relativism (as it is the only option 
outside) and moreover what reality poses towards us. Here “the reality of our lived experience is 
denied conceptual legitimacy” (Chia, 2011: 184), in which social phenomena need to be rendered 
“more comprehensive and hence amenable to productive action” (Chia, 2011: 185).  The current 
way of action leads to “mutilating simplifications” of what we perceive in scientific terms (Morin, 
2007, 2008; Chia, 2011: 188–189; see and compare also Foucault‟s truth and the apparatus of 
power). 
  
In reality, let it be decision making or researchers, many times the more complex (for Mikulecky it 
means in a complicated sense in this situation) the situation is, then, the more likely they are to 
revert back to this “Cartesian reductionism” (Mikulecky, 2011), but in this current set of operation 
culture can you blame them? After all, the more there are uncertainties and controversies present 
when an official makes a decision or someone leaves a funding application, then, is he not more 
likely to revert back to the allure where something certain rests? Something he knows to be 
perceived as a valid reason; that which he can use to justify it. On the other hand, when we are 
demanding for efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. Rehn, 2016) are researchers not likely to adhere to 
(see phrasing) something that is measurable and perceived to be efficient and hence with certainty 
useful.
155
 The need to argue through efficiency is discernible e.g. in Finnish literature; its earliest 
forms are illustrated already by Merikoski (1944) who saw, in the start, administrative science as a 
pivotal task of balancing and keeping the relationship between legal protection challenges 
(oikeusturvavaatimuksen) and the efficiency of governance (hallinnon tehokkuusvaatimus) 
(Merikoski, 1944: 180 cf. Vartola, 2011: 34). Henceforth, is this task of creating something that is 
perceived as inefficient in the current context even useful? After all, positivist related 
comprehension cannot accept (in the same „category‟ of what is truth) even the tiniest bit of what 
they regard as relativism that would give its „truths‟ the same heighted/shared place on the podium. 
How we produce knowledge and how this production of scientific knowledge is linked to the way 
e.g. we evaluate the process of this production has a lot of unforeseeable implication (Morin, 2007; 
2008) 
 
If we elaborate this problem in relation to a problem of context for a variety (I am referring to 
mental association); why is realizing different contexts for complexity important? For instance, this 
line of thinking easily leads into one of those treacherous roads; whenever potentially the horizon 
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 A phenomenon that is recognized in various places in organization and management literature, for example, 
efficiency implementations into universities (e.g. Kallio, 2015) and change in companies (e.g. Brunsson, 2009). 
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attached to complexity meets any problem we are discussing, then, it is in emergent ways attached 
or perceived in relation to e.g. inefficiency; where it is seen as something that needs to be optimized 
towards efficiency, instead of being e.g. a natural or an intrinsic outcome of certain situations, or 
perhaps even a desired one. By not realizing this context we are doomed to reduce these situations, 
connected to complexity, as something unnatural and illogical (e.g. Ahskenas) or waiting for the 
right truth or the right concept to emerge (complicacy – positivism156).  
 
4. Interpretative framework of general complexity 
 
In the sections, included in the fourth part of the thesis, I will outline the interpretative framework 
of general complexity based on the theoretical points illustrated in the previous sections. I will start 
this outline (in 4.) by explaining key concepts for philosophical hermeneutics and comparing them 
to the key principles in Morin‟s general complexity. Philosophical hermeneutics will explain and 
relate on understandings ontological side, on the other hand, Morin‟s contemplation was mainly 
concerning epistemology. Due their high interrelatedness, which was shown earlier in the context of 
complexity, in their discussion separation has not been artificially imposed. 
 
Hermeneutic circle can be understood in two different ways. As an ontological or methodological 
task; the latter (methodological)
157
 is based on the work of Schleiermacher and the former on 
Gadamer (Schwandt, 2007: 133). The main difference can be drawn to few differing conclusions. In 
Gadamer‟s version of the hermeneutic circle the interpreter can never get outside of the circle, in 
other words, in order to achieve “the true meaning of the text”.158 For Gadamer the circle of 
interpretation is not a methodological principle but a fundamental quality of “all knowledge and 
understanding” (Schwandt, 2007: 134). In philosophical hermeneutics, as well as in critical 
hermeneutics, there is no distinction maintained between interpretation and understanding (Prasad, 
2002: 16). In practice this means that there is no truth achievable outside of the „text‟159 – there is 
no perfect harmony somewhere – our language constructs what we call truth, but this does not mean 
                                                          
156
 Here our inability to understand complexity leads into an account where we commonly seem to deal with it in the 
context of (reduce it to) complicacy. Rather than just seeing this merely as some kind of inaptitude to see different 
kinds of complexities, which it also is, we furthermore need to understand what drives us towards this bare 
understanding. What I am inclined to state is that much of our problems with complexity are now not merely 
concerned with our ability to grasp it or solve it due to the multifacetedness build into it but different pre build in 
conceptualizations. 
157
 Compare further to Dilthey and objectivism (see 1.1 and 1.4.). 
158
 The task of hermeneutics is not a problem of method at all but a question how to understand; how this 
understanding happens (Scott-Villiers, 2014: 404). 
159
 Text signified in this hermeneutic context means all modes of understanding (see 1.3.). 
59 
 
that the „logical‟ conclusion following it is therefore merely relativism or, on the other hand, 
leading into a conclusion were saying or doing anything becomes an impossibility; understanding 
should be understood to be the nature of it as a process in an event.
160
 As Schwandt (2007: 227) 
formulates it, understanding is rather a process or an event in which we participate in, where 
language is our means of doing it, not in an instrumental sense but as a meaning. Is this not the 
logical
161
 conclusion one would reach when he is thinking about this? For instance, consider 
different ministries or universities; no one would claim them to be exactly the same, no matter even 
if the two universities were established the same day, had exactly the same amount of resources, 
students, subjects of the studies, teaching schedules were identical, et cetera – best they could hope 
for was maintaining an appearance of sameness for some time.
162
 Yet it is the way they are treated 
in many situations, where their history is not seen as that relevant – rather it is inclined to be seen as 
a necessary amount of fluctuation or variations that nonetheless, at least to an extent, needs to be 
contained.
163164165
 
 
What hermeneutic circle looks like as a method can be seen in the figure one. Like complexity it 
accentuates a realization where understanding (interpretation) is an interplay between the whole and 
the parts – in order to understand meaning of the parts we need to understand the whole and vice 
versa. For those promoting the methodological side of hermeneutics it only means a process that is 
temporal, where its completion means achieving the harmony; escaping the circle and achieving the 
„true‟ meaning of the „text‟ (Schwandt, 2007: 133–134).  
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 Compare, for instance, to Habermas’ conception of truth (see e.g. Bohman & Rehg, 2014: 3.3.). 
161
 Note that hermeneutics specifically is not merely a logical process (see e.g. Prasad, 2002: 18), but I use the word to 
mean some sort of sensible conclusion as others have as well (see e.g. Prasad, 2002). 
162
 ‘Historical’ problems included in this understanding are discussed/ adjusted, for instance, through the inclusion of 
organization culture and organization culture related theories (see e.g. Hofsted, 1991; Schein, 2010); furthermore, for 
many complexity related theories understanding local conditions is vital, as well as accentuating the need to include 
local understanding in a new way while implementing e.g. change (see e.g. Stacey, 2010). 
163
 In the most drastic contemplations, it can be seen as their own fault for developing in a ’wrong way’ (what is the 
right way?) even though they have had exactly the same directives, which has led them into to a situation where they 
need to be guided into a right direction (see e.g. Stacey, 2010, critical perspectives on managers’ ability to guide the 
system towards the wanted place, as well as downplaying the impacts of local circumstances).  
164
 For instance, as a comparison – not saying or claiming this to be positive or negative – in Finland, the tendency is 
currently in streamlining government structures (not referring to monetary streamlining); this can be seen in The 
Ministry of Finance’s objectives in their administrative structures explanations for the future (not available in English). 
Administrative structures are decreased (from three stair model to two stair model), joint strategies and objective 
agreements are formed, and their aims are clarified to concentrate solely on steering and instead leaving the 
execution to their ‘sector and local agencies’ (compare further e.g. The Ministry of Finance: administrative structures; 
VIRSU and KEHU -reports). 
165
 Furthermore, it correlates to the seemingly never-ending question of how to regard locality (compare e.g. Stacey’s 
2010 conclusions). 
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Figure 1. The hermeneutic circle as a method of interpretation (Schwandt, 2007: 133)  
 
 
As you can remember, Morin (2008) divided his understanding on complexity into three different 
principles: dialogic, organizational recursion, and the holographic principle (see in 2.2.1. 
explanations). Comparing this understanding to the methodological hermeneutics, then, we can 
notice that the methodological understanding elicits certain sides of these principles, for instance, 
the dialogic principle – where duality of two often antagonistic principles is kept as a constant 
interplay and a dialogue. In addition, it brings understanding evident in the organizational recursion 
where the product and the producer are in a way contributing to the self-constitutive, self-
organizing, and self-producing cycle. It also contains some elements of the holographic principle, 
where the part is in the whole and the whole is in the part. But for Morin (2008: 38–57) these 
principles do not guide us to the harmony, it would not let us to escape the temporal, even if it 
produces knowledge about the temporal circumstances; it leads into a gradual betterment of 
understanding knowledge
166
 that is furthermore based on the reasoning how we perceive knowledge 
production possible due to our traditional setting.  
 
The ontological understanding of the hermeneutic circle illustrates this understanding depicted in 
the previous paragraph. As the task of interpretation does not originate from something objective, 
hence, it is always someway based on a previous interpretation; being a fundamental feature of all 
knowledge and understanding. It means that we cannot achieve the previously mentioned Cartesian 
plane, as there are no independent e.g. „super‟ meanings167 waiting to be discovered – we cannot 
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 Although it can be the outcome as well, it is not meant in quantifiable way. As Morin (2008:51–52) explains, he 
cannot give this new paradigm of complexity out of his pocket, as it does not have this kind of one universal rule that 
should be followed – it comes as a product of an entire cultural history and civilizational development – the way we 
perceive knowledge to be produced; new visions, concepts, discoveries and reflections that will make it possible. 
167
 Referring to e.g. in social settings. 
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escape the circle when interpreting nor can we transcend the background (beliefs, practices, 
historical traditions, et cetera) (Schwandt, 2007: 134; see also Prasad, 2002: 17–18.) In other words, 
language is seen as the meta-institution in which all social institutions are reliant on (Prasad, 2002: 
22; see also earlier remarks on Gadamer and language in 3. end of first paragraph). As figure two 
illustrates, according to this understanding we are historical beings (ontological character). The 
preceding operation of tradition “(a) as a fore-structure of understanding both conditions and 
suggests the foreconceptions („prior knowledge,‟ if you will) (b) that the inquirer brings to interpret 
the object (a text or another human being). The feedback from the reading of the text (or from 
another human being's response in a conversation) motivates a new projection of meaning 
(interpretation). The relations (b) and (c) represent the hermeneutic circle. The relationship signified 
by (d) indicates that in the process of interpreting, the inquirer's relation to a particular tradition can 
change; foreconceptions (prior understandings) can be challenged and modified, and so on.” 
(Schwandt, 2007: 134.) I will further explain and elaborate on these different elements and 
understandings next. 
 
 
Figure 2. What is included in the hermeneutic circle in philosophical hermeneutics (original outline 
of the circle from Gallagher, 1992: 106 adapted version cf. Schwandt, 2007: 134).  
 
 
In this understanding historical tradition plays a crucial role as it starts an answer for Gadamer‟s 
three questions of understanding: “How is „understanding‟ possible? What kinds of knowledge can 
understanding produce? What is the status of this knowledge?” (Blaikie, 2004c: 456.)168 In a vague 
sense, the role of history can be seen functioning as a context for the text; yet this would ignore 
differences in the historical contexts or cultural milieus – the prior understanding that the interpreter 
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 Hermeneutic inquiry requires that the organizational researcher develops a thorough familiarity with the historical 
aspects of the phenomenon of interest (Prasad, 2002: 24). 
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will bear in his/ her expectations and a priori understanding of the historico-cultural tradition in the 
approach (the whole) towards the text (the part) being interpreted (Prasad, 2002: 19). Gadamer calls 
this preunderstanding of the whole as a “prejudice” (Gadamer, 2006: 271; see also Prasad, 2002: 
18). Prejudices are divided into legitimate/ productive prejudices and to those that “hinder and lead 
to misunderstandings” (Gadamer, 2006: 278, 295, 298; see also Prasad, 2002: 18–19).169 As Prasad 
(2002: 19) notes, the natural follow up question becomes, how can we distinguish between these 
different prejudices – the question translates into a significance of temporal distance, where the 
interpreter is separated from the text. It comes back to the meta-point of views of different problems, 
society, et cetera, as discussed earlier (Morin, 2008: 50–52), that we can use to „distance‟ ourselves. 
This temporal distance cannot be exceeded like “a gulf to be bridged”, as proposed by the 
methodological side (Gadamer: 2006: 297–298; compare CAS in 2.2.1.).170 The way we can 
achieve this distancing is with a „text‟ that challenges our historical meanings; it is what brings a 
“provocation” to the mix and enables us to see our prejudices – the prejudices we know as our 
„truths‟ (Gadamer: 2006: 298). It does not mean that we can always challenge every prejudice that 
the interpreter has,
171
 rather it offers a possibility in the way it can be done; in other words, the point 
is not getting beyond them, as pointed out in the distancing example. 
 
As was exemplified, since the interpreter cannot escape the circle, then, it is a constant interplay; 
the understanding advocated by Gadamer (2006: 286–291) is dialogical in nature, but not a one 
between the subject and the object (i.e. gradual enrichment of one‟s mind); it is a dialogical 
interplay between the text‟s tradition. This conversation is what produces, in other words, where 
text‟s meaning emerges from; it is an interplay between the text and the interpreter where both ask 
questions from each other, aiming to ask the questions in which those texts constitute an answer to 
(Prasad, 2002: 19; see figure 2.). Hence through this provocation and interplay we can see beyond 
those unproductive prejudices that otherwise can lead us questioning the text already in the start. 
What we can achieve by this „process‟ is a “fusion of horizon” – it requires a “historically effected 
consciousness” (effect of others) that recognizes the traces it has (Gadamer, 2006: 336–341). One 
needs recognition of one‟s own horizon, understanding interpretation as a dialogue, and openness 
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 Prejudices should not be understood in a same straight correlative way as, for example, racism; furthermore, 
compare e.g. Foucault’s genealogy of racism to Gadamer’s prejudices. 
170
 Distance should not be read as to remove, or to get ‘outside’, et cetera. For instance, as was in the ‘objective’ 
understanding of historicism; as in putting ourselves in their shoes. Compare to CAS in 2.2.1. 
171
 Hence, we can never fully put ourselves in someone else’s time and account for every meaningful fact for that 
particular interpretation. For Gadamer when we are looking at a text, we are not seeking for a truth but participating 
in its tradition (Prasad, 2002: 19).  
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for tradition (Prasad, 2002: 20).
172
 As for Morin (2008: 51–52) complexity was about distinction, 
conjunction and implication; for Gadamer it is firstly realizing these effects of others, their 
distinctions that come, as a horizon, into a conjunction with our own horizon, which starts the 
conversation. These horizons form a state where the past or the present are never fixed, but form a 
constant space of conversation that is never ready nor is it closed by some boundaries. (see e.g. 
How, 2011: 49–51.) This follows the inevitable part played by the application173 (implication for 
Morin), which is the difference (i.e. not representing either of them) between the two sides of 
radical contextualism or trying to get over it, which the latter is what Gadamer calls as a positivist 
illusion (How, 2011: 55–57).174 The last part – Morin‟s implication and Gadamer‟s application – 
play a crucial role when examining our understanding originating from positivism. In other words, 
our way of applying hinders other than positivist way of understanding application; as its 
appearance needs to portray what we perceive to be „truth‟ (science, paradigm, practice, usefulness, 
et cetera).  
 
What was pointed out does not translate into something where we can perceive the history (part of 
tradition) as a cannon into our understanding.
175
 Where they have some kind of intrinsic betterness 
attached to them per se, leading us into merely seeing how well we can apply them, or how well 
that particular historical understanding suits our current time.
176
 Other than offering these meta-
points of views, historical understandings, or a „text‟, it moreover offers the subject matter as 
“properly portrayed” (Gadamer, 2006: 285). Even though it would be tempting to see this as the 
starting point we have so profoundly hoped for, it merely offers us the starting piece of that 
particular holograph, which does not translate into truthness in itself. There is in itself no thing 
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 In a limited way, as a mental image, these horizons can be seen as nebulas, in an old astronomical sense of a 
diffuse object, where there are no fixed boundaries, where they overlap, and eventually transformations happen. 
Limited because of great mass, bifurcation points, et cetera. Rather it is a good metaphorical illustration in one sense – 
as we are often stuck dealing with thinking in systems in complexity thinking, this illustration exemplifies the boundary 
problem inherent to it. As Morin (2008: 48) proclaims, nothing important should be defined by their boundaries but 
by their cores. 
173
 Application does not merely mean an instrument but it is its original meaning of understanding – presumptions, so 
that it can be applied in the first place; How (2011: 56–57) exemplifies this by saying that before we can understand 
jokes, most of the time we need to know the cultural setting. In addition, what is seen as applicable is one of the 
conceptions that positivism has influenced. It can be contemplated, for instance, by asking a question that cannot be 
answered due to its contextual variation: to a what extend does information offered to a decision maker have to be 
certain to be somehow useful i.e. applicable?  
174
 Concerning the positivist illusion, we cannot understand beforehand the meaning that some text might have for us, 
nor can we know the potential future implication of our texts, henceforth, meaning that it is an illusion that we can 
somehow know the fixed meanings it might pose (compare e.g. Habermas’s understanding of truth). 
175
 See the debate about classics as a cannon problem, e.g. How, 2011 (how classics influence us and how we position 
ourselves towards them; what kind of implications these have/ it has). 
176
 Compare, for example, 1.3., how Deleuze regards concepts, and Ricoeur’s intentional fallacy problem. 
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called uncertain, complexity, or efficiency (the super-meaning) in the world. Properly only means 
properly portrayed in relations to the concept we are contemplating per se. 
 
But what was before articulated does not mean as seeing it nothing else than gradual 
reinterpretations that we cannot escape; where the historian‟s dead hand or the texts cannon cannot 
be avoided (see e.g. How, 2011; see also 1.3.). As interpreter’s task is creative we cannot regard it 
merely as an adaptation, we cannot know all the „elements‟ in one‟s tradition, what he/ she knows 
and the way he/ she connects the dots in between (prejudices). Hence, it creates an unforeseeable 
mixture that is connected to other, and others, unforeseeable mixtures; making accounting for 
uncertainty of the forthcoming difficult – to say the least. Moreover, the interpretation as well 
leaves the interpreter as soon as it is said (as theory potentially escapes the purposes of its inventor 
from the moment it is invented). This constant escape of meaning makes it impossible to, or for, a 
method per se (at least in a strict sense), as it correlates to the fact that there are no fixed 
meanings.
177
 We cannot trace meaning to some ultimate starts, betternesses, et cetera; it is a 
constant emergent conversation, hence, its potential meanings are unforeseeable (see e.g. Prasad, 
2002: 21). This denial of fixed meanings makes it practically impossible for any kind of objectivists 
centered approaches to accept.  
 
What would this interpretative framework signify for a decision maker? What the interpreter is 
doing while interpreting is entering into a conversation referred to as a dialogue between the „text‟ 
and the interpreter. For Gadamer (2006: 363) “the meaning of a sentence is relative to the question 
to which it replies”. Henceforth, the goal of an interpretation is to find those questions the „text‟ 
constitute an answer to (Prasad, 2002: 19). In other words, the goal is to see interpreter‟s prejudices 
in order for us to surpass them temporally (remember what was earlier said about distance); and 
achieve a new, better understanding. This does not mean that the current understanding has to be a 
wrong, twisted, or somehow an „evil one‟; as disappointing as that was and what I will say is, it is a 
need for constant pondering that is always partial and malleable. As Gadamer (2006: 363–364) 
notes, all this comes back to the logic of question and answer; where these questions can be and are 
derived from; if one does not recognize something as part of it, then, its contemplations or critique 
are mere shadow boxing.
178
 It quickly succumbs to the old question whether we are doing science, 
craft, or art; and in what settings is which of these really e.g. the useful one. Yet this setting I 
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 Compare e.g. how certain ways of thinking reaffirms western ways of understanding (see e.g. Saad’s critique 
towards Foucault’s). 
178
 What is useful or brings betterness in their particular setting. 
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portrayed already bypasses the incorrect presumption, why does it have to be one of these; even 
more pressingly in the current understanding, why is it foremost one of them that others are often 
times supplement? In other words, now that we have every nook and cranny covered, then, those 
that cannot be first and foremost understood with what we perceive as most useful, let it be science 
„or whatever‟, can then be hopefully further understood, if there is a need, with „others‟ (compare 
e.g. CAS). 
 
Toward what this understanding correlates to is a way for our „future creation‟. You have to 
compare Morin‟s (2007; 2008) conception of system and understanding of borders that limit the 
way we can create understanding, in other words, not through borders but by the core. What kind of 
way Gadamer‟s hermeneutic understanding guides us, if we think about in some form of simpler 
analogical terms, is a position of an ever eager student who is intrigued. Rather than forcing his/ her 
own understanding/ horizon everywhere, he/ she constantly keeps pondering why (extending own 
horizon as a dialog) towards this understanding of other (conversation with the tradition). As 
standing points (prejudice) for everyone differ, it is a task that is never completed; e.g. what 
Ministry of the Interior‟s tasks are concerning the feeling of security change, as does one‟s own 
perception of what is causing it at that time of the glance. We can try to exemplify this in relation to 
CAS. It is important to note that there are ways we can pose this contemplation that quickly 
„mistakes‟ the task; for instance, by reading this question in a form of why not. In this case it could 
refer to the use of power and control that make further possibilities ever more unforeseeable. This 
relates to the way we use control while extending our horizon, because it is exactly only asking the 
question of why not and perceiving ways we can force our horizon towards others (CAS: who gets 
to decide how we adapt). It, furthermore, transforms the task to focus on the ways we can perceive 
future (compare future in CAS). 
 
At the end, can seeing this position of the interpreter make us further understand the reason how, or 
why, it can be regarded in a way of mutilating the subject, truth, reality, et cetera [I do not refer to 
the limited understanding tried to be understood by the „effect analysis‟ (vaikuttavuusanalyysi) done 
e.g. in the ministries]? To what extend is this problem of mutilation already covered, in case of the 
subject, by referring to the local (or rather in a way reduced to
179
). As interpretation is always 
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 Why did I say that local is already a reduction? For example, often time’s larger framework decisions already have 
local components inside them, but these components favor certain kinds of locality (when it is pondered how locality 
can be taken into account), which depends on the decisions (i.e. locality, local ‘application’, by someone else’s terms). 
Hence, the usage of the word local should rather be contextual, which in fairness is what it is often tried to be 
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affected by the interpreters‟ own history (tradition) as well as the history of the object(s) that he/ 
she/ they can acquire, embrace, or include. In other words, it would be fair to say, then, that those 
making decisions are always struggling in their conversation towards the tradition posed by the 
local. No matter if it is concepts, measurements, or decisions – more „strings‟ seems to be making it 
even more apparent. This can be taken exactly as a struggle towards the outside; hopefully by this 
point these different exemplifications have made it clear and one can realize that it should be read 
as a constant struggle towards understanding. Henceforth, it offers us possibilities where we can 
look beyond what is said and what is being taken for granted while saying it.
180
 
 
4.1. Interpreting public policy  
 
In line with a more practical contemplation, this part will consider the two different approaches 
(general complexity and CAS) in a short public policy context example. It will consider suitability, 
possible impacts, and ways it would portray it. It as well aims to explicate why it is important to 
consider these philosophical background assumptions. I will go through how complexity thinking is 
evident in these examples. For this section I have chosen three future review reports and a future 
operational environment report;
181
 these reports concentrate on the pivotal questions concerning 
development, possible problems, and different solutions in the Ministry of the Interior‟s domain 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2014).
182183184
 Firstly, I will exemplify problems 
portrayed in these future reports that seem to be suitable for the problems pointed out when 
contemplating complexity.
185
 I will compare this towards what are the junctures and how these 
different understanding of CAS might seem suitable and appealing towards these problems and 
solutions. Secondly, I will contemplate on the differing understandings it creates compared to the 
interpretative framework explained earlier (4.), and what kind of different approaches they portray. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
illustrated, but the local global dichotomy rather more often produces presumptions that can only be discussed with 
the notion of bias or favoring. 
180
 Compere e.g. with the aims of problematization that where gone through in 1.3. 
181
 This fourth report is done by interviewing ministry’s high level officials and is compiled by a researcher. Hence, it 
seems to rather well indicate on the way the operational environment is seen and approached ‘inside the house’. Of 
course it is impossible to know how much of this canvas is painted by the writer (the researcher). 
182
 Future review reports are available for every ministry (starting 2006); they are published in a four year intervals. In 
addition, and as was pointed out, Ministry of the Interior has one extra report. Ministry of the Interior was selected 
based on my analysis on 2.2.1 as CAS is/ seems suitable (and in reality seems to appeal) to security centered 
organizations and scientific researchers. Furthermore, I used the sense of security as an example in the start, hence, it 
will provide a good correlation for it as well. 
183
 An analysis for these future reviews is done using theory-based content analyses. For an explanation of the theory-
based content analysis, refer to the earlier explanation that you can locate in 2.2.1. 
184
 All the citation translations in this section (4.1.) from the Ministry reports are my own translations. 
185
 These examples are only few chosen ones; my aim is not to analyze them altogether or to be somehow 
comprehensive, rather it is to shortly exemplify and contemplate these few chosen and connected problems. 
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In addition, I will contemplate some related differences concerning the other two central concepts – 
uncertainty and efficiency. 
 
If we merely start by reading chapters number one (all named operational environment) for the 
three future reports (2006, 2010b, 2014), then, as its central problems the ministry defines different 
issues that can be roughly divided into contingencies (unpredictabilities) and uncertainties. First 
ones can be looked to effect specific and usually in a rather well understood ways; they have a 
certain fairly straight like correlation to an effect (i.e. they understand well the source problem and 
its effects). These are almost always accompanied with a mellowing factor that would 
counterbalance its effects – i.e. increased „attention‟, meaning e.g. resources slash money. For 
instance, urbanization, individualism, unemployment, alcohol, ICT development, increasing public 
expectations in quality, budget deficiencies, and aging population will mean decreasing security and 
decreasing sense of security as well (e.g. compare 2006 and 2014); these create uncertainties for the 
future operational environment.
186
 On the other hand, there is a wide array of larger scale factors 
(local, national, EU, or global level); in these the higher the level is – i.e. where the problem is 
situated or stemming from – then the more their effects are arduous to know (especially since we 
can affect them in a very limited way). For instance, cyber security, EU- and Russia-cooperation, 
international criminality, immigration and security environment. terrorism, and globalization in 
general (e.g. 2010b, 2014); – these create contingencies for the operational environment (nonlinear, 
emergent behavior).
187
 Their meaning is that they most often force us to be reactive, when on those 
uncertainty problems we can compensate and effect, what is seen in an efficient way, beforehand 
(see 2006; 2010b, 2014). What makes working with these uncertainties and contingencies 
problematic is, as it is pointed out in the reports, the unpredictable mix between them that creates 
further uncertainties and contingencies – “the totality is complex” (2010a: 3) and the more complex 
it gets, then, the further we find ourselves in a situation where we are more contained to predicting 
or trying to sniff out the potential future problems. These are the situations we try to avoid getting 
into (i.e. we try to find ways to affect). Adaption seems to offer us means we can use to get away 
from this vicious cycle. In addition, in small portions of the report there are explanations for few 
                                                          
186
 Of course these can, and do, potentially create unpredictable outcomes, but usually they are referred to in a way 
that there is already considerable amount of research that tells us beforehand their correlation in a rather linear way 
(if/ when – then); for instance, when the general population gets older, then, the general sense of security decreases; 
when urbanization increases, then, the general sense of security decreases; when ICT dependency increases, then, the 
general potential variety of problems increases; and so on. (see 2006; 2010b; 2014.) 
187
 Mostly they are referred to in a way, which means that they are in many courses out of our hands, and whether/ 
how much they are increasing or decreasing is many times almost impossible to know (other than trying to ‘sniff out’ 
the upcoming trend).  
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potential different ways that the ministry can interact and henceforth effect outside. For instance, 
ICT, trust, new interaction channels, national, EU and global level cooperation (2006, 2010b, 2014) 
– these create possibilities.188 
 
In this paragraph I will stop for a while and contemplate adaption; a central concept for any CAS 
related understanding. In other words, how does adaption offer us means to get away from this 
vicious cycle that was mentioned in the last paragraph. Instead of being the poor farmer who has to 
cultivate the land once again after the flood has destroyed the plantation, adaptation is the 
„comprehension‟ that the farmer achieves when he/ she reaches an understand where they build 
dams to control the flow of the water. In other words, adaptation is the answer to the problem – any 
problem – that gets us beyond of being forced to live with the problem or sniff out the problem (i.e. 
merely trying to save what crop we can after the flood already starts). Yet understanding adaptation 
in this simple linear way is only the first part of the „solution‟ that adaptation offers for us – suitable 
for problems of the first kind mentioned in the last paragraph. The „true‟ offering of the adaption 
comes from the second part. When we are solving problems of the second kind or the complex 
ones, then, adaption becomes a tool of domination (see e.g. 2010a; 2.2.; 2.2.1.; 2.3.; Finnish 
Government, 2012). It offers us an understanding where adaptation is a game of who gets to decide 
on what grounds adaptation occurs – who has to play the part that has to be „sniffing out‟ 
something. Adaptation
189
 becomes the central focus of energy in internal action (see Finnish 
Government, 2012), external action (e.g. 2010a), in its purpose (Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland & 
Miller, 1991), and in its meaning (Luhmann, 1990). By ignoring the potential positive sides of these 
understandings that I am about to list, it becomes a compulsion of context; perhaps even a 
transformation of context towards some form of a rationalist cause and an object. The reason for 
saying this is that adaptation becomes an all-encompassing solution, while remaining unclear (it is 
like a chameleon towards anything) practically in everything else, other than those central 
understandings. It is nothing else than ceaseless endeavor for a new set of definition(s), which 
becomes the central part of its fascination; finding the attractor, the interface, the meaning, et cetera 
– it provides the answer, the end-goal, the need for it, that we have inherited from scientism. For 
this reason in its most plain and distinct comprehensibility remains, and it creates more of its own 
incomprehensibility. In the next paragraph I will get back to the future operational environment 
reports. 
 
                                                          
188
 These are given only a small attention compared to the other two. 
189
 Do not confuse adaptation to adaptability. 
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The future operational environment report (2010a: 3–4) differs in style from the other three; it tries 
to be treating more of the ways through which the ministry can respond to these problems in 
practice and in the end through e.g. strategy;
190
 i.e. why, how, and where it can and should be 
proactive in an uncertainly and unpredictably changing environment. What is the best way to adapt 
in a way that will enable us to see those mechanisms that instigate it, so that we can influence those 
„forces‟;191 There are diverging ways how to respond to it and on what the response is based on. In 
governance most amplified way of getting practical knowledge “is exactly through targeted and 
simplified working environment analyses” (2010a: 8). As the environment is risk based, then, the 
reactions to the working environment are often reactive due to different constraints; yet the aim is to 
be proactive and to find places where we can be; as problems that are examined are those that are 
perceived as “certain or anticipated” ones (2010a: 9–10) – as we can predict almost all of its fuel 
and coarse ways it progresses (2010a: 7).  
 
If one compares this listing, then, by first comparison, compared to what CAS claims to be offering 
(see 2.2.1.) to those problems that the Ministry of the Interior is facing, it comes across as a gold 
mine – correlations are evident e.g. in phrasing. Secondly, especially the understanding accentuated 
in the operational environment report (2010a) has a lot of the characteristics related to CASs 
embedded into it.
192
 Hence, we can, at least in some way, affirm that CAS is evident or has 
influenced public policy (in Finland), even though this is not per se related to the aim of this thesis. 
One cannot deny that these contemplations do seem to suit „ably‟ security related fields of study or 
that there are these kinds of problems that security related fields actually do face – nor is it the 
point. What we need to examine is the possible blind spots that are carried in this understanding. 
After all, there is only some minor critique on CAS per se. Hence, what is the effect of this kind of 
uncertainty or complexity reduction? What is the problematic outcome of addressing the nature of 
the problem this way? How do we position towards other organizations, information, et cetera; and 
how does it make us position ourselves towards them? How would/ does CAS manage in some 
other fields of study such as health care (e.g. wicked problems)? 
*** 
 
                                                          
190
 Compare e.g. Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Heinlahti (2006: 172–174) what positivism means in a strategy setting. 
191
 Ability to be reactive is needed, but the aim has to always be proactive (2010a: 7). 
192
 It, furthermore, has a little twist of Kauffman’s natural science understanding that was not gone through in this 
thesis. Also see the starting footnote of this chapter where this report is explained considering the impact of the 
understanding that the research writer might have. 
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So what are the possibilities we can perceive, „achieved‟ as an understanding, through this 
interpretative framework? It forces us to look at it in another way, other than as a competition, 
domination, or war (in metaphorical sense); it forces us to recognize, and hence might prevent, 
some of the different mutilations and mutations that security institutions produce (compare e.g. 
Foucault‟s apparatus of power). Moreover, it makes us confront different prejudices instead of 
trying to just overcome them. As insightful as the scientific revolution was by bringing new ways of 
understanding towards e.g. problems, none would claim those approaches to be the only valid ones. 
In addition, as the time has passed more problems have sprung up; and moreover, we have noticed 
more issues that were precisely caused because of the mutilations created by these approaches. 
Notably this is the case in „social science related fields of problems‟.193 Currently many ways of 
complexity science are done using a limited (scientific approach stemming from the one side in 
relation to the philosophy of science) and even one sided (approach) knowledge. After all, in case of 
complexity thinking it is only one possibility of the ways we can approach it, in relation to what we 
perceive as complexity to be and mean. Henceforth the question is: what are the possible problems 
we cannot yet see, which will in the future manifest because of this? The more pertinent this 
becomes the more one can put it in a context, in other words, comparing it to the problems 
/mutilations that rose, for instance, in relation to efficiency and complexity that we have examined 
in this this thesis. In addition, we need to ask how these possible problems / mutilations, in 
understandings, are related to these concepts we can then examine. It can help us contemplate it in 
relation to uncertainty, i.e. what unknowability poses for us (reduction, overcoming, struggle, et 
cetera); in relation to efficiency, i.e. the ways of perceiving it when we are solving what it poses. In 
the end, one might quickly try to diminish this talk by referring back to the old problem: is it a 
science, a craft, or an art. But then one would once again ignore what was just said before and 
furthermore ignore some of the elements proven and understood to be pivotal. In a case related to 
security, we can examine sense of security as intractable problem towards CAS. In other words, 
such as in the previous understandings (e.g. CAS, see 2.2.1.), I am not claiming that we cannot 
somehow still embrace its essentiality (sense of security), but in reality can we regard it as anything 
else than as an accumulation stemming from elsewhere – not by itself as a concept? Even though 
these are precisely the kinds of problems that complexity has promised to be bringing some form of 
'relief‟, then, what is this relief exactly in the end in case of CAS? 
 
                                                          
193
 Hence, what are the limitations still? After all, we are talking about problems that are related to a social ‘setting’ 
being solved through an understanding based on objectivist and positivist ethos – ignoring some sides of these 
problems and only referring to the same clashes of explanations and understandings in the philosophy of science. 
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4.2. Meaning we attach to general complexity by addressing it as a character of efficiency 
 
It‟s economy stupid! (Bill Clinton‟s Presidency campaign in 1992) 
 
When we are talking about an interpretation, then, it necessarily starts with some form of 
contemplation; a contemplation that leads into a journey that is one of many. Henceforth, it is time 
to start asking: what is the journey we have traveled as the end is starting to loom ahead.  
 
As we have established, both general complexity that Edgar Morin (e.g. 2007, 2008) proposes as 
well as Gadamer‟s (2006) philosophical hermeneutics (Prasad, 2002) do not translate into anything 
that can regarded as a method per se – and they cannot be made as one in a common sense of the 
meaning (see Prasad, 2002
194
). For this reason, if we examine it in relation to a method, they are not 
meant to be understood as a list that has e.g. different subjugations, which one can check and use to 
progress step by step to achieve an outcome. The optional way it shows, rather, is the ways of 
understanding different limits (or rather outcomes of these limits) of the way one applies it – the 
impacts it has outwards. In other words, if we consider it‟s ontological and epistemological relation, 
it offers ways for one to examine limitations inherent in the way he/ she thinks and, on the other 
hand, the way he/ she constructs reality (interprets) – as one can remember, in this line of thinking 
there is no difference between understanding and interpreting.
195
 
 
By referring to this line of thinking, we are approaching the question, the question that is posed by 
the researcher in a different way. Instead of trying to impose regularities on what we are researching 
(or perhaps they would use an argument to find those that naturally occur in them), we can perceive 
e.g. the way our actions constructions effects on others understandings, and not how it affects others 
only. Instead what this alternative interpretative framework offers us, first of all, are ways to 
examine the consequences of the different stances we take in the philosophy of science. For 
example, how we perceive efficiency intrinsically or how we position ourselves towards uncertainty 
or what are our premises when we approach complexity. In the case of efficiency this influences 
e.g. what we perceive to be an answer and how it can be solved (see 3., 3.1., 3.2.); in the case of 
uncertainty this stance has affected e.g. the way we (can) approach it and in our measures that we 
take towards it (see 2.2., 2.3.); in the case of complexity this has created e.g. ignorance and 
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 “The major concern of [philosophical] hermeneutics is not with creating prescriptive theories for regulating 
interpretive practice” (Prasad, 2002: 15). 
195
 It offers a clear difference towards those posing objectivity, but once again reading this through its mere 
dichotomy, i.e. relativism, forgets the point illustrated earlier and is debating in either-or fashion.  
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reduction (see 2., 2.1., 2.2., 2.4.). Instead of just referring to the source of their truth as the only 
truth, it shows its limitations. It does not deny it nor does it deny its accomplishments per se.  
 
As we saw when examining complexity, uncertainty, and efficiency their stances (problems I listed 
above and in the chapters) in the philosophy of science were stemming from the positivist and 
objectivist perspectives. This „bond‟ has affected on the way the conceptualization of these concepts 
was and is developed. For instance, the reduction of uncertainty stemming from engineering; 
efficiency foremost as a ratio stemming from engineering and economics; and in relation to 
complexity where the way of understanding is seen to be achieved by overcoming it, which stems 
from e.g. mathematics and natural sciences. One of the secondary understandings provided by these 
illustrations are the new terms, concepts, or ideas – as sublime as they might seem – often times 
inherit these intrinsic conceptualizations. Awareness of these background attachment is important, 
not just for realizing potential „downfalls‟ or limitations, but possibility wise in our quest for more 
novel research. For example, new angles, focal point, or meta-point of views create potentialities 
that can emerge as e.g. seeing new contexts, junctures, or possibilities. In the way of seeing it as a 
full circle it can then, furthermore, show us potential problems we might have not otherwise known 
or realized. The basic aim of this understanding is not to overthrow something but enable an 
interpretative understanding to emerge. From an end product perspective, it makes us perceive how 
understanding is possible in these contexts, what kind of knowledge we can produce of them, and 
what kind of conclusions we could draw from it. 
 
If we now start contemplating what this interpretative framework means towards those 
understandings we depicted in the last chapter (4.). Considering from an administrative perspective, 
historical tradition forces us into a realization where there are no things that we can consider to be 
value free, to have a built in betterness in them (if we just find a way to apply it into our contexts 
and the right context), or that there are only certain „logical‟ conclusions one can draw from 
different concepts, theories, et cetera; being the case also towards the understanding one can draw 
connected to the three concepts discussed in this thesis. After all, different traditions, that everyone 
brings with them to the interpretation, means, then, that we cannot know their meaning for the 
interpreter beforehand (see 4. e.g. fixed meanings). We cannot assume some universal value or 
meaning. It forces us to consider the different ways we relate towards the problem contemplated in 
the last paragraph (in relation to the three concepts). It forces us to ask why we think something has 
certain kind of value, instead of pondering e.g. ways how to get to the direction already set out to us 
(compare e.g. Rehn, 2016). 
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Once again considering from an administrative perspective, prejudices enables us to consider these 
perspectives. Furthermore, if we accept the idea of prejudices that is connected to our historical 
tradition, then, it forces us to actively find and look at them in each situation, so that we can realize 
possible mutilations, and on the other hand, make more novel research, decision, et cetera. As 
shown, a way of doing this is through temporal distance that enables us to produce meta-point of 
views – as we saw in this case it was done by showing the concept as properly portrayed196or 
provocation that enabled e.g. contemplation what is taken for granted. In this thesis this was shown 
by examining the three concepts that enabled us to perceive different meanings attached to these 
meta-points of views in case of each concept. Hence, it made it possible for us to see different 
possibilities, potentials – to question our prejudice, and furthermore to show different places where 
these prejudices can be „hindering‟ or „productive‟ depending on the case.   
 
As was pointed out, since the interpretation is a never ending task and the interpreter’s task is a 
creative one, hence, this understanding enables future potentialities. As I was trying to point out, 
any form of relativism should not be perceived as some naïve proclamation or a task where we just 
abandon it all and replace it with new. But as the task is creative, it means that by combining these 
different elements in the last two paragraphs,
197
 then, means that we are being able to get past this 
loop we are situated in; a loop where the prophecy won‟t just appear. Hence, it produces hope for 
us. We can gradually start finding different complementary ways to perceive these different e.g. 
concepts, problems related to them, their solutions, or different stances taken in the philosophy of 
science – instead of seeing it as a bridging contest. These are the kinds of understandings that we 
can achieve when interpreting by using the hermeneutic circle as hermeneutic circle in itself does 
not determine someone‟s context beforehand or take it as something readily decided by its 
becoming. 
 
Even though the aim, in what the aims are for a dialogue, it is not to create or reach some solutions, 
at least not as a premise, but to foremost „bring into the table‟ different point of views,198 I will try 
                                                          
196
 As said, properly portrayed does not mean something that is better, or that holds truthness, et cetera (see earlier 
explanation in 4.). 
197
 As a short summary it appears as this: by combining these different elements in the last two paragraphs, then, we 
can notice our historical traditions, overcome (remember the meaning of this) our prejudices by the temporal distance 
provided through meta-point of views that can be seen e.g. in properly portrayed concepts that shows alternative 
meanings. 
198
 As it is not for certain kinds of narratives either; from the ‘process’ everyone can reach different conclusions 
instead of guiding someone else’s thought; nonetheless, many of the conclusion are there to be found in the analyses 
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to some way reach conclusions in the last two paragraphs of this section due to the nature of 
expectations presented towards theses. I have insisted that the way we perceive understanding to be 
created effects the way we can even see problems; affecting the way we can resolve them. By 
examining this in relation to the CAS, it correlates towards what adaptation each time brings into 
the table, then, affects what the solution is.
199
 Theoretical perspectives help us to understand where 
this understanding originates from and what it is based upon; on the other hand, different points of 
views help us realize the affects that they have had or would have. In other words, these correlate 
e.g. how we can realize the way understanding is transforming into our present situation. 
Furthermore, they make it possible for us to transform and realize the weaknesses of each theory. 
For instance, in the case of CAS, it helps us to realize that even though the theory builds the 
realization as a meta-character (see 2.2.1), when we talk about something that is „social in some 
parts of its nature‟, not to apply it as a character of the problem by its nature. This in the 
hermeneutic circle transforms into a better realization how CAS solves problems. 
 
All and all, what then does it mean to interpret general complexity when we address it as a character 
of efficiency? It means that I can only enunciate my own contemplation. For me it means 
possibilities; it means in case of efficiency, where now efficiency is seen as the overall cornerstone 
of betterment (see earlier; Finnish Government, 2015), that there can be different kinds of things we 
can start to perceive to be efficient; something that shows efficiency in a completely different and a 
new way. For instance, not just with a new indicator or something that is tied to an indicator. It 
correlates towards complexity where dealing with complexity is not a task of overcoming it but 
perhaps even a direction (or if wants to try be nifty and say in this case an indicator) that shows we 
are going in a right way. In case of uncertainty, it might lead into seeing it in additional new and 
positive ways.
200
 Of course the aim cannot be an end result where everything becomes an 
impossibility, but it is only so if the truth of what is possible has to be in a same way possible as it 
is for those who assert it in the context of their own understanding of truth. Then naturally it is a 
goal we can never achieve – it is the same in reality. This kind of conversation makes us blind to 
reality – and also in reality from my personal experience. It is also, furthermore, connected to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
parts. Of course, it is not to say that one even has to reach something. Hence, it would be preferable to read the 
whole thesis, think about one’s own reached understanding and then reflect on them. As mine are not necessarily 
‘better’, but they nonetheless easily might guide the ones the reader reaches. In addition, the level of concreteness 
that I offer with my conclusions might not be the most preferred one for some, depending on one’s own 
understanding what is beneficial. 
199
 The way that it is done, is more related to the other two parts of the acronym CAS that I did not go through in this 
thesis. 
200
 As there are already some, for instance, see creativity and innovation related fields of study. 
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diverging everyday situations where we need to get past these sometimes rather naïve assumptions 
of if-then, either-or dichotomies that researchers are especially keen on pointing out e.g. towards the 
public and policy related conversation; yet still sometimes they forgot to check their own standing 
points or contemplate on their meanings; and base the rationalization on these old dichotomically 
validated stances – especially when solving problems, then, reverting back to these dichotomically 
established truths, which furthermore keeps reaffirming them. 
 
5. Time to start jogging – not towards the unknown but towards an understanding 
 
As we have reached the end of this thesis, it is time to ask what is the outcome of this interpretative 
understanding we have tried to build towards and, moreover, to achieve? Did we reach the same 
kinds of conclusions as those who we tried to problematize? In other words, where the changing 
world poses us new problems that seem to be saturated with complexity; complexity which our 
current ways of understanding cannot efficiently handle in order to overcome the uncertainty posed 
by it? Did we at least find ways to use e.g. nonlinearity, emergence, or recursion to build up steps 
out of uncertainty or towards efficiency – amidst complexity? To put it frankly, we were unable to – 
we were unable to reach any optimum or even the outlines of an attractor; we were unable to build 
bridges towards scientism. We were then feeble in the face of despair to find new ways to account 
e.g. for effectiveness. This is an undeniable truth, yet it is only so from one perspective. It is a 
perspective of those who perceive what real sciences and answers are. But as was stated, who wants 
to ponder these peripheral trivialities when it is time for action, after all, if they cannot tell or 
produce you the truth the way it was told for them to say it, then, it is not the truth but a trivial 
ponder.
201
 
 
This thesis has sought out to explicate and enhance our understanding in relation to the philosophy 
of science. The concerns of this thesis have been how different approaches have affected the ways 
we see complexity to be build and, moreover, solved; in relation to it, how uncertainty and 
efficiency are to be build and, moreover, solved; and how this affects how the problem posed by 
complexity can be answered in the first place. The approach taken has been based on less known, or 
at least used, theories in the administrative science that have tried to bring out differing views. As 
the first part of the headline of this study already indicates, one of the main aims has been to 
produce a diverging interpretation, which opens up self-evidences elsewhere. This thesis showed 
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 All these points are references to some of those questions and public policy contexts pointed out in 1., 1.1., 1.2. 
and 1.3. 
76 
 
some of the taken for granted viewpoints in diverging contexts in the administrative science 
perspective. Furthermore, it tried to bring the reader to question some of the things he/ she might 
have taken for granted beforehand. Henceforth, in order to answer the question asked in the first 
paragraph of the thesis: is this complex operational environment merely a new thing, a state of 
reality we have slowly reached, or just a new way of conceptualizing the problem? The answer is 
that is none in „reality‟; yet it has elements of each. It is a new thing as it took us so long to 
acknowledge it. It is a state we have slowly reached, partly due to our actions, mutilating thought, 
and evolvement of the world. And lastly, it is a new conceptualization, but what kind of one it will 
be at the end still remains to be seen. In its essence it is none of these – there is no complexity per 
se. As it, what we use complexity to describe it, has always been there.  
 
As we are often forced to live with the concepts forged to us by those before us, the main argument 
has been to build towards an understanding where we can interpret
202
 complexity, uncertainty, and 
efficiency to be also something else – separately but also together under the same question – than 
how they are supposed to be answered at the moment. In order to accomplish this, thesis started by 
asking a research question: what is the meaning we attach to general complexity by addressing it as 
a character of efficiency; took a bearing towards it by explicating the approaches of differing 
understandings in complexity, and in relation to the other two concepts of uncertainty and 
efficiency. The other two concepts were chosen for the recognized part they play in administrative 
science; it is not to the say they were necessarily the only ones or the more crucial ones per se. In 
the first part, the thesis was gradually discerning an understanding towards the second part. Besides 
the contemplations achieved in the first part – for instance, why we perceive complexity, 
uncertainty, or efficiency to be what they are – the main contribution has been depicting an 
alternative interpretative framework for general complexity by using philosophical hermeneutics. It, 
furthermore, provided a short public policy contemplation and an interpretation to the research 
question. The purpose of this second part was to provide more than just problematization; it 
provided some preliminary ways to address problems posed by complexity, other than something 
adhered to positivist or objectivist ethos. Naturally this alternative framework has wider 
potentialities than just complexity thinking. As an example, it provides possible contemplations 
towards power, value, and reflection
203
 in their related fields on inquiry. In addition, and as 
mentioned in the complexity related sections, ethical consideration in relation to knowledge, 
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 In this case, answer the problem posed by it. 
203
 On reflection, what constant reflection would really correlate in see e.g. Pillow (2003). 
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knowledge production, and method are as well possible angles of consideration (see also Alhadeff-
Jones, 2008, 2010). 
 
According to the contemplation adhered by the understanding, in which I have contributed towards, 
the clarifications, provocations, and „proper‟ portrayals of the concepts have contributed to an 
interpretation that can e.g. incorporate more of the meanings that are now left at the periphery, seen 
as „anomalies‟, those we are not being able to discuss, or those we even regard as futile. It can as 
well be seen to produce a less mutilating way of producing solutions towards problems. In terms of 
more practical juncture, I demonstrated complex adaptive systems (CAS) approach‟s effects on the 
way we perceive reasoning, truth, reality, et cetera. By bringing these understandings towards the 
front I wanted to elucidate CAS related effects in an example that is used in a policy context, which 
I further compared to a Ministry setting. What I further wanted to exemplify was the „gains‟ 
achievable when we alter our understanding of construction (such as concept), time (e.g. in relation 
to validity), and their purpose (e.g. in relation to truth), but furthermore, how this is dependent on 
certain ways of acceptances‟; acceptances also in paradigmatic settings. 
 
If we would accept the principles elucidated in this thesis, then, what interpreting general 
complexity, by addressing it as a character of efficiency, would mean – if we try to illustrate some 
of the characteristics in analogical terms – it can be apprehended as touch typing. First of all, most 
people do not think that it is as relevant, at least in terms of the gains you get, towards the time it 
takes for you to learn it – you need to put into it a considerable effort in order to master it. At first it 
seems arduous and is actually less efficient (in both senses of meaning in the concept of efficiency). 
Only once you have mastered it, then, you can see how much more efficiently you can really type. 
Furthermore, it is efficiency in the other meaning of the concept as well, as you can also fully 
concentrate on thinking what you are writing and not also having to think and watch how you are 
typing, hence, you can also get things forward as a „premise‟. Secondly, the most important part of 
this analogue is that once you have learned it, then, you also start forgetting it as soon as you stop 
using it – it needs constant practice. In the case of touch typing many people seem to start forgetting 
it eventually, for instance, because of laziness, inconveniences, appetite for comfort, et cetera – 
paradoxically even though one already knows and has recognized it is more efficient (in both 
meanings of the concept). It is the same, for instance, in problems tried to be solved through 
policies; where something „understood‟ before is taken as the truth, where context is misunderstood 
or overlooked, where something is taken for granted, analyses is ignored as it was done already, et 
cetera. If there are social „elements‟ included in the action, then as depressing it sounds, there are no 
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other than unique missions, unique circumstances, unique outcomes, et cetera. Something we have 
learned we cannot take for granted. This does not correlate to a meaning that anything learned 
before cannot or even might not be ever valid; it only comes back to the different premises how we 
approach the question in the first place and each time again and again. There is no static 
understanding, which means there should be ways to understand constant interpretation; constant 
interpretation that is not constraint to an already set outcome. 
 
How come I am claiming that this is not something that will lead into nothing but relativism? In 
correlation to practice, when I was listening to the ESDC HLC upper level officials, one of the main 
critiques stemming from their point of view was e.g. using any kind of readymade solutions, not 
updating the analysis, not being able to be realistic, or ignoring any of the previous in any level of 
the activities – accentuated by the top level decision making. Problems were almost solely to do 
with reality and our inability to account for it. Partly this is due to the constraints (power, laziness, 
inconveniences) we have set but mostly it has everything to do with the fact that we take reality for 
granted in different ways. I wish I could tell that what I depict is like one‟s own reality: only 
certain, simple, and effective; or a one that will only be like that, if one gives it a little bit of 
consideration or perhaps now and then little bit more consideration. In the end, hopefully this thesis 
will enable us to ask not just right kind of question but also just new ones. The purpose is not to 
dismiss certain kinds of knowledge, but to endorse that knowledge produced different ways suits 
different purposes, but not as a „premise‟. Having one kind of knowledge does not encase it 
impermeable from other kinds of knowledge. Moreover, even if this is not anymore the most 
pertinent case in practice, then, it reverts to a realization that this opening does not happen on 
something else‟s terms.204 Hopefully we can get outside of the mere quasi-monopoly competition or 
on whose terms this competition is weighted on – it is no competition between the two extremes as 
most often no public argument is either. Hence, often times a good start towards solving a problem 
is that we need to get past these dichotomies, categorization, bridgings, et cetera and start 
interpreting reality, not the reality.  
                                                          
204
 Compare e.g. multidisciplinary (Nicolescu, 2002) and multidisciplinary in a university setting (e.g. Lehtinen, 2015). 
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